
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL EL SEGUNDO CA NORTH AMERICAN --ETC F/G 15/5 ONBOARD TEST SÝSTEM DESIGN GUIDE.(U) AUG 81 K DERBYSHIRE. G BRAMMALL. T HAIT F33657-80-C-0138 TFD-80-206 ASO-TR-81-5023 AD-A112 301 UNCLASSIFIED ASD-TR-81-5023 NL 1 " 5



ASD-TR-81-5023



ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM DESIGN GUIDE

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL NORTH AMERICAN AIRCRAFT DIVISION LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90009

AUGUST 1981

FINAL REPORT FOR PERIOD MARCH 1980 - JULY 1981

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433



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FOR THE COMMANDER

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER ASD-TR-81-5023 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
	Final
Onboard Test System Design Guide	March 80 - July 81 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(a)	TFD-80-206 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)
K. Derbyshire	B. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(3)
G. Bramhall	F33657-80-C-0138
T. Hait Performing organization name and address	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Rockwell International	}
North American Aircraft Division Los Angeles, CA 90009	P.E. 64708F Project 2479
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS	12. REPORT DATE
Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD/AEG)	August 1981
Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 404
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
	Unclassified
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)	N/A
Approved Public Release; Distribution Unlimited	
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abetract entered in Block 20, if different fro	om Report)
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	
	•
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number	
Central-Integrated-Test Fault De	tection/Isolation
System-Integrated-Test Performan	nce Assessment
Built-In-Test Onboard 1 Testability	Test System
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)	
In response to operational requirements for increa	used aircraft availability,
higher performance, and quicker turnaround, aircre increasingly complex. The resulting complexity ha	oft system designs have become
upon maintenance equipment, maintenance personnel,	and logistics resources.
Onboard testing was developed to (1) improve maint	cainability and availability. I
(2) enhance test philosophies to keep up with incr	eases in system complexity.
and (3) reverse the trend toward increasing suppor advanced aircraft. Onboard test is also intended	to improve operational

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	readiness of the aircraft through reduced systems downtime. This onboard test design guide is intended to help minimize design problems by drawing on proven design experience and providing guidance based on lessons learned in the development of the Central Integrated Test System (CITS) for the B-1 aircraft.		
	development of the Central Integrated Test System (CITS) for the B-1 aircraft.		
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PREFACE

This report describes the results of F33657-80-C-0138 funded by the Support Equipment System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433, under Program Element 64708F, "Other Operational Equipment"; Project 2479, "Common Support Equipment Development".

This report was written between the period March 1980 and July 1981 with the primary authors being Ken Derbyshire, Grover Bramhall and Tom Hait of the North American Aircraft Division of Rockwell International.




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Section 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM

1.1.1 DEFINITION

The test system around which this design guide is structured is a special form of Built-in-Test (BIT) and conforms most closely to a combination of the established definitions for Built-in-Test Equipment (BITE) and Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) as listed in MIL-STD-1309 (Definitions of Terms for Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment). In the absence of an existing singular definition for Onboard Test System, the following definition has been developed and will apply throughout this document.

Onboard Test System - Equipment that is designed to interface with or is part of an on-line system, subsystem, or other equipment on a continuous basis for the express purpose of analyzing functional or static parameters to evaluate the degree of performance degradation and perform fault isolation of unit malfunctions. The test, logic, and control functions are essentially automatic, with a minimum of operator participation.

1.1.2 PURPOSE

The purpose of an onboard test system is to test and verify the performance of a system, subsystem, or other equipment in an operational environment. In addition, the onboard test system provides identification of a malfunctioning Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) and displays the test and fault isolation results.

1.1.3 BENEFITS

The prime benefit to be realized from the use of an onboard test system is the reduction of cost of maintenance. This reduction is brought about through several cost-related factors. The time required for maintenance can be shortened considerably by decreasing the time necessary to detect and isolate failures; the time lost by incorrect detection/isolation of failures can be reduced; the skill level requirement for maintenance technicians can be lowered without sacrificing quality or speed of detection and isolation; test equipment can be reduced in quantity and complexity; training equipment can be reduced in quantity and complexity; maintenance of test and training equipment can be reduced; and the number of maintenance and training personnel can be reduced. Attendant to the cost-reducing benefits will be an increased availability of the system under test, increased probability of mission success, and increased safety of operation.

1.2 DESIGN GUIDE

1.2.1 PURPOSE

If the purpose of the onboard test system is to be fulfilled, the design of the test system must satisfy two conditions. The first condition, of course, is that the performance requirements established by the customer are met. Secondly, the cost of development plus on-going costs of ownership must not outweigh the cost advantages realized from the planned application of the test system.

The purpose of this design guide is to provide a philosophy and approach to the overall task of developing an onboard test system which will allow an optimized design from the standpoint of the two conditions mentioned above.

1.2.2 CONTENT

The design guide includes sections on the background and history of onboard testing, the analysis of test requirements, the analysis of hardware requirements, the analysis of software requirements, signal processing, and self-test. The various sections will present a series of guidelines for developing a test system, beginning with a test approach and proceeding through a logical sequence of tasks involving selections of test parameters, test sensors, interfacing methods, and test techniques from available alternatives, taking into account at all times the determining factors of requirements such as levels of detection, degree of isolation, safety, testability, availability, and cost. Although no one set of rules, guidelines, or limitations can be made which would apply specifically in all aspects and details for all possible combinations of requirements imposed by a procurement agency or customer, the contents of this design guide cover those areas of concern which are of prime importance and significance in a disciplined, phased development of a functionally sound and cost-effective onboard test system.

1.2.3 FORMAT

The sequence of presentation of the material in this document is such that the user is spared the need for interrupting the normal flow of his efforts with topics which are not immediately pertinent. References to material in outside sources or in other sections of the design guide are kept to a minimum within procedural text and, if necessary, material will be repeated from one section to another to avoid disrupting an orderly approach to a particular task. Within each section of the design guide subject matter is arranged according to priorities of importance and with respect to the interdependencies of the steps or phases involved. In other words, first-things-first and nice-to-know things last.

It is realized that future development and results of other programs will produce information which will prompt additions, deletions, and revisions to this design guide. These changes are not only expected, but are encouraged and every effort has been made to format this document to accommodate such changes efficiently.

1.3 SUMMARY

This design guide defines and describes an onboard test system to be designed and developed as a future system, based on past experiences with BIT, BITE, ATE, Central Integrated Test System (CITS), and other test systems. Guidelines and ground rules are presented for the development of such an onboard test system beginning from the conceptual stage and continuing through to delivery and acceptance of hardware and software.

Section 2 ONBOARD TEST PHILOSOPHY

2.1 EVOLUTION OF ONBOARD TESTING

Since the advent of aircraft electronic systems, the complexity of those systems has gradually but steadily become more complex. As a direct result, the ratio of maintenance manhours to flight hours has increased, higher skill-level maintenance men have been required, and aircraft maintenance times have increased to a point where the repair times of the aircraft were seriously impacting aircraft availability requirements.

Early testing of aircraft systems was relatively simple and could be accomplished using manual procedures utilizing discrete measurements of operational signals. As long as the systems were of low complexity the main problems encountered were personnel safety, LRU access, and connector damage due to improper handling. The quality of maintenance was directly dependent on the knowledge and skills of the technicians and, therefore, varied greatly from unit to unit as individuals developed their own troubleshooting techniques. There was no general agreement on test approach or methods and no special attempts were made to standardize them. As each new generation of aircraft developed, maintenance requirements and procedures were increased to a point that later generation aircraft were surrounded by support equipment and maintenance personnel in order to perform system fault detection, isolation, repair, and system reverification. As maintenance demands upon the maintenance personnel increased, shortcut methods were often substituted for approved maintenance procedures. The most common and most costly shortcut method employed was that of LRU failure isolation by LRU substitution. LRU substitution was based upon the maintenance man's prior experience where a similar failure was rectified by replacing a particular LRU, or because the LRU was accessible and easily replaced, or because it was assumed that through the process of elimination the failure would be found. This method of fault isolation created sparing problems, induced failures, and also increased the cost of maintenance due to the replacement of units that had not failed and

the unnecessary cycling of these units through the Intermediate and/or Depot maintenance facilities for reverification.

Over the years, several significant attempts to improve the maintenance situation have occurred. Each attempt resulted in some progress, but has never completely eliminated all the problems. These events, leading up to the present time, are discussed below.

2.1.1 TEST POINTS

In an effort to alleviate the problems associated with operational connectors and LRU substitution, special requirements were imposed on equipment manufacturers for the inclusion of test points, preselected for maximum applicability to manual troubleshooting procedures and measurements, in the design of their equipments. These test points were provided in two different ways.

2.1.1.1 Probe Access

Manual probing of voltages at points within equipment with limited or obstructed access has always presented the possibility of damage to equipment or harm to personnel. An attempt to reduce these possibilities and add to the ease of maintenance was made by providing electrical access to pertinent points within equipment circuitry at terminal posts or terminal boards which were physically arranged, located, and identified to facilitate testing and trouble-shooting through manual probing. This feature also reduced the practice of probing at operational electrical connectors.

2.1.1.2 Connectors for External Test Equipment

In a further effort to provide test point accessibility without the removal of LRU covers or cases, manufacturers were required to route test points to special test connectors on the face of the LRU. These special connectors provided a more efficient means of interfacing LRU test points with test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), which included special test harnesses or cables to provide proper interface connections.

2.1.2 BUILT-IN-TEST (BIT)

Although test points and test connectors were useful for aircraft checkout, the time required to open equipment bays, connect test equipment, and perform manual checkout again compromised aircraft availability requirements as the aircraft systems grew in complexity.

It was at this time that additional requirements were developed for circuitry, components, and devices to be included in operational equipment for the sole purpose of providing aids to testing. These aids included means for exercising or stimulating equipment or portions of equipment (self-test), means for visually observing self-test results (GO/NO-GO), or means for visually observing the value of key voltages or other measurable parameters. These provisions ranged from simple indicator lamps or meter displays to manual initiation of test sequences which stimulate subsystem equipment and verify proper response characteristics. It was only natural that these provisions were referred to as "built-in-test," and the components or devices were known as "built-in-test equipment."

2.1.3 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM

In the interest of meeting higher system availability requirements and still lowering life cycle costs associated with maintenance manhours, skill-levels, support equipment costs, and spares cost, it became apparent that the testing of systems should be accomplished during normal system operating times and that sufficient maintenance data be provided to the ground crew to allow the maintenance to be performed without the need for running ground tests to detect and isolate the system failures. This could only be done by performing the fault detection and fault isolation testing using on-aircraft test equipment. It was also apparent that to physically transfer operational support equipment test concepts onto the aircraft would require a great deal of equipment and would add significant weight to the aircraft. Obviously, the traditional methods of fault detection and fault isolation testing would have to be changed if cost effective on-aircraft testing was going to become a reality. About the same time, system designers recognized that the maintenance of systems

was less costly and easier if operational functions were designed into functionally replaceable units, i.e., single boxes, cards, or modules. The results of this functional packaging development permitted end-to-end functional testing which eliminated the need for discrete component measurements to perform fault isolation to a replaceable unit. Also, onboard test designers recognized that computer techniques could be used to identify and perform logical patterns of functional parameters to identify faults and isolate the fault to the defective LRU. The breakthrough of on-aircraft test technology was then provided by the development of digital airborne technology. This allowed the testing of aircraft systems to be performed by using end-to-end functional testing instead of by discrete measurements. Systems engineering analysis of onboard test operations identified three primary functions required for performing onboard testing. These functions are data acquisition, data processing, and data dissemination. Further analysis of available building block technology and cost trade-offs revealed that the lower cost candidate was distributed data acquisition and centralized data processing and data dissemination. In addition, by centralizing the onboard test system controls and displays, a secondary cost reduction could be achieved by making the test system control and display common for both flight and ground personnel. Subsequent experience has further revealed that the on-aircraft availability of aircraft systems functional parameters is a valuable asset to the flight operations of the aircraft.

Operational and support analysis indicated the need for providing a permanent record of all detected failures and isolated units to the ground maintenance crew and logistics support functions. The requirement for a permanent record is best satisfied by high density digital magnetic recording techniques in that the stored fault detection/isolation data is easily transferred to ground processing centers. However, significant delays can be encountered in processing the records and providing the in-flight test data and isolation results that permits ground personnel to start repair actions on the aircraft. A second problem of providing maintenance data existed concerning aircraft operations at austere bases where ground processing equipment was not available.

Therefore, a means was sought to provide the ground crew with fault isolation and fault isolation data immediately after aircraft shutdown. Trade studies of available technology indicated that a hard copy printer could satisfy this requirement. Although all test systems require some degree of operator actions, some test system concepts require considerably more operator involvement than others. This degree of operator involvement is the key factor in comparing two basic categories of onboard test systems below.

2.1.3.1 Semi-Automatic Control

The first category of onboard test system utilizes semi-automatic operator involvement. In this test system, signals may be accessed and processed automatically, and the failure display may indicate which subsystem failed, or the subsystem operational mode that has been lost, or a signal that was found to be out of tolerance. The operator must then consult a troubleshooting procedure or depend on his own ingenuity to troubleshoot a subsystem malfunction and isolate the failure to an LRU. Should a troublehsooting procedure be required, much time would be consumed in the manual interrogation of test signals or the necessity to connect and utilize TMDE. In the event that no troubleshooting procedure exists, the operator must be of sufficient skill level and possess sufficient subsystem knowledge to effectively isolate subsystem faults. This additional skill level and knowledge would, of course, result in higher maintenance cost. During the development phase of the B-1 aircraft, a study was made which concluded that a technician skill level 3 would be required to maintain the aircraft equipped with CITS, whereas the same aircraft without the CITS would have required a skill level of 5. Taking into account the estimated reduction of the number of maintenance men required, the dollar savings (corrected to 1979 dollars) was calculated to be \$12,667 per year per aircraft.

2.1.3.2 Automatic Control

The automatic control test system requires considerably less operator involvement than the semi-automatic system. Like the semi-automatic system, the test signals are accessed and processed automatically.

The major difference between the automatic system and the semi-automatic system is that the contents of the semi-automatic troubleshooting procedures and the operator's ingenuity have been incorporated into the automatic systems's computer software.

With the automatic system, the maximum skill level required for maintenance personnel is considerably lower and maintenance times are reduced to include only remove, replace, and retest times. The additional cost of the automatic test system equipment, software, and development is more than offset by lower maintenance costs and increased aircraft availability, assuming, of course, that the test system design is based on a judicious selection of tests and test hardware which involves consideration of failure rates, cost, and ease of implementation. These and other factors are discussed in greater detail in Section 3 and 4.

2.2 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS

2.2.1 ASSUMPTIONS

In order to arrive at a definite starting point in the procedure of establishing guidelines and instructions for designers, it was nessary to make certain assumptions which, if not stated would allow a great deal of the ensuing material to be misconstrued, perhaps to the extent of delaying the eventual optimization of the onboard test system design. These assumptions are given in the following paragraphs.

2.2.1.1 Acquisition Decisions

The decision to incorporate an onboard test system has been made by the

customer and requirements governing application and performance have been established and delineated based on the results of studies made starting with the conceptual phase in accordance with the guidelines set forth in this document.

2.2.1.2 User Level

The top level user in this design guide will be the Air Force Program Office (PO) and/or a weapons systems prime contractor.

Although this design guide is prepared for universal application, whereby designers at all levels of effort may be involved, it was decided to present the material as though the development of the onboard test system is to be the responsibility of the Air Force PO and/or a single prime contractor of a complete weapon system. The prime contractor is assumed to take on the role of an integrator, whereby systems, subsystems, and equipment are procured from subcontractors, or suppliers either totally or in part, with the design requirements delineated and imposed b, the prime contractor. The total integration of each system or subsystem, including the onboard test system, with each other into a weapons system as the function of the prime contractor does not, however, preclude the use of the design guide by designers working under different, less extensive contract arrangements.

2.2.1.3 Test System Usage

The onboard test system is for the sole purpose of testing. No portion of the test system will be involved in the normal operation of any of the systems under test.

Provisions for "fail safe" operation incorporated in aircraft systems because of safety or mission success requirements, whereby a failure of the system initiates an action which switches faulty parts or circuitry out and automatically inserts backup redundant parts or circuitry to prevent the loss of unacceptable degradation of the system function, are not considered to be a portion of the onboard test system. The distinction is made in accordance with the requirement

that the onboard test system is prohibited from the automatic initiation or control of switching of subsystems, functions, or modes (see paragraph 3.1.1.6.2).

2.2.1.4 Design Timing

Design of the test system will be concurrent with the design/selection of the systems comprising the weapons system.

The basic content of the design guide is based on the development and design of totally new systems and subsystems to be tested by an onboard test system which is also to be developed and designed as a new system. However, the adaptation of an existing system, subsystem, or equipment design to a new onboard test system design (or vice versa) can be directly addressed, by following the same guidelines, with certain ramifications to be identified in those instances where they apply.

2.2.2 DEFINITIONS

MIL-STD-1309 is used as the reference for definitions of terms used in the design guide, with certain exceptions.

2.2.2.1 Standard Definitions

The following definitions are provided for convenience in using the design guide and are listed verbatim from MIL-STD-1309.

2.2.2.1.1 Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE)

Any device which is part of an equipment or system and is used for the express purpose of testing the equipment or system. BITE is an identifiable unit of the equipment or system (see self-test).

2.2.2.1.2 Built-In-Test (BIT)

A test approach using BITE or self-test hardware or software to test all or part of the unit under test.

2.2.2.1.3 Corrective Maintenance

Actions performed to restore a failed or degraded equipment. It includes fault isolation, repair or replacement of defective units, alignment, and checkout.

2.2.2.1.4 Self-Test

A test or series of tests, performed by a device upon itself, which shows whether or not it is operating within designed limits. This includes test programs on computers and automatic test equipment which check out their performance status and readiness.

2.2.2.1.5 Line Replaceable Unit (LRU)

A unit which is designated by the plan for maintenance to be removed upon failure from a larger entity (equipment, system) in the latter's operational environment.

2.2.2.1.6 Logic Diagram

A graphic representation of steps and branches used in the development of test sequences and procedures.

2.2.2.2 Exceptions

The following definitions are exceptions to MIL-STD-1309. These exceptions arise due to: 1) Absence of definition, 2) Incomplete definition, or 3) Inaccurate definition. Definitions in these categories are given below.

2.2.2.2.1 Availability

The probability, expressed as a percentage, that a system, subsystem, or equipment will be available in an operationally acceptable condition at any time.

2.2.2.2 Degraded Performance

That condition of a system, subsystem, or equipment whereby certain critical parameters have deteriorated to values below expected operating levels but above failure limits, while retaining the intended function.

2.2.2.3 Detection Assurance

The probability, expressed as a percentage, that a failure of a system, subsystem, or equipment under test will be detected and displayed by the test system.

2.2.2.2.4 Failure

The inability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to perform its intended function in accordance with the performance requirements described in the appropriate detail performance specification.

2.2.2.5 Failure Mode

That system, subsystem, or equipment operational function lost or degraded as the result of a particular single failure.

2.2.2.2.6 Failure Mode Rate

That figure assigned to a failure mode in terms of occurrences per million hours of operation.

2.2.2.2.7 Fault Isolation

The determination that a detected failure is located in a single identifiable LRU.

2.2.2.2.8 False Indication

An indication by the test system of a failure of a system, subsystem, or equipment when, in fact, no failure exists; or the absence of an indication by the test system of a detectable failure of a system, subsystem, or equipment when the failure exists.

2.2.2.9 Isolation Certainty

The probability, expressed as a percentage, that the test system can correctly ascertain and indicate which LRU must be removed and replaced to correct a particular detected failure.

2.2.2.2.10 Maintainabilty

The probability, expressed as a percentage, that a system, subsystem, or equipment can be maintained in an operationally acceptable condition through maintenance procedures which do not exceed a given time period.

2.2.2.2.11 Onboard Test System

Equipment that is designed to interface with or is part of an on-line system, subsystem, or equipment on a continuous basis for the express purpose of analyzing functional or static parameters to evaluate the degree of performance degradation and perform fault isolation of unit malfunction. The test, logic, and control functions are essentially automatic, with a minimum of operator participation.

2.3 TEST APPROACH FACTORS

To obtain an optimum test system, a total systems engineering approach of integrating the functional system design, test system design, test analysis, reliability analysis, and maintainability analysis must be accomplished concurrently.

Many questions concerning test approach must be answered and the applicable requirements established to arrive at an effective onboard test system.

Some of the more important items that must be considered in developing the proper test approach for the test system are given in the following paragraphs.

2.3.1 TEST SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Failure detection/fault isolation (FD/FI) performance requirements for the test system are usually expressed as an assurance level (0 to 100 percent) that a fault within a subsystem will be detected and that the faulty equipment will be isolated to a single LRU. Since each functional system/LRU under test has a level that can be practically achieved, it becomes necessary that the aggregate FD/FI capability of all of the functional systems/LRU's being tested equal the overall test system FD/FI performance.

The proper establishment and allocation of the test performance requirements for the individual functional systems being tested provides the basis for a successful cost effective test system implementation. It is, therefore, imperative that good engineering judgement and proven methods be utilized in determining the extent that the test system FD/FI requirements are to be applied to each of the systems under test.

2.3.1.1 Failure Detection

Failure detection is the means of monitoring the general "well-being" of the functional system and is the starting point in the isolation of the failed equipment. This detection testing is best accomplished by utilizing an end-to-end type of testing for the functional system. This end-to-end testing monitors the input data to the operational system and then compares it with expected output data to determine overall system performance.

2.3.1.1.1 Maintenance Level

Prime consideration must be given to the maintenance concept under which the onboard test system is to be operated. The maintenance level at which the test system must detect and isolate failures in order to satisfy maintenance requirements, such as availability and maintainability, influences the test approach elements of test selection, parameter selection, and test logic.

Maintenance levels are typically categorized in the order of increasing maintenance capability as organizational, intermediate, and depot. Organizational maintenance is performed at the flight line by the operating unit, and consists of the necessary postflight testing to isolate failed equipment, replacement of failed LRU's, system reverification after maintenance action, physical inspections, servicing of consumables, handling, and preflight readiness testing. At the organizational level, the onboard test system provides system failure data and failure isolation to the LRU level which enables maintenance actions to begin without the need of hooking up support equipment, provides reverifications of systems after maintenance actions, provides preflight checkout of the aircraft, and provides manual troubleshooting capability for manual fault isolation.

In those cases where isolation ambiguity exists, or where isolation is not provided automatically by the test system, some manual troubleshooting procedure must be employed in order to complete the maintenance action. The onboard test system can provide special features which allow the monitoring and display of selected aircraft subsystem parameters on an individual basis. This feature would preclude the necessity for disconnecting equipment, removing equipment, gaining physical access, or using special test equipment in many cases when troubleshooting at the organizational level. Intermediate maintenance is performed at centrally located facilities in support of the operating units and consists of repair, modifications, and test of components requiring shop facilities not available at the organizational level. An onboard test system can contribute to this type of maintenance by providing data obtained during testing at the organizational level if the test system is

designed to provide isolation to the failure mode as well as identification of the failed LRU level. Depot maintenance is performed in industrial-type facilities, including contractor plants, and consists of overhaul and repair of components beyond the capability of the intermediate or organizational work level. Again, an onboard test system can enhance maintenance by providing failure mode data and parameters which would reduce the additional requirements necessary to provide failure isolation.

2.3.1.1.2 Detection Assurance

No practical test system implementation will be able to detect 100 percent of all possible system faults. This is not unexpected since virtually all testing approaches use probabilistic and statistical data with supporting rationale to prove that maximum detection is being accomplished within reasonable restraints. However, the detection assurance requirements will normally be expressed as a high percentage of the total system failure rate based on the data contained in the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In addition, the detection requirement may specify detection of all failures classified as impacting safety-of-flight and mission success. Consequently, it is essential that an accurate FMEA be provided since this is the prime document utilized during design and developed in the verification of the attainment of the detection assurance requirement.

2.3.1.2 Fault Isolation

Accurate fault isolation to the failed LRU is the key to an effective test system and fulfillment of the organizational level maintenance testing requirement. This fault isolation requirement can only be achieved through system failure analysis, development of optimum system tests, and proper parameter selection.

2.3.1.2.1 Isolation Certainty

The percentage of isolation certainty is defined as a result of studies performed in the conceptual phase and is formulated based on the total maintenance requirements. Fulfillment of the requirement is the key to a successful test system, since isolation to a failed, defective, or malfunctioning unit with a high degree of confidence is the ultimate function of an onboard test system.

Accomplishment of this isolation provides maintenance personnel with that information necessary to perform corrective actions within the boundaries of time imposed by maintainability requirements. Obviously, if the isolation information provided is ambiguous or incorrect, additional troubleshooting must be performed, at the expense of time allowed for maintenance.

2.3.1.3 False Indications

False indications are one of the most serious problems that undermine the effectiveness of a test system. These false indications occur for several reasons: (a) the system under test does not operate as expected; (b) the test mechanization is incorrect; (c) the software is programmed incorrectly; (d) failure limits have been set too tight for dynamic conditions; (e) failure of test system logic circuitry; or (f) test parameters affected by noise. Resolution of these false indications is very difficult and time consuming since adequate test data must be recorded and analyzed to confirm the cause. Each of these problems requires detailed investigation of the system performance and coordination with the design personnel, system supplier, and flight test personnel to effect an optimum resolution.

During the flight test period of four B-1 aircraft, 1,704 unique failures were annunciated by CITS, and of these, 919 were classified as false indications. The causes of the false indications experienced were studied and were identified according to the categories listed above. Of all the false indications studied, 47 percent were of category (c), 27 percent were category (b), 15 percent were category (a), 10 percent were category (d), with the remaining 1 percent divided between categories (e) and (f).

2.3.2 LIMITATIONS/RESTRICTIONS

The effectivness of the test system can be severely limited when the decision to include test system requirements are implemented late (after pre-liminary design review) in the system design phase. In addition, this type of implementation usually results in a higher cost and often provides an over-all design which is far from satisfactory. Even when the test system design is implemented at initial design, certain limitations/restrictions must be considered as follows:

2.3.2.1 Functional

The choices of tests may be limited by functional restrictions such as the stipulation that only noninterference testing may be used in-flight, whereby the use of stimuli to initiate a test or to switch operational circuitry is prohibited. Although not usually specifically imposed as restrictions in the requirements, dynamic parameter characteristics such as rate of change, frequency, magnitude, or power may limit the selection of tests and thus impact test approach.

2.3.2.2 Physical

The physical aspects of the test system may require special consideration depending upon the system being tested. The special considerations may include weight allocations, volume limitations, cooling requirements, and accessibility.

2.3.2.3 Cost

Since the test system must be designed to minimize weapon system acquisition costs and overall life cycle costs, it is essential that the test approach be well established and the level of testing be clearly defined in order to meet these cost objectives. Consequently, it is imperative that trade-off studies be conducted and alternate concepts, methods, and techniques be evaluated in the process of arriving at an optimum cost effective test system design.

Also, since the recurring cost of the onboard test system is part of the flyaway cost of the aircraft, onboard test system benefits to total weapon system life cycle cost must be clearly understood by the contractor in order that effectiveness of the test system is not compromised at the expense of increased life cycle costs. Life cycle cost studies of the total weapon system must be made which include cost factors associated with the reduced spares, reduced maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMHFH), reduced skills levels, reduced support equipment, increased availability, and increased alert rate benefits provided by effective onboard testing. A recent study was made comparing the life cycle cost of a proposed off-aircraft ground test set (GTS) to the life cycle cost of CITS, as applied to the B-1 aircraft. The results are shown in Table II-1.

LIFE CYCLE COST SAVINGS WITH CITS

Table II-1

Quantity of Years Aircraft	55	111	165	330	
10	97.24 M	158.21 M	223.46 M	401.35 M	LCC Savings
20	162.55 M	293.12 M	415.12 M	749.60 M	With CITS
30	236.85 M	428.10 M	607.77 M	1097.87 M	1979 Dollars

2.4 ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND CONTROL

The overall success of any onboard test system design program is heavily influenced by the structuring of the test system design group and related working groups, and the policies and procedures governing their efforts.

Ineffective procedures and lack of control contribute materially to lost time and the acceptance of less than optimum testing by the onboard test system in many areas. Cooperation from other groups must be assured by the presence of a strong central authority with the ability to make decisions and issue directives to resolve differences of opinion quickly and definitely. Of special importance is the ability to deal directly with subcontractors and suppliers, with full authority to accept or reject data or equipment, as necessary, without fear of being overruled by a higher authority outside the test system complex without adequate coordination and discussion.


2.4.1 ORGANIZATION

The assignment of engineering, technical, and support personnel must be made purposefully to insure proper coverage of the many aspects of the overall design, development, and checkout of an onboard test system. These assignments can be more easily determined by identifying functional tasks and grouping personnel accordingly. The prime purpose is to avoid the need for broad qualifications in any one area below the category of management, even though the various functional areas may be quite diverse from one to another.

2.4.1.1 Contractor

It is recommended that the organization of the onboard test system group be made up of the functional units and subgroups and structured as shown in figure 2-1. This is a basic arrangement and is, of course, subject to some variations, depending on the size and complexity of the onboard test system and the application.

The separation of the overall design function into the subgroups of hardware design, software design, test requirements, and integration provides for



better visibility and control of these definitive areas of effort. Further subdivision is necessary to better take advantage of established skills and expertise and to allow concentration within special disciplines at the lower levels. The designers and analysts are all relieved of a great majority of the necessary and important duties of integration, whereby the more routine and less technical aspects of record keeping, internal scheduling, and tracking, documentation preparation and control, change control and general overseeing of compliance to formats, procedures, and agreements is accomplished by personnel who devote their full time to these particular tasks. It is found that the efficiency of engineers and other technical personnel increases with a decrease in the percentage of nontechnical tasks included in their overall assignments while, at the same time, such tasks can be performed much better by specialized personnel experienced or trained in such matters. The end result is a better product, produced within optimum time and cost frameworks.

2.4.1.2 Customer

It is felt that the customer should provide counterparts for contractor personnel in the areas of hardware design, test requirements, and software design in order to best follow and evaluate the progress of the program. There is no particular need for the customer to provide for personnel devoted specifically to the integration function since the success of this function will be reflected in the normal evaluation and coordination process. As in the case of the contractor, personnel should be assigned on a full time basis, not being required to share time on the onboard test system program with any other program, nor should an individual be required to perform duties or accept responsibilities outside of his regularly assigned functional area within the onboard test system group.

2.4.2 MANAGEMENT

Management of an organization involves the direction and control of personnel in their assigned tasks. This management is provided by personnel specifically designated as supervisor, manager, director, chief, or some other title, depending on the level at which the management function occurs and the definition of the title or position. Management personnel are not normally directly involved in the detailed tasks of their subordinates but are sufficiently knowledgeable to evaluate problems and proposed solutions and make related decisions, within the limits of their immediate responsibilities.

2.4.2.1 Customer

Past experience in the development of onboard test systems has shown that differences of philosophy exist within the customer's organization regarding the requirements for and the implementation of an onboard test system. Even after trade-off and life cycle cost studies were completed and the decision to install an onboard test system was made, conflicting direction from the customer was received by the contractor. Some elements of the customer's organization fully supported the implementation of the test system and expressed their support and direction when interfacing with their contractor counterparts. Other elements of the customer's organization did not fully support the test contractor counterparts. These differences in customer direction to the contractor's various design groups provided confusion and difficulty in implementing the test system. This confusion often led to a less than desirable implementation of the test system.

It is, therefore, obvious that a single management point of interface be established by the customer to provide direction and control of the requirements for the test system development and implementation.

2.4.2.2 Contractor

Similar problems occurred in the customer's organization regarding the degree of support of the test system implementation as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Because of this, a single management point must also be established by the contractor to provide direction and control of the test system development and implementation requirements in each aircraft system to be tested.

2.4.3 CONTROL

With a group such as the onboard test system design group depicted in figure 2-1, control can be established and maintained because the lines and levels of authority are clear and well defined. There are no overlapping or redundant responsibilities within the group which could lead to conflicting directions or efforts. However, such a group does and must interface with other similar groups, both within the same basic functional management structure and with other groups not operating under the same discipline. These disciplines usually include engineering, technical operations, logistics, and finance, each with their own groups and subgroups working on a particular part of the overall weapon system. The degree of impact one has on another varies, but a method of control must be established and exercised to prevent impasses, not only between contractor elements but also in dealings with associate contractors and subcontractors.

2.4.3.1 Aircraft Systems Design

The most obvious and most important interface of the test system design group is that with the group or groups designing the various aircraft systems. Since these systems are to be tested by the onboard—test system, it is only natural that their design affects the design of the test system. These design groups may be within the prime contractor's organization, may be an associate contractor group, or may be a subcontractor group.

2.4.3.1.1 Contractor In-House Interfaces

In addition to the internal organization of the onboard test system design group shown in figure 2-1, it is also necessary to establish interfaces and controls outside of the test system design group. There are seven areas that require in-house interface and control. These areas are: (1) Aircraft systems design; (2) Project management; (3) Specifications; (4) Configuration management and change administration; (5) Engineering release and scheduling; (6) Contracts and proposals; and (7) Checkout and flight test operations. These interfaces are shown in figure 2-2.

When implementing an onboard test system, the test system design group must interface with each aircraft subsystem design group to implement the test rerequirements. In-house policies and procedures must be set up to control this group-to-group interface, outlining the responsibilities of each organization. These procedures must provide that the design groups have joint responsibilities of implementing the test requirements into each aircraft system and determining that the implementation is sufficient to meet the contractual requirements of the test system. Any deviations from the stated test requirements must be approved by the test system design manager. In order to provide a uniform implementation of the test system for all aircraft systems, an onboard test system analyst should be assigned to each tested aircraft system. It would be the responsibility of these analysts to interface the work with the aircraft system design engineers in the implementation of the test system requirements.

When procurement specifications are required for aircraft systems hardware, those specifications must include an onboard test requirements section. A test verification section should also be included in the specification which, as a minimum, should require 100 percent onboard test interface verification by analysis plus a percentage of verification by actual hardware tests. This testing should be conducted using fault insertion techniques to verify predicted LRU output changes associated with selected failure modes. The test system

ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM DESIGN GROUP IN-HOUSE INTERFACES Figure 2-2 2-24 design group must be responsible for the preparation of both the test requirements and verification testing sections and the incorporation of the sections into the procurement specification through coordination with the specifications group.

Inner-group control of design changes to the test system, whether they be to hardware, software, or test requirements, is impacted by the methods and procedures established and utilized by the configuration management and change administration group. Care must be taken to conform to the broader control features employed on the weapon system program. Similarily, the overall weapon system schedule impacts internal controls relating to test system design schedules and milestones.

2.4.3.1.2 Associate Contractor Interface

An associate contractor is that contractor which does not have prime responsibility for an overall weapon system, but is under contract directly with the customer for a particular system, subsystem, or other portion of the weapon system. This type of contractual agreement dictates that the associate contractor is accountable directly to the customer, as is the prime contractor. Normally, associate contractors are responsible for the design and integration of major subsystems critical to the overall performance of the total system. In this capacity they have an obligation to be involved in major decisions concerning total system design. To perpetuate controls regarding decisions, agreements, and technical data exchanges, both the prime and associate contractors must have agreement between themselves and the customer prior to design implementation.

When interfacing with associate contractors there are several tools used to retain design configuration control: (1) On-site technical representative; (2) Coordination memorandums; (3) Memorandums of agreement; and (4) Interface control document. Depending on complexity of system design, an associate contractor's technical representative should be on-site at the prime contractor's

facility on a continuing basis. In this way, when necessary, face-to-face interface between the two contractors can be accomplished. Coordination memorandums are used when official (i.e., recorded and tracked) correspondence is desired. By utilizing recorded and tracked correspondence, design control can be obtained because all of the pertinent design disciplines would review the formal paperwork in transit to or from the contractor's facility. When critical design decisions have to be made the memorandum of agreement documentation is utilized. The documentation would describe the problem, proposed solutions, and the one solution agreed upon by the contractors. The document would be filed with the prime contractor for future reference. The final means of control is the Interface Control Document (ICD). This form of documentation is the most formal means of reporting the agreed upon design interface between associate's subsystem and the prime's total weapon system. The ICD is reviewed by the prime and associate contractors and by the customer before it can be approved for implementation. Continuing reviews of the ICD must take place to insure that the information is current, and periodic meetings must be held to accomplish necessary updates and revisions. By utilizing the discussed methods the prime and associate contractors can retain the needed subsystem/system interface design configuration control.

2.4.3.1.3 Subcontractor Interfaces

The test system design manager or his representative must have the authority to deal directly with the aircraft system subcontractors to assure the test requirements stated in the procurement specification are met.

Test design personnel must be closely involved with the subcontractor during the development and design of the various aircraft subsystems and must attend and participate in the aircraft systems design reviews with the subcontractors.

Past experience has shown that in many cases where test system design personnel participated in the design review processes with the subcontractor, the quality and performance of the test interfaces was demonstrably better than where the test design personnel were not involved. In those cases where the test design personnel were not involved, or lacked the authority to force compliance with the test requirements, the aircraft system design personnel neglected to enforce the test requirements or tended to reduce/compromise the test requirement without proper coordination with the test design group.

Subcontractor data items involving the test system implementation must be approved or rejected by the test system manager. Data items that are rejected must be coordinated by the test system group (in conjunction with the system design group) with the vendor via the assigned buyer. The buyer must negotiate a timely data resubmittal date with the subcontractor in order to support design activities and schedules.

Subcontractor design approval by the aircraft system design group should not be granted until the implementation of the test requirements is finalized and approved by the test system design manager. Past experience again has shown that when system design approval was given before test implementation was finalized, the test requirements were often compromised by the vendor claiming cost, weight, size, and schedule impacts to comply with the test requirements. As a result the test requirements were often reduced by the aircraft system design group thus compromising the test system.

2.4.3.2 Test System Design

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Control of the design of the onboard test system is almost completely an internal function of the test system design group. The organization and management structure recommended in paragraph 2.4.1.1 and shown in figure 2-1 is structured with this control in mind. The integration subgroup performs the majority of the control tasks, under two levels of management. The controls

are primarily concerned with changes in the design areas of hardware, software, and test requirements which very often impact each other. Coordination of such changes between the three subgroups is an absolute necessity, regardless of the reasons for the change or whether or not the change was the result of outside influences (e.g., aircraft system changes, weapon system configuration change, customer redirection, etc.).

2.4.3.3 Test System Checkout

Later in the development phase, when the test system has been installed in the aircraft and the weapon system has been released from the control of manufacturing, post-installation checkouts must be accomplished prior to first flight. Preparation of checkout procedures and specifications are normally the responsibility of logistics, but extensive coordination must take place to insure that the test system is properly used. Additionally, if these checkouts reveal anomalies, the test system design group must analyze the problems and make the determination, with the help of associated aircraft system design personnel, as to whether the problem is caused by the aircraft system or the test system.

It is imperative that adequate effort/priority be provided in resolving these anomalies. This effort may also require the support of the flight test checkout personnel in taking additional measurements/data and/or running extra tests to define the cause of the problem and also provide the necessary data to verify or redefine the test requirements and subsystem performance requirements. This effort is essential in order to provide as optimum a test system as possible to minimize potential false indications at first flight. Past experience has revealed that when unresolved problems/false indications are carried over for correction subsequent to first flight additional complications/delays are encountered. Typically after first flight additional analysis effort is required to provide the following:

- . Analysis of data for real-world subsystem performance for the design group.
- . Analysis of data for validation of failure indications and dispositioning.
- . Validation of test mechanization/limits for subsystem go/no-go status.

With the above extra efforts on the test system designers and general lack of adequate support from flight test personnel due to their maintenance workload in keeping the aircraft in-flight status, the test system problem resolutions are slow in coming. Furthermore, after first flight a new group of test problems may arise due to flight condition variables which may cause different test system/subsystem responses than expected, thus requiring additional investigation and resolutions.

2.5 SUMMARY

Preliminary considerations which may not be directly related to test hardware or software are covered in this section. A baseline philosophy and approach is given which governs the development and content of succeeding sections of the design guide. These include definitions, assumptions, limitations/restrictions, performance requirements, and organization, management, and control. Not only do these considerations affect the actions and efforts of an onboard test system contractor, but also influence how the customer conducts and directs the overall program.

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
Section 3 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS GUIDELINES

3.1 EVALUATION OF FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The first step toward establishing a design for an onboard test system is the determination of what the system is supposed to accomplish. Generally, the procuring agency (the customer) has outlined the performance requirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP), the System Specification, and the Development Specification in sufficient detail to understand what is wanted, but too often that is not the case. A failure on the part of the contractor to ask enough of the proper questions results then, in a lack of understanding which usually does not become apparent until later in the development phase, whereby considerable effort may have to be redirected at the expense of time and money. In the light of this distinct possibility, special attention should be given to a careful and thorough evaluation of all functional requirements, both for the onboard test system and for those systems, subsystems, or equipments which are to be tested. This evaluation should be for the express purpose of establishing agreement between the customer and the contractor on every specific detail to eliminate the chance for erroneous assumptions, ambiguities, incomplete or unclear definitions, and vague wording.

Figure 3-1 shows the events and the sequence of events starting with the conceptual phase in the development of an onboard test system and ending with the prequalification testing of the test system. Activities between beginning and end are identified by a description title, areas of responsibility for each activity is designated, and design guide paragraph numbers relating to certain activities are referenced. The designators for responsibility areas are as follows:

- 1. Air Force (Customer)
- 2) Prospective Prime Contractors
- (3) Prime Contractor (Onboard Test System Design Group)



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4) Prime Contractor (Aircraft Subsystems Design Group).

5 Subcontractor (Onboard Test System).

6. Subcontractor (Aircraft Subsystem).

(7.) Associate Contractor (Aircraft Subsystem)

3.1.1 TEST SYSTEM

Those functional test requirements pertaining to the test system include detection assurance, isolation certainty, availability, maintainability, false indications, and the various contraints which may be imposed and which impact the performance of the test system.

3.1.1.1 Detection Assurance

The first function of a test system is the detection of failures. A measure of the capability of the system to accomplish this function is the "detection assurance," defined in Section 2 as the probability that a failure of a system, subsystem, or equipment under test will be detected and displayed by the test system. This probability is normally expressed as a percentage and is computed as follows:

where:

D = percent detection assurance

 λ_i = failure rate of ith failure mode (failures per hour)

 λ_d = summation of all failure modes detected by the test system (failures per hour)

- λu = summation of all failure modes undetected by the test system (failures per hour)
 - λ = summation of all failure modes, both detected and undetected (failures per hour)
 - m = the number of failure modes detected
 - n = the total of failure modes of the item tested

This method of computation takes into account the relative failure rates of the various failure modes inherent in a system, subsystem, or equipment and gives greater credit to the detection of a failure of frequent occurrence than it does to a failure which rarely occurs. The failure rates are, of course, not definite but are predictable and as such result in a figure of merit (percent detection assurance) which is nothing more nor less than a probability. Therefore, the percent detection assurance cannot necessarily be proven to be a particular value at any given time, but must be evaluated only after a relatively long period of operation has taken place in an environment typical of that for which the test system was designed. Nevertheless, the probability figure obtained by the computation above is by far the most reliable method of providing an initial insight into what must be provided in the way of testing to achieve a design which is worthy of consideration.

The source of the failure rates necessary for the calculation of detection assurance is the FMEA, which must be available for each LRU in each system, subsystem, or equipment comprising the overall weapon system. Usually, the requirement for a given detection assurance is stated on the basis of the entire weapon system, but it can be stipulated as applying to each system, subsystem, or equipment. This point must be clearly established since the emphasis on testing one system versus another system can be a big factor in influencing the test system design to meet the detection assurance requirement. Although the selection of test points and tests will be primarily determined by failure rates, other factors enter into a final selection. These factors will be covered in more detail later, but for now the main objective is in

arriving at a combination of tests which provide an acceptable detection assurance figure. This initial figure will then provide a basis for trade-offs and alternative approaches.

3.1.1.2 Isolation Certainty

The second and probably most important function of a test system is the isolation of a detected failure to a particular LRU. A measure of the capability of the system to accomplish this function is the "isolation certainty," defined in Section 2 as the probability that a failure of the system, subsystem, or equipment which has been detected by the test system can be correctly identified and displayed as being located in a given LRU. This probability is normally expressed as a percentage and is computed as follows:

where:

I = percent isolation certainty

 $^{\lambda}$ iLRU = failure rate of ith LRU (failures per hour)

 $^{\lambda}$ ILRU = summation of failure rates for all LRU's isolated by the test system (failure per hour)

 $^{\lambda}$ ULRU = summation of failure rates for all LRU's not isolated by the test system

 $^{\lambda}$ LRU = summation of failure rates for all LRU's both isolated and not isolated by the test system (failures per hour)

m = the number of failure modes detected

p = the number of failure modes isolated

This method of computation takes into account the relative failure rates of the various failure modes inherent in the various LRU's, in much the same manner as was done in the computation of detection assurance. Thus, more overall credit is given for the isolation of an LRU with a high failure rate than is given for isolation of an LRU which rarely fails. Again, the FMEA provides the necessary figures for calculating percent isolation certainty but one important fact must be kept in mind. That fact is that only failures which have been detected can be isolated. In other words, the computation of isolation certainty cannot involve the failure modes not included as detectable as determined by the computation of the detectable assurance. It follows then that isolation certainty can only be determined after detection assurance has been calculated.

Credit for isolation of a failure of an LRU involves still another factor - that of uniqueness of isolation. Ideally, each isolation to an LRU would be unique. This is, 100 percent of the detected failure modes would be associated with one, and only one, ilentifiable LRU. More realistically, however, the situation occurs where such positive identification is not practically possible and ambiguity of isolation exists. A failure of an LRU causes a system/subsystem failure mode. This failure mode may be detected at a point other than at the actual failure point. Several different failures located in different LRU's may cause the same failure mode. By utilizing additional test signals, a failure may be located to a particular LRU (unique isolation) but in some cases it is possible or feasible only to locate a failure to within a choice of the two or more most likely LRU's (ambiguous isolation). In those cases of ambiguous isolation, credit taken for isolation can only be partial since isolation to a single identifiable LRU is not made (see definition of fault isolation, paragraph 2.2.2.2.7). The method of determining the degree of isolation creditable in the computation of percent certainty is based on failure rates. The maximum failure rate is determined for that failure in each LRU which can cause a particular system/subsystem failure mode; the failure rates are summed for the group; each failure rate divided by the group sum gives the percentage of that failure rate to be used in computing the overall system/subsystem isolation certainty.

For example, if for a given system/subsystem failure mode (failure mode X) the failure can be isolated only to a group of three LRU's with failure rates of 30 failures/million hours, 20 failures/million hours, and 10 failures/million hours respectively, the determination of partial isolation credit is made as follow:

$$^{\lambda}$$
 1 + $^{\lambda}$ 2 + $^{\lambda}$ 3 = $\frac{30 + 20 + 10}{10^{6}}$ = 60 failures/10⁶ hours

 $^{\lambda}$ 1P = $\frac{^{\lambda}}{60}$ x $^{\lambda}$ 1 = $\frac{30}{60}$ x 30 = 15 failures/10⁶ hours

 $^{\lambda}$ 2P = $\frac{^{\lambda}}{60}$ x $^{\lambda}$ 2 = $\frac{20}{60}$ x 20 = 6.67 failures/10⁶ hours

 $^{\lambda}$ 3P = $\frac{^{\lambda}}{60}$ x $^{\lambda}$ 3 = $\frac{10}{60}$ x 10 = 1.67 failures/10⁶ hours

where:

- $^{\lambda}$ 1 = Failure rate (associated with failure mode X) of first LRU in isolated group
- $^{\lambda}$ 2 = Failure rate (associated with failure mode X) of second LRU in isolated group
- $^{\lambda}$ 3 = Failure rate (associated with failure mode X) of third LRU in isolated group
- $^{\lambda}$ 1P = Creditable failure rate of first LRU in isolated group
- $^{\lambda}$ 2P = Creditable failure rate of second LRU in isolated group
- $^{\lambda}$ 3P = Creditable failure rate of third LRU in isolated group

Use of these creditable failure rates in the computation of a system/subsystem isolation certainty is as shown in the following example:

Given: A system comprised of 10 LRU's with failure rates as follows:

$$^{\lambda}$$
1, $^{\lambda}$ 4, $^{\lambda}$ 8 = 30 failures/million hours

$$^{\lambda}2$$
, $^{\lambda}5$ = 20 failures/million hours

$$^{\lambda}$$
9, $^{\lambda}$ 10 = 15 failures/million hours

$$^{\lambda}$$
3, $^{\lambda}$ 6, $^{\lambda}$ 7 = 10 failures/million hours

LRU's 1, 2, and 3 are isolated ambiguously

LRU's 4 through 10 are isolated uniquely.

$$I = \frac{\sum \lambda_{iT}}{\sum \lambda_{T}} = \frac{\sum \lambda_{i}}{\sum \lambda_{T}}$$

$$^{\lambda}$$
2p = 6.67 failures/million hours

$$^{\lambda}$$
3p = 1.67 failures/million hours

$$I = (23.34) + (130) = 153.34 = 0.807 (80.7 percent)$$

3.1.1.3 Availability

Although availability is primarily a requirement imposed on the overall weapon system, it is a definite consideration in the design of an onboard test system. Availability of a weapon system is a complex function of equipment reliability, corrective maintenance time, mission time, duty cycle, functional performance threshold, and failure detectability. For the purpose of quantification, availability can be expressed as:

$$A = P_{tm} + D M_{tr} (1 - P_{tm})$$

where:

- A = Availability (probability that the weapon system will be available in an operationally acceptable condition at any time).
- P_{tm} = Probability that the weapon system will be operational (no failures) for the duration of time t_m (a function of reliability).
- M_{tr} = Probability that a detected failure can be repaired in time t_r (maintainability).
- t_m = Mission time.
- D = Probability that a failure will be detected (detection assurance).

It is obvious that the basic factors in the determination of availability are reliability, maintainability, and detection assurance. Thus, the attainment of a particular availability is entirely dependent upon these three variables. Of the three, reliability is the least likely to be improved to any appreciable extent.

Maintainability is actually affected by two areas of influence - weapon system design and test system design. Such weapon system features as LRU accessibility, weight, volume, and complexity can be controlled positively through careful planning and coordination but generally are limited as candidates for improving availability because of operational considerations. However, test system design can substantially impact maintainability through improved fault isolation which reduces time necessary for troubleshooting, and through improved and more thorough testing which not only speeds up reverification testing, but reduces repetitive maintanence resulting from removal and replacement of LRU's erroneously identified as failed. Thus, the isolation certainty aspect of the test system weighs heavily in determining whether or not a weapon system can meet a particular availability goal. The primary aspect of the test system (detection assurance) is the third basic factor influencing availability directly. As can be seen, the greater the proportion of failures de acted immediately the sooner the problem can be

addressed and the sooner corrective maintenance can be accomplished. An example of the application of these quantified factors is given in the problem stated below:

GIVEN: A weapon system is required to meet an availability requirement of 95 percent, with an average mission time of 10 hours and a maximum turnaround time of 3 hours. The corresponding probability of operational integrity for this mission time is 80 percent and the probability of maintenance success for the turnaround time is 80 percent.

FIND: The minimum detection assurance that must be provided by an onboard test system in order to achieve the availability goal under the given conditions.

SOLUTION:

$$A = P_{tm} + D M_{tr} (1 - P_{tm})$$

$$D = \frac{A - P_{tm}}{M_{tr} (1 - P_{tm})} = \frac{0.95 - 0.80}{0.80 (1 - 0.80)} = \frac{0.15}{0.16}$$

$$D = 0.94 (94 percent)$$

It should be noted that the above calculation does not directly show the influence of the isolation certainty of the test system on the maintenance figure, although it is reflected in the 80 percent probability given in the problem. This influence will be discussed in the following paragraph on maintainability.

3.1.1.4 Maintainability

It is apparent that maintainability is the area which can be most improved by a well-designed onboard test system. Time is the all-important factor in effective maintenance since an overall goal is the reduction of weapon system downtime. Consequently, the onboard test system must contribute to time savings

in those maintenance tasks where testing is involved. Reduction of time in detecting failures and in locating those failures without sacrificing accuracy or completeness of testing is the basic task.

Using the system requirements given in the example of paragraph 3.1.1.3 (Availability), the relationship between the various factors affecting maintainability and those affected by maintainability can be shown. If only the correction of failures is considered in the maintenance task (ignoring such things as replacement of expendables and administration time), Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (M_{Ct}) can be obtained by using activity categories and associated times as given in MIL-HDBK-472:

Activity Categories	Mean Time (H	Mean Time (Hours)						
	I = 100%	I = 0%						
Preparation Time								
Gaining Access	0.275	0.275						
Malfunction Verification								
(No observations or tests necessary	0.000	0.000						
after initial failure report)								
Fault Location								
Interpreting Displays	0	0.333						
Interpreting Meter Readings	0	0.089						
Switching/Substituting Units	0	0.221						
Consulting Tech Orders	0	0.240						
Conferring With Tech Representatives/Maintena Personnel	nce 0	0.466						
Performing Standard Test Problems	0	0.582						
Using Special Test Equipment	0	0.320						
Part Procurement								
Obtain Replacement from Shop, etc.	0.012	0.012						

Activity Categories (Cont)	Mean Time (Hours)								
	I = 100%	I = 0%							
Repair Remove/Replace Units	0.239	0.239							
Final Malfunction Test Observing Indication Only	0.039	0.039							
Total Corrective Time	0.565	2.816							

Maintainability can be expressed using the exponential approximation:

$$M = 1 - \varepsilon \frac{-t_r}{M_{ct}}$$

where:

: 1

 t_r = repair time for which M is estimated

 M_{ct} = mean corrective maintenance time

Applying this equation:

$$-\frac{3}{0.565} = 1 - \epsilon$$
 - 5.3 = 1 - 0.005
M = 1-\varepsilon \frac{0.565}{0.565}

This, therefore, shows that a test system with a detection assurance of 95 percent and an isolation certainty of 100 percent will permit the maintain-ability requirement of 80 percent to be easily exceeded for a maximum allowable repair time of 3 hours. However, since it is highly unlikely that an I of 100 percent would be practically attainable, further computations should be made to determine what a more feasible value of I (75 percent) would permit.

The worst case (I = 0 percent) fault location time was found to be 2.251 hours, so the fault location time ($t_{\rm T}$) for I = 75 percent would be:

$$t_{I} = (2.251) (1-I) = (2.251) (1-0.75) = 0.563 \text{ hours}$$

and the total corrective time would be increased by this increased isolation time:

$$M_{ct} = 0.565 + 0.563 = 1.128$$
 hours

Then:

$$M = 1 - \epsilon \frac{-t}{m_{ct}} = 1 - \epsilon \frac{-3}{1.128} = 1 - \epsilon^{-2.66}$$
$$= 1 - 0.07$$
$$= 0.93 (93\%)$$


Thus, a reduction of isolation certainty to the value of 75 percent did not materially endanger the ability of the weapon system to meet (actually to exceed) the maintainability requirement. Furthermore, the results of computations give rise to a need for further investigation into a more compatible set of requirements. The impact of several combinations of detection assurance and isolation certainty for an onboard test system is shown in Table III-1 and Figure 3-2. The effect of isolation certainty on the maintainability figure for a given set of repair times is shown in Figure 3-3.

3.1.1.5 False Indications

Typically, the requirement pertaining to false indications will be stated as a percentage not to be exceeded. Often this is taken to mean that of a total number of indications occurring, a certain percentage is expected (or is allowed) to be erroneous. Without further qualifications, such as the period of time over which indications are to be evaluated for correctness, this requirement cannot be taken seriously or treated with concern. Furthermore, if the definition of false indications (as given in Section 2), is adhered to, an accounting must be made not only of indications occurring erroneously, but of these instances where indications did not occur when they should have occurred. Furthermore, intermittent failure indications must also be included, even though the indication does not persist over any particular length of time. Each such indication must be evaluated and identified as either a true failure (denoting an abnormal situation) or a false indication. Additionally, a more accurate evaluation of the ability of a test system to display a correct representation of system, subsystem, or equipment health

TABLE III-1 IMPACT OF ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM VARIABLES ON WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

$\begin{array}{c} \text{REPAIR} \\ \text{TIME} \\ (\mathbf{t_r}) \text{ (HOURS)} \end{array}$	0.91	1.27	1.80	1.98	2.71	3.43	3.65	1.00	1.40	2.00	2.20	3.00	3.80	4.03	1.20	1.67	2.40	2.63	3.60	4.55	4.85	1.58	2.22	3.15	3.48	4.75	00.9	6.40
MAINTAINABILITY (M) (PERCENT)	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	88.5	88.5	88.5	88.5	88.5	88.5	88.5	94	94	94	94	94	94	94
CORRECTIVE TIME (M _{ct}) (HOURS)	0.565	0.790	1.128	1.240	1.695	2.140	2.275	0.565	0.790	1.128	1.240	1.695	2.140	2.275	0.565	0.790	1.128	1.240	1.695	2.140	2.275	0.565	0.790	1.128	1.240	1.695	2.140	2.275
ISOLATION CERTAINTY (1) (PERCENT)	100	06	75	70	20	30	24	100	06	75	70	20	30	24	100	06	75	70	20	30	24	100	06	75	70	20	30	24
DETECTION ASSURANCE (D) (PERCENT)	95	92	95	95	95	95	95	06	06	06	06	06	06	06	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS (P) (PERCENT)	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
AVALLABILITY (A) (PERCENT)	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	92	95	92	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95



Isolation Certainty, I (Percent)
EFFECT OF DETECTION ASSURANCE AND ISOLATION CERTAINTY
ON TIME FOR REPAIR

Figure 3-2




Figure 3-3 3-16

should take into account <u>all</u> the possible indications as a basis for comparison, and not just those indications which actually occur.

Thus, the necessity for some method of record-keeping involving false indication rate is to be made. The source of the information to be recorded for non-indicated failures must rely on failure reports and other maintenance records not ordinarily associated with the test system, but even then such records must be examined for applicability to the evaluation. For instance, if a failure is reported which was not indicated by the test system, it must be determined whether or not that particular failure was supposed to have been detected by the test system. Naturally, if the failure was not considered or included in the test logic, it should not be counted as a false indication in the computation of false indication rate.

An example of the method of computing false indication rate is given below.

The B-1 aircraft onboard test system has the capability to output and display 1,250 different failure indications. Flight test data obtained from one aircraft over 60 flights revealed that the number of false indications per flight varied from a high of 28 to a low of 3, discounting two flights where no indications were recorded due to equipment problems. On a single-flight basis the maximum false indication rate would be:

F.I. rate =
$$\frac{28}{1.250}$$
 = 0.0224 = 2.24% (maximum)

Taken over the entire 60 flights, the data shows a total of 793 false indications. Using only the 58 flights for which data was actually recorded, the average number of false indications per flight is 13.7. Thus, the average false indication rate is:

F.I. rate =
$$\frac{13.7}{1.250}$$
 = 0.011 = 1.1%

It is obvious that the F.I. rate will vary depending on the number of flights considered and the time period covered. Since fixes will be made along the way to eliminate false indications, calculations of F.I. rate which include the most recent data should reflect the improvements in a lower rate. In addition, some failures not previously considered or included in the test logic because of predicted low failure rates exhibit failure rates in actual operation high enough to necessitate their inclusion. These additions, would, of course, affect the F.I. calculations and lower the F.I. rate even further.

3.1.1.6 Constraints

Depending upon the type of aircraft or weapon system on which the onboard test system is to be installed, and the basic mission assignments, the test system will be subject to certain functional constraints. These constraints will limit the choice of tests, the methods of testing, and the degree of automaticity. Requirements involving interference/non-interference testing, failure switching, radiation silence, and degree of operation participation are some of the constraints which may be encountered.

3.1.1.6.1 Interference/Non-Interference Testing

Interference testing, whereby normal operation of the unit under test is disrupted, should be avoided. Exception can be made only if such testing is limited to an environment where the system under test is active but not operating under weapon system mission conditions, such as on the ground. Use of input test stimuli in such tests should be carefully controlled to avoid the possibility of inadvertent application, and subsequent interference, in flight.

Consideration must also be given to incorporation of safety features for the ground tests whereby movement of surfaces, doors, actuators, etc., is initiated and can present conditions possibly harmful to maintenance personnel.

3.1.1.6.2 Failure Switching

A constraint that may be imposed is the prohibition of the automatic initiation or control of switching of subsystems, functions, or modes by the onboard test system. However, this does not prevent the test system from monitoring such operations employed in fail-safe schemes by system, subsystem, or equipment designers.

3.1.1.6.3 Radiation Silence

The onboard test system may be required to be capable of evaluating and testing system performance when radiation systems are either radiating or observing radiation silence.

Depending upon the type of weapon system and the type or types or missions normally performed, it may be important to know at all times the status of those equipments which radiate. These include not only communications equipment, but also radar used for navigation and offensive/defensive purposes. It is possible that a particular mission may require radiation silence for a relatively long period of time, after which the radiation equipment is necessary for successful completion of the mission. Therefore, if a failure of any of this equipment occurs during the radiation silence period, it would be imperative to be aware of this fact immediately to allow an inflight assessment of the remaining capabilities and impact on the mission.

3.1.1.6.4 Operator Participation

A requirement for automaticity may simply specify that the test functions shall minimize manual or semi-manual operations. This usually includes interpretation of displayed test results by the test system operator through the use of a manual, code sheet, or other documentation.

This requirement is based on the premise that the introduction of human intervention (manual operation/operator interpretation) not only increases the time for testing, but also increases the possibility of error. In some

cases, tests involving operator participation are made necessary because the disadvantages are outweighed by the impracticality/cost of implementing automaticity. Thus, the requirement cannot be stated quantitatively, but is broadly stated to allow the designer to exercise his judgement in the selection of the proper degree of operator participation. It is expected that his judgement will be influenced by the impact on other more specific requirements such as availability and maintainability.

3.1.2 SYSTEM UNDER TEST

The development and implementation of adequate test requirements into the system under test requires complete definition of functional requirements including sufficient data covering availability, maintainability, and performance. The inter-relationship of these factors determine what type of onboard testing is required and at what time intervals testing should be done. The following will discuss these factors and their relationship to onboard test requirements development.

3.1.2.1 Availability

Aircraft availability time is one factor of the maintenance concept which is directly affected by onboard testing of the subsystems. When developing onboard test requirements there should be priority given to the study of the effects to aircraft availability.

The availability requirement for the system under test would be calculated in accordance with the method defined in Paragraph 3.1.1.3.

3.1.2.2 Maintainability

Evaluation of the maintainability requirements impact on the system under test requires careful consideration. This involves an assessment of the qualitative and quantitative maintainability requirements together with a thorough understanding of its relationship to the system availability requirements and the test system's contribution to meeting these requirements. Review of the system's design configuration, installation, and the mechanization of the test system components into the system are all essential factors in this evaluation. Computations for verification of the maintainability requirements shall utilize the method defined in paragraph 3.1.1.4.

3.1.2.3 Performance

System performance can be defined as that system's capability to properly execute those specific design characteristics as prescribed by the procurement specification. An evaluation of the system's performance requirements is essential to insure that a clear definition of these requirements exists and that they can be implemented. This includes a functional understanding of the system and the ability to incorporate the necessary test requirements into the system.

3.1.2.3.1 Parameter Characteristics

In reviewing the functional requirements of the system under test, particular attention should be devoted to the characteristics of the parameters. Each of these parameters requires analysis for their criticality in system operation and their compatibility with the test system.

An example of this situation can be seen in the engine test development for the B-1 CITS. During examination of failure modes for engine testing, it was found that during repetitive stalls the compressor discharge pressure oscillates at about four times per second. To monitor such a signal the sample rate would have to be 40 times per second, which was considered impractical for the CITS system which had a maximum sample rate of 16 per second. However, further analysis revealed that the failure rate of the repetitive stall failure mode was small compared to the complexity of monitoring this condition. In addition, this failure condition does progress into a fixed stall failure mode which is detectable and the parameter can be adequately monitored thus

satisfying the detection/isolation requirements.

Considering the example given, parameter characteristics are very important when deciding what failure modes to test, and what signals should be monitored for detection of those system malfunctions.

3.1.2.3.1.1 Normal. The normal characteristics of each operational parameter should be evaluated for its normal range, response rate, stability, repeatability, accuracy, and how critical it is to system operation. The review should also include an analysis of the parameters during non-normal conditions for assessment as a test parameter.

An example of this type of analysis can be cited from the B-1 CITS development. Analysis of the fire protection system indicated that the sensing element parameter was essential to system performance and should be monitored by the test system. However, in evaluating the voltage levels of this analog signal it was determined that overlaps existed through the stand-by/fire/short stages of operation, thus appearing that ambiguous indications were possible. However, additional analysis revealed that by using additional status discretes for the fire and short conditions, the parameter was useful in the testing of the fire protection system. It is seen by this example, that the study of the normal characteristics of the test signals is essential in determining a proper onboard test mechanization.

3.1.2.3.1.1.1 Electrical. The system's electrical external/internal interfaces for input/output signals should be assessed for their compliance with the applicable requirements for their respective impact on system performance. This review should include supply voltages, signal types, (serial digital, discrete, and analog), together with their voltage ranges, currents, percent regulation, transient, and noise rejection characteristics.

3.1.2.3.1.1.2 Mechanical. In evaluating the functional requirement for the system under test there may be mechanical portions that must be analyzed for their design performance and assessed as possible candidates for testing. These mechanical aspects may be grouped into the following categories:

- A. Position type functions which measure linear or angular direction.
- B. Rate functions that cover acceleration, vibration, and flow.
- C. Pressure functions.
- D. Temperature functions.
- E. Mechanical states covering: open/closed; extended/retracted; up/down; in/out; and left/right.
- F. Electrical states covering: singular on/off functions or composite on/off type patterns.

Each of the above parameter types, as applicable, must be weighed for its relationship to system performance, normal/failure signature pattern, and ability to be monitored by the test system. Evaluation should cover the parameter's basic stability, repeatability, accuracy, range, sensitivity, and working environment. As these parameters are analyzed the decision to monitor them as test parameters must be made concurrent with system design in order to effect an optimum system/test system configuration in lieu of a costly ineffective addon test system.

3.2 SPECIFICATION OF FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROCUREMENT

After the prime contractor has evaluated the customer's requirements sufficiently to understand the customer's needs, appropriate requirements must be established and communicated to the subcontractors. The basic means by which these requirements are transmitted is the procurement specification. The scope of these procurement specifications may range from single LRU's to complete systems. These subparagraphs deal with the types of requirements which should be considered as functional requirements are established for the procurement of both the test system and the systems under test.

As an example of the format and content of a typical specification, refer to Appendix A.

3.2.1 TEST SYSTEM

The test system consists of onboard hardware and software which operate together for the purpose of performance monitoring, fault detection, and fault isolation. The basic functions of the onboard test system hardware are to acquire test signals, process these signals, and display the results to flight and ground crews. In addition to these real-time functions, test results in hardcopy printer form as well as continuous signal recording may be required for ground maintenance.

From the standpoint of procurement, the test system may be procured with a single specification or each LRU may be procured individually. In either case, specification requirements must be established by the contractor such that when the procured test system is integrated with the systems under test, the customer's original requirements for an onboard test system will be met. In the development of the test system hardware procurement specifications the use of a standard signal interface specification should be considered. Operational modes also must be established before the design of the test system hardware can be specified.

3.2.1.1 Standard Signal Interface Specification

Since the test system hardware procurement usually occurs at the same time as the procurement of the systems under test, signal interface requirements must be clearly established before any procurement specifications are released. One means of assuring compatible signal interfaces is the preparation of a separate standard signal interface requirements specifications. The requirements of this specification can then be imposed on the hardware subcontractors of the test system as well as on the suppliers of systems under test. As an example of a standard signal interface specification, refer to Appendix C.

In order for the contractor to develop this kind of specification, inputs by all internal engineering disciplines having procurement responsibility must be made. These inputs must be then organized into a preliminary specification for review and finalization.

3.2.1.2 Operational Modes

In order to properly implement the test functions, several modes of test system operation may be necessary. Changing modes may affect actual testing or may only affect the display function. Mode selection would normally be a cockpit switch function, although the selection of certain modes may also require interlocks involving certain key aircraft parameters. The following are typical test system modes:

- 1. Dynamic test mode This mode may be manually selected or automatically entered in the absence of any other mode selected. In this mode the systems under test would be monitored on a non-interference basis during usual systems operation. Depending on the display mechanization, two submodes, fault detection and fault isolation, may be required to display detected faults or failed LRU isolation messages.
- 2. Ground active test mode This mode must be manually selected and interlocked with key aircraft parameters such as weight-on-wheels, engine speed, or aircraft velocity such that inadvertent mode entry is precluded. In this mode a selected system or group of systems can be actively tested by the interruption of normal operation and the automatic application of stimuli to cause certain predictable responses. Where potentially hazardous operation exists such as the automatic movement of control surfaces or doors, a man-in-the-loop interlock must be mechanized as a part of the active mode selection. In addition to software interlocks, sufficient hardware interlocks must be

implemented to prevent inadvertent application of test system stimuli to all systems under test.

As with the dynamic test mode, fault detection and fault isolation submodes may be necessary depending on the display mechanization.

- 3. Self-test mode This mode can be manually selected, automatically entered at power-up, or automatically entered periodically. The purpose of this mode is to verify the integrity of the test system such that a test system failure will not be interpreted as a failure of a system under test.
- 4. Parameter monitor mode This mode, which must be manually selected, is used to display the status of any test signal acquired by the test system. This mode should be a parallel mode to the dynamic and ground active test modes such that the testing function will not be interrupted if parameter monitor is selected.

During the development of the test system display function, one important factor to consider is the capability of displaying more than one signal at a time. With many systems being dual-, triple-, or quad-redundant and with the probable absence of ground equipment, it may be necessary to display all redundant channels of a given signal simultaneously.

5. Data entry mode - This mode may be necessary if a hardcopy printer or recorder is implemented in the test system design. This mode would be used for identifying printer or recorder data with key information such as the date, aircraft identification number, and engine number(s).

This mode, which must be manually selected, requires a keyboard for data entry. This mode should also be a parallel mode to the test modes such that selection of this mode will not interrupt testing.

3.2.2 SYSTEM UNDER TEST

For the purpose of this section, the system under test will be defined as that LRU or group of LRU's which are procured with a single specification. It must be noted that functional requirements will vary between single and multiple LRU systems. For example, an LRU fault isolation requirement cannot be imposed on the supplier of a single LRU system if an interfacing LRU failure can result in a malfunction of the single LRU system, since the supplier should not be held responsible for failures of systems other than his own. The determination and resolution of such ambiguities must be made by the contractor.

3.2.2.1 Test Objective

In the specification of functional requirements for a system's test provisions, the extent or goal of testing must be established. As with reliability and maintainability, the capability of a system to be tested must be quantitatively specified. Since the purpose of the test system is to detect and isolate faults with a minimum number of false indications, the following areas must be included when establishing the extent of the test provisions for the system under test.

- Fault detection The ability to detect faults based on the real-time computer analysis of the system's test signals must be defined. The fault detection criteria may be defined as the percentage of the system's failure rate which can be detected by the computer processing and analysis of the test signal provisions of the system under test.
- 2. Fault isolation Next to the detection of faults, one of the main objectives of a test system is the reduction of maintenance manhours. In order for a test system to significantly reduce maintenance time, the system under test must provide sufficient test points to allow effective isolation of faults to the LRU

level. As with the specific fault detection requirement, fault isolation may be defined as a percentage of a system's detectable failure rate which can be isolated to the LRU level.

3.2.2.2 Interface With Test System

After the test system interface requirements have been established for the procurement of the test system hardware, compatible interface requirements must be imposed on the design of the system under test. During the design phase of the system under test, a trade study should be conducted to determine if multiplexing techniques would be more effective than individual wire interfaces. This trade study should take into consideration the following factors: wire size, length, and weight; multiplexer cost, weight, reliability, accuracy, signal capacity, and access time.

3.2.2.2.1 Signals

Since it is impractical to design test system hardware to interface with any type of test signal, several standard interface types must be established. Once these standard interfaces have been established, the system under test must provide the necessary signal conditioning to insure a compatible interface with the test signal.

The following information describes basic test signal interface characteristics which must be specified in the procurement of the system under test:

- 1. Analog Voltage range, frequency limits, accuracy, linearity.
- 2. Discrete inputs and outputs Logic voltage levels, rise and fall times.
- 3. Serial digital inputs and outputs Bit count, parity, logic voltage levels, rise and fall times, synchronization pulse, clocking, data rate, address word format, data word format, message word count, maximum waveform distortion.

3.2.2.2.2 Isolation

The test signals provided by the system under test must be conditioned and buffered such that a failure of test system hardware or interface wiring will not cause degradation of the operation of the system under test.

Efforts must be made in the design of the test signal interface circuitry such that failures of this circuitry or interface wiring will be detected by the test system. In addition to detecting failures of these test provisions, consideration must be given to the capability of differentiating test provision failures from actual failures of the system under test.

3.2.2.2.3 Impedance

In addition to the signal characteristics listed above, the input and output impedance requirements must be specified. The type and maximum length of system-under-test to test-system interconnect cabling must also be specified, including cable impedance, distributed capacitance, and shielding.

3.2.2.2.4 Output Circuit Drive Capability

In order to provide the test system with intelligible signals, the minimum drive current of the test signal output circuitry of the system under test must be specified. The specific output current requirement should be based on cable length, cable type, and input impedance of the test system circuits.

3.2.2.3 Development Testing

The majority of the onboard test system test performance evaluation is accomplished by means of analysis of supplier submitted data and is received by the prime contractor. However, certain development testing is required to demonstrate the performance and effectiveness of the onboard test system detection and isolation capabilities.

After receipt of the supplier analysis data, and after a review by the prime contractor has resulted in a preliminary or conditional approval of

the analysis, a development test should be conducted at the supplier's facility. This test should utilize a breadboard or prototype version of the design as described by the analysis, and should be accomplished as soon as possible after this non-production unit is available. This testing is not to be construed as a part of either prequalification testing or acceptance testing and should be completed well ahead of the beginning of prequalification testing.

The test should verify the performance of the onboard test system by actually simulating a number of failure conditions. These failure conditions would be monitored to verify that the onboard test system detects/isolates the indicated fault as documented in the supplier's data. These simulated faults would be selected by the prime contractor and the quantity of tests should be based on a percentage of the total possible number of failure indications of the subsystem. This selection should include all failure conditions affecting safety-of-flight and mission critical modes. During the simulation of each failure condition, each of the applicable test signals characteristics should be monitored to validate its compliance with the defined failure. In the event that any of the required demonstrations fail, then the prime contractor would select additional tests to provide the required confidence level in the onboard test system demonstration. Also the supplier would be responsible for re-evaluating the faulted condition and providing an adequate fix or an acceptable alternative.

3.2.2.3.1 Failure Criteria

A firm definition of the system failure criteria is required as a base for established testing requirements. This criteria should utilize the system performance requirements as a foundation in determining these failure definitions. However, when utilizing these performance requirements, insure that realistic test limits are provided for testing the system in its operational environment. Establishment of the failure criteria should include:

- 1. Sufficient test delays to cover normal system response times.
- 2. Adequate test tolerances for system/test system transducer measurements.
- 3. Allowance for transient system operating conditions (system warm-up/mode changes) before indicating a failure.

Once the failure criteria have been defined, then adequate testing/monitoring of system operation should be specified to validate the test system capability to detect and isolate these failure conditions.

3.2.2.3.2 Test Signals

Specific testing of each test signal's performance is essential to a successful test mechanization. During the development phase of the test system, each test signal should be analyzed to determine the specific tests required for its validation. These tests should exercise the test signal over its full range of required operation, thus insuring that signal accuracy meets the specified requirements. The signal accuracy and repeatability testing should be specified to cover all the required test areas (e.g., approaching the test limits from all directions, increasing/decreasing measurements, and checking hysteresis). Each signal should be monitored during dynamic conditions of system operation to verify the noise rejection capability of the test circuitry.

3.2.2.4 Data Requirements

To arrive at an optimum test system design, the designer requires much detailed data covering system requirements, design, reliability, failure data, interface signal definition, and much more. Defined in the subsequent paragraphs are the various data requirements necessary to accomplish the test system design. In addition, format/co-tent of the required data has been specified to insure completeness and facilitate expeditious review/usage of the data. Timely compliance with complete fulfillment of the data requirements

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is also a key factor in the successful design of the test system. To insure achievement of this requirement, a strong initial effort with the subcontractor is required. This effort includes initial coordination/briefings on the test system concept/capability/mechanization, plus a review of the data requirements so necessary for the design evaluation.

Proper scheduling of the data submittals are essential in order to accomplish the necessary review in a timely manner for incorporation of any required changes without impacting hardware design/fabrication schedules. The initial data submittal should occur at least 2 weeks prior to the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) of the system. The second submittal should occur no later than 2 weeks prior to Critical Design Review (CDR). The final submittal should occur at least 1 month prior to hardware delivery. Interim submittals may be required to incorporate revisions made necessary by system design review changes. Timely resubmittal dates should be negotiated and established as soon as the need for changes becomes apparent. Based on past experience, the majority of any required changes must be incorporated by PDR, because when CDR arrives, hardware is being fabricated and changes are difficult and costly to incorporate. Consequently, adherence to the above mentioned data requirements/schedules are mandatory.

3.2.2.4.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

The FMEA is a most important document since it defines the failure data associated with the system under test. In order to perform an FMEA on a system the first requirement is to establish the basic performance, safety, maintenance, and inspection criteria for overall evaluation and to identify the elements and functions of the system. FMEA's are derived from functional flow diagrams, schematics, and timing sequence diagrams and are then used to identify components affecting the different failure modes. An example of an FMEA, with typical entries, is shown in Figure 3-4. A description of the format used is given in Table III-2.

WEAPON SYSTEM:

X-1 AIRCRAFT

SYSTIM:

ENVIRONMENT CONTROL

SUBSYSTIM:

AIR CONDITIONING & PRESSURIZATION

EQUIPMENT:

CREW PACK

MODULE:

SENSOR

ITEM DESCRIPTION			COMPONENT FA		URE MODE		FAILURE LETECT ON				
NOMENCLATURE	IDENT NUMBER	DWG REF DESIG	OR SYSTEM PURPOSE AND WHEN NEEDED	F/M ID NO DESC		FAILURE RATE X10 ⁻⁶	COMPONENT/ FUNCTIONAL ASSEMBLY	AIRCRAFT SYSTEM	TOTAL AIRCRAFT	SAFETY OF FLIGHT	Р
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
SENSOR, CREW PACK OUTPUT TEMPERATURE	1111-1	2112 A4	SENSORS WATER SEPARATOR DISCHARGE TEMP, ALL MISSION PHASES	41-1	OPEN	2.02	LOSS OF TEMP SITNAL	BY -PASS VALAT WITL OPEN - CREW PACK OUTPUT TEMP WITL BE TOO HOT	CREW CABIN AIR WILL BE TOO HOT	S	
				41-2	SHORTED	2.0	MAXIMUM OUTPUT TEMP SIGNAL	BY-PASS VALAT: WILL CLOSE: - WATER SEPARATOR WILL ICE	CREW CABIN WILL BE OVER COOLED. WATER MAY CARRY OVER INTO CABIN	S	

NOTE: THIS TABLE IS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED AS REAL DATA.

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

Figure 3-4

PAGE	OF	
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		CRITIC CATEGORY				TEST SYS DET METHOD	TEST SYS ISOL METHOD	CORRECTIVE ACTION & SAFETY FACTOR AVAILABLE	
. TAI. ERCRAFT	SAFETY OF FLIGHT	SAFETY OF PERSONNEL	SAFETY OF EQUIP	MISSION SUCCESS	MIEN DISCOVERED/ HOW DETECTED				COMMENTS
10	11	11	11	11	12	13	14	15	16
REW ABIN IR WILL E TOO OT	S	IV	IV	А	CREW CABIN AIR IS TOO HOT, TEST SYSTEM	9	9	SWITCH TO WEAPON PACK FOR BACK-UP CREW COOLING	
WW W IN LL BE WER OLED. TER Y RRY ER TO	S	IV	IV	A	CREW CABIN AIR IS TOO COLD, TEST SYSTEM	9	9	SWITCH TO WEAPON PACK FOR BACK-UP CREW COOLING	

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Table III-2

FMEA FORMAT DESCRIPTION

- 1. <u>Nomenclature</u> Name of component/equipment in the subsystem being analyzed. Nomenlature to be consistent throughout all documentation, using only approved abbreviations as applicable.
- 2. <u>Identification Number</u> Drawing number or part number by which component or module is identified.
- 3. <u>Drawing Reference Designation</u> Indicate reference designation used to identify component or module on schematic. The designation number will be assigned by the contractor in accordance with DOD-STD-863 specification. Applicable schematic and wiring diagram numbers should be listed.
- 4. <u>Component/System Purpose</u>, <u>Function</u>, and <u>When Used</u> Concise statement of the function performed. The specific mission phase during which the item is required to operate should be listed.
 - The mission phase classifications are: (1) ground alert, (2) engine start, (3) taxi, (4) takeoff, (5) climb, (6) refueling, (7) subsonic cruise-high altitude, (8) subsonic dash-low altitude, (9) weapon delivery, (10) supersonic cruise, (11) descent, (12) approach, (13) landing, and (14) ground operations.
 - These phases may be further subdivided or combined, as appropriate, (i.e., all flight phases, prior to weapon delivery).
- 5. <u>Failure Mode Identification Number</u> Each failure mode listed is to be identified by a unique number. Each number is to be prefixed by a subsystem code identification number assigned by the subcontractor in accordance with DOD-STD-863 specification.
- 6. <u>Fail Mode Description</u> Only the category of the failure is to be given. For example, note only that a valve has failed "open". Do not enumerate the ways of failing open. All possible failure modes for each item are to be listed whether their signifiance is great or small.

- 7. Failure Rate Give the failure rate for the failure mode in terms of failures per million operating hours. The failure rate figure shall consider environment, stress, and other applicable conditions relative to component usage in these computations. Reliability predictions for military electronic equipment should use MIL-HDBK-217 as a guide for these computations.
- 8. <u>Component/Functional Assembly</u> Describe the immediate effect of the assumed failure mode on function/subsystem operation, indicating the resulting function failure state, if any. A function failure state is generally defined as a degradation or loss of one or more discrete outputs of a function.
- 9. <u>Aircraft System</u> A brief description of the effect of the failure on the aircraft system.
- 10. <u>Total Aircraft</u> A description of the effect of the component failure on the total aircraft performance. The narrative should support the criticality levels specified.
- 11. <u>Criticality Level</u> Classify each assumed function failure state according to its level of safety of flight, safety of personnel, safety of equipment, and mission success. See paragraph 3.2.2.4.1.3 for criticality category levels. For safety of flight use "S" for safe flight and "U" for unsafe flight.
- 12. When Discovered, How Detected Indicate when and how the assumed failure mode would be detected. For example, a failure may be detected by actuation of a warning device, by an erratic or improper indicator reading, by a noticeable degradation in aircraft performance, or by a ground test or inspection. If the failure mode would be detected by the onboard test system, so indicate.
- 13. <u>Test System Detection Method</u> Cross-reference the identification number of the test logic diagram block that detects this failure mode. This number is arbitrarily assigned by the subcontractor during test logic development.

- 14. Test System Isolation Method Cross-reference the identification number of the test logic diagram block that isolates this failure mode. This number is arbitrarily assigned by the subcontractor during test logic development.
- 15. Corrective Action and Safety Factor Available Describe any compensating provisions, either automatic or required by an operator, which allow continued system operation or control. List all fail-safe features.
- 16. Comments/Recommendations Include additional information needed to clarify the data in the other columns. Also include any recommendations for design or procedural changes, or additional testing to reduce criticality of the assumed failure mode. Comment on any problem areas that may require special consideration.

- 3.2.2.4.1.1 <u>Failure Criteria</u>. Definition of system failure criteria should be provided along with the tolerance for the GO/NO-GO determination. Degraded modes of system operation should also be identified for evaluation of detect-tion/isolation requirements and the duration they can exist before the test system should indicate them as a failure.
- 3.2.2.4.1.2 <u>Failure Rates</u>. The failure rates for the system/LRU's/test circuitry shall be defined in the FMEA. The failure rate unit shall be defined as the number of failures per million hours of operation. The failure rates of the test components/test circuitry shall be listed in the system FMEA.
- 3.2.2.4.1.3 <u>Criticality of Failure Modes</u>. The criticality of each failure mode should be identified in the FMEA. This criticality classification is to be assigned to each failure mode according to its effect on the operational mission or in causing personnel, equipment, or property to be exposed to hazardous conditions. The functional effect of loss or degradation should be identified so that the failure mode effect can be properly categorized. The criticality categories are defined as follows for the purpose of this document:

Safety-of-Flight:

- A. Safe Flight The absence of failures during takeoff, flight, or landing which prevent a qualified crew from: (1) sustaining flight (with possible reduced range and/or performance, (2) safely landing the aircraft, or (3) safely aborting takeoff. This definition encompasses not only those failures which result in an immediate unsafe condition, but also those failures which permit contained safe flight but preclude a safe controlled landing.
- B. <u>Unsafe Flight Condition</u> The occurrence of material failures which preclude safe flight as defined above.

Safety of Personnel - Hazard levels:

Category I - Catastrophic - May cause death.

Category II - Critical - May cause severe injury or severe occupational illness.

Category III - Marginal - May cause minor injury or minor occupational illness.

Category IV - Negligible - Will not result in injury.

Safety of Equipment - Hazard levels:

Category I - Catastrophic - May cause system loss.

Category II - Critical - May cause major system damage.

Category III - Marginal - May cause minor system damage.

Category IV - Negligible - Will not result in system dan age.

Mission Success Levels:

Level A - No effect on mission success.


Level B - Mission can be successfully completed, but with significantly degraded performance.

Level C - Mission cannot be successfully completed.

The foregoing classification/definitions should be compared against any imposed reliability, safety or mission reliability specifications to insure that conflicts do not exist.

3.2.2.4.2 Block Diagrams

Block diagrams of the system shall be provided which identify the functional elements and signal flow. These diagrams require identification of the interface signals between the system and other subsystems, signal flow between system LRU's, and the location of the test parameters to be used for system monitoring. The method of identification of LRU's and test signals/parameters shall be consistent with the method used in the LRU list, the test parameter list, FMEA, and the test logic to provide accurate and easy correlation and cross-reference. An example of this type of block diagram is shown in Figure 3-5.



*NOTE: THIS FIGURE IS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED AS REAL DATA Figure 3-5 * Crew Pack Block Diagram

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3.2.2.4.2.1 <u>LRU's</u>. Once the block diagrams are available, a list of the LRU's making up the system should be prepared. A firm definition of what constitutes an LRU must be clearly established and followed in preparing the list, since this is the basis of meeting the LRU isolation certainty requirements. From this each LRU can be evaluated to verify that all specified failure modes in the FMEA are being detected and that unique isolation of these failures to that LRU are being accomplished. An LRU list example is given in Figure 3-6. Table III-3 describes the LRU list format and content.

3.2.2.4.2.2 <u>Input/Output Signals</u>. The signal flow indicated on the block diagram is used to define the operational input/output signals. This list should include a definition of the operational signals recommended to be monitored during the test sequence and should include: a) electrical interface definition in terms of voltage level and impedance; b) range of variation and nominal and worst-case operational use; and c) signal response characteristics.

3.2.2.4.2.3 <u>Power</u>. The power requirements defined by the system under test must meet the requirements of the generating source. In addition, system operation during degraded power modes (loss of one phase or under voltage) should be analyzed for the effect on test parameters. Development of the test logic should contain adequate precondition test parameters to verify that basic power requirements are met before testing is performed.

Power utilization within the system's LRU's must also be reviewed to insure that noise from these lines does not adversely affect the test parameters.

3.2.2.4.3 Test Parameter List

A complete listing of the recommended test parameters and their characteristics must be provided to accomplish the required analysis (see Figure 3-7). Test parameter list definitions are given in Table III-4.

TOTAL LRU FAILURE RATEFAILURE RATHFAILURE RATE ALLURE RATH DETECTED ISOLATED BY NOT DET/ PER 10 ⁶ HRS BY TEST SYS ISOLATED	(b)	1.1	1	1	
FAILURE RATH ISOLATED BY TEST SYS	(b)	38.7	17.3	4.25	
FAILURE RATE DETECTED BY TEST SYS	(A)	44.4	20.8	4.25	
TOTAL LRU FAILURE RATE FAILURE RATH DETECTED PER 10 ⁶ HRS BY TEST SYS	(a)	45.5	20.8	4.25	
LRU SELECTED FOR ISOL	9	yes	yes	yes	
DESCRIPTION	©	Controller, Crew Pack Temp	Valve Assy, Crw Pack By-Pass	Sensor, Crew Pack Output Temp	
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	2	1113-1	1112-1	1111-1	
QUANTITY	-	г			

LRU List Figure 3-6


Table III-3

LRU LIST

- ① Quantity Enter the quantity of the particular LRU comprising a part of the subsystem.
- 2 <u>Identification Number</u> Enter identification number of LRU (part number/ reference designator/etc. that is consistent with all other documentation).
- Obscription Enter description/nomenclature of LRU that is descriptive of subsystem/LRU/function/location/etc., and is consistent throughout all other documentation.
- 4 LRU Selected for Isolation Enter "Yes" or "No" depending on whether or not LRU is selected for failure isolation by test system.
- 5 Failure Rate Data of LRU (Failures per million hours of operation) Enter applicable accumulated failure rate data from subsystem's FMEA for each LRU failure category as noted in each column.

Test Parameter List Figure 3-7

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL EL SEGUNDO CA NORTH AMERICAN --ETC F/G 15/5 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM DESIGN GUIDE.(U) AUG 81 K DERBYSHIRE, 6 BRAMHALL, T HAIT F33657-80-C-0138 TFD-80-206 NL AD-A112 301 UNCLASSIFIED 2 ... 5 Andrews Andrews



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Table III-4

TEST PARAMETER LIST DEFINITIONS

- 1) Parameter Identification Number Each test parameter shall be assigned an identification number. This number will correlate the parameter to its usage in the test logic diagrams, schematics, and block diagrams. This number is arbitrarily assigned by the subcontractor.
- 2) Description Provide an adequate description of the test parameter as defined in paragraph 3.2.2.4.3.1.
- (3) Source Identify the LRU where the signal originates.
- 4) <u>Signal Type</u> Identify the type signal being provided (e.g., discrete, packed discrete, analog, multiplexed analog, serial digital, etc.)
- 5) Operational Range Define the operational range of the signal in terms of engineering units (e.g., 0-30 PSIA, 70° 120°F).

 For discrete signals, define trip point, tolerance, and direction of measurement (e.g., "1" logic at 170°F + 3°F on increasing temperature).
- 6. Response Time Define response time of signal to change state for full scale reading (e.g., from minimum temperature range to maximum range; from full closed (logic "0") to full open (logic "1"); from zero pressure (logic "0") to 140 PSIA (logic "1")).
- 7. Normal Range Define normal operating range of signal in engineering units.
- 8. <u>Tolerance</u> Define tolerance of signal over full range of operation in engineering units.
- Onversion Factor Define conversion factor of signals from engineering units to volts; may be expressed as formula, tabulated table, or in graph form.

- 3.2.2.4.3.1 Nomenclature. The nomenclature assigned to the test parameters should be descriptive of the operation signal being monitored. This nomenclature should also include location (left hand (LH), right hand (RH), forward, aft) and system application (system 1 or 2, primary, or secondary) as applicable and use only approved abbreviations and acronyms. If possible, discrete type signals should also contain nomenclature defining function for the logic "1" signal state (e.g., on/off, open/closed, energized/de-energized).
- 3.2.2.4.3.2 Type. The type signals being provided as test parameters must be adequately defined and be in accordance with the specified type signals that the test system will accept. The data should specify the type transducers being recommended and include: a) electrical interface definition in terms of voltage output, input, and impedance; b) response characteristics; and c) tolerance definition under nominal and worst-case conditions of use and environment.
- 3.2.2.4.3.3 <u>Characteristics</u>. Define the test characteristics for each parameter being recommended for testing. These characteristics shall be defined in engineering units for the categories listed below:
 - Normal Define the normal characteristics of each test parameter for all modes of system operation.
 - Failure Define the failure characteristics for each test parameter during all modes of operation.
- 3.2.2.4.3.4 Conversion Factors. Conversion factors for each test parameter shall be provided. The factors shall define the test measurement correlation to engineering units or function and also provide the test tolerance for the parameter over the full scale of operation as applicable.

3.2.2.4.4 Preliminary Test Logic

Preliminary test logic diagrams shall be provided for each system under test. The diagrams shall provide the test logic necessary to meet the specified failure detection and isolation requirements for all modes of system operation. These diagrams shall also specify the necessary test pre-conditions and system warm-up times required before entering the test routine. The test logic diagrams shall utilize the symbols in Figure 3-8. The output failure block should contain an identification number which correlates to the applicable failure mode in the FMEA. An example of test logic is shown in Figure 3-9.


3.2.2.4.5 Preliminary Calculations

Preliminary calculations demonstrating compliance with the detection and isolation requirements shall be provided in accordance with the applicable equations. These calculations shall utilize the most current FMEA system data.

- 3.2.2.4.5.1 Detection Assurance. Detection assurance computation in accordance with the defined method shall be provided. These calculations shall vailize the failure mode and failure rate data of the applicable system FMEA. The failure modes detected by the test system shall be identified as well as those which will not be detected. All failure modes established as affecting in-flight safety must be detected and indicated. The computations shall cover each mode of system operation. Condition wilting in degraded system/ LRU operation shall be detected and indicated as advisory message (not as a failure) for possible maintenance action.
- 3.2.2.4.5.2 <u>Isolation Certainty</u>. Isolation certainty computations should be provided in accordance with the defined method. Computations for each LRU should be provided in enough detail to: 1) identify the failure rate for each LRU failure mode that is isolated as well as for those not isolated, 2) specify those LRU's that are uniquely isolated, and 3) specify those LRU's that are isolated in groups of two or more.

Enter, exit, time delay			
Operation/Process			
Decision		AA:	Parameter Identification Number (from Test Parameter List)
Input/Output	XX YY ZZ		Failure ID Number (arbitrarily assigned by contractor/subcontractor, for cross reference to FMEA) Failure Message (identifies failed system) LRU Work Unit Code (WUC) Number/s
On-page connector	\bigcirc		(in order of highest failure rate if multiple LRU's)
Off-page connector			
Flow direction	>		
Confluence	*		

Test Logic Diagram Symbols Figure 3-8



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Special attention should be given to those calculations involving partial credit for ambiguous isolation, so that sufficient information is available to allow the evaluation of alternate isolation testing schemes.

3.3 EVALUATION OF SUPPLIER DATA

The foundation for development of an effective test system is the timely acquisition of proper and adequate data for evaluation. Therefore, to insure the availability of the data in conformance with a submittal schedule, it is advisable to coordinate with the supplier periodically prior to the due date to verify data completeness and progress status.

If problem areas exist, special effort should be expended to correct any discrepancies or anomalies without disrupting the schedule or extending the completion date. Once the data is received, copies should be distributed to the other affected/supporting design groups for their concurrent review/evaluation and comments. A detailed methodical review of the data as outlined below should be accomplished to verify test system requirements are met. In addition, schedule dates for completion of the data review/comments should be set to insure timely resolution of problems and incorporation of changes.

3.3.1 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Upon receipt of the FMEA it should be reviewed for completeness and accuracy. An initial check should verify that all columns are complete and that proper ground rules have been followed. If some columns are incomplete, then the supplier should be notified immediately to initiate corrective action so the review is not delayed. In addition, a detailed check of the data for one LRU, selected at random, should be conducted during this initial check to verify the acceptability of the FMEA. The review should include an analysis of the test circuitry failure data to evaluate the acceptability of its reliability and failure modes in relation to the operational signal being monitored. Careful evaluation of the criticality columns is essential to insure that all safety critical failure modes are being detected by the test system.

3.3.2 DEVELOPMENT TEST RESULTS

Review of the development test results is essential to insure proper performance of the selected test parameters. This review should include analysis of the applicable test set-up for utilization of actual system components. The test results should cover adequate testing of the parameters over the full range of operation and be within the specified test tolerance.

3.3.3 TEST SELECTION ANALYSIS

Analysis of the FMEA failure modes and the test logic must be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the recommended test routines. This evaluation should verify that all failure modes are detected/isolated in the test logic to the extent specified by the requirements. The review should also validate the optimum usage of the test parameters in performing the applicable test. The effectiveness of each test should be weighed against the criticality level of the failure mode detected/isolated and the associated failure rate probability.

3.3.3.1 Order of Consideration

In reviewing the selected tests, each of the below listed categories should be given careful consideration in order to validate their compliance with the specified requirements.

3.3.3.1.1 Failure Modes Impacting Safety

During the evaluation of the FMEA and test logic, special emphasis should be applied to the analysis of all failure modes affecting safety critical categories to make certain that detection and annunciation of these failures meet the test system requirements. In this review, verify that the criticality levels specified in the FMEA agree with the proper classification/level for the safety of flight, safety of personnel, and safety of equipment requirements. To aid in this evaluation, the narrative description of the total aircraft failure mode in the FMEA should support the criticality classification/level.

3.3.3.1.2 Failure Modes Impacting Mission Success

Validate the accuracy of the failure modes affecting mission success as defined in the FMEA. This can be accomplished by reviewing the FMEA column which defines the aircraft mission phase when the function is required and compare this to the aircraft mission success requirements. Once this data is validated, then the test routine can be reviewed for proper detection/annunication of these failure modes.

3.3.3.1.3 Failure Modes Impacting System Performance

The final failure mode evaluation covers those items affecting system performance, other than safety of mission success related. These failure modes would cover loss of system function and/or degraded performance. Each of these failure modes can be validated by examining the output function description in terms of the following typical possible failure modes: a) premature operation, b) failure to operate at a prescribed time, c) failure to cease operation at a prescribed time, d) failure during operation, and e) degradation or out-of-tolerance operation (depending on the subsystem, other unique failure modes should be considered as applicable). Degraded modes of operation should be reviewed to determine what test system detection/annunication is required and how maintenance action is initiated.

3.3.4 PARAMETER SELECTION ANALYSIS

Upon completing the analysis of the FMEA and the recommended test routines, review of the selected test parameters can begin. This analysis should evaluate the effectiveness of the test parameter(s) utilized in the detection routine and the uniqueness of the LRU isolation being accomplished. Evaluation of these test parameters can best be analyzed by asking the following questions for each parameter:

- A. Is the failure rate of the test circuitry involved in the conversion and scaling of the parameter realistic and effective in relationship to the failure rate of the system circuitry failure mode being detected/isolated?
- B. Is the parameter sensing point at the optimum location in the circuitry for monitoring the input/cutput operational signal to avoid ambiguous failure indications?
- C. Can the validity of each parameter be checked prior to usage in the test routine?
 - Example: (1) Are analog signals scaled such that they can be tested for opens/shorts of the test sensor?
 - (2) Do discrete signals use logic "1" for GO condition, so as to guard against logic "0" failures of failed open switches, broken wires, etc.?
- D. Is the recommended parameter, or combination of parameters, optimum/adequate for the required test?

Positive answers to the above questions should provide an optimum/cost effective set of test parameters.

3.3.5 SAFETY ANALYSIS

The safety aspects of each test parameter should also be analyzed. This analysis should confirm the fail-safe design of the parameters in that none of the test parameter failure modes should cause any system degradation/failures. In addition, if test stimuli are used in system testing, confirm that adequate hardware lockouts are provided so that a failed "on" condition does not interrupt system operation.

3.3.6 PRELIMINARY CALCULATIONS ANALYSIS

Confirmation of the supplier's detection assurance/isolation certainty calculations are most important in determining the effectiveness of the test system. This will require compilation of all the failure rates of the system's failure modes and then computation in accordance with the defined detection/isolation equations to validate that the test requirements are met. As system designs progress and changes are incorporated that affect the FMEA and system testing, re-evaluation of these calculations will be required to insure that the test system requirements are not impacted.

3.3.6.1 Detection Assurance

Validation of the supplier's detection assurance calculation is required to insure compliance with the test system detection requirements. The figures used in the supplier's calculation should match the failure data listed in the system FMEA and test routine. Consequently, compilation and computation of the FMEA failure data for the detection/undetected failure modes in accordance with the defined formula should conform to this requirement.

3.3.6.2 Isolation Certainty

Review of the supplier's isolation certainty calculation should be conducted to substantiate compliance with the isolation requirement. This review involves accumulating the system's LRU failure rates (for detected failures only) as defined in the FMEA and then segregating them according to how they are isolated in the test routine. Care must be taken that each LRU's failure rates are properly separated so that the correct calculation is used for the uniquely isolated LRU failure rates and those isolated in groups of two or more. Verification of this isolation certainty calculation is most important since this is the prime function of the test system.

3.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF TEST CONFIGURATION

After data from each of the suppliers has been received, reviewed, and approved, the prime contractor test system design group has the responsibility of integrating the various aircraft system and subsystem tests to an optimum configuration. This configuration must fulfill not only the performance requirements imposed on the suppliers, but must meet the overall weapon system requirements as well. These include not only the onboard test system detection assurance and isolation certainty requirements but also the ability of the test system to permit the availability and maintainability requirements of the weapon system to be satisfied. There may be more than one combination of tests which can qualify in meeting or exceeding all the requirements, in which case further analysis must be made with respect to cost so that the most cost effective arrangement can be selected. Even so, the final selection must be approved by the Air Force, who may decide that certain reductions in requirements result in a more cost effective test configuration. This decision or acceptance must be made by the Air Force before documentation can be completed and used as a basis for detailed software development.

3.4.1 ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES

Any combination of tests must be made up of individual tests selected in accordance with some sheme which establishes priorities. Otherwise, a conglomeration of tests may result which satisfies quantitative performance requirements but which may exclude a test or tests vital to safety of flight or mission success.

Obviously, all tests involving failure modes which impact safety of flight must be included mandatorily. If at all possible, failure modes impacting safety of personnel, safety of equipment, and mission success should be covered by tests, but need not be mandatory. Overall, the priorities of tests selected for incorporation should be:

- 1. Tests for failure modes impacting safety of flight (mandatory).
- 2. Tests for failure modes impacting safety of personnel.
- 3. Tests for failure modes impacting safety of equipment.
- 4. Tests for failure modes impacting mission success.
- 5. Tests for failure modes impacting safety/subsystem performance.

The optimum combination of tests will almost certainly not include all of the tests listed above, but for the purpose of providing a basis for comparison a set of calculations should be made for detection assurance (D) and isolation certainty (I) using all of the tests devised. Conformance of the calculated D to the availability requirement (A) and of the calculated I to the maintainability requirement (M) should be checked. The values obtained for D and I will be the maximum attainable.

Calculations should be made from a selected group of tests which result in minimum allowable values for D and I, where "allowable" means that D, I, A, and M requirements are met and that all mandatory tests are included. Other combinations of tests should then be used which give a maximum value for D with a minimum allowable I, and then again for a maximum I with minimum allowable D. The four combinations of tests resulting from the foregoing calculations will then be comprised of the two extremes (maximum and minimum) and two combinations of the two extremes, relative to the two basic performance requirements for an onboard test system - detection assurance and isolation certainty. From these four sets of tests, other mixtures can be derived which compromise the extremes to various degrees. All of these possibilities are candidates for the final test configuration, subject to the results of a cost analysis.

3.4.2 COST ANALYSIS

The purpose of a cost analysis is, of course, to determine the most costeffective test configuration. This involves a somehwat detailed comparison of development costs, production costs, and support cost of all of the candidate test configurations, including the cost of any TMDE necessary to supplement the onboard test system in achieving full failure detection and isolation capabilities. The cost analysis covers the period of time from the beginning of the development phase to the end of the contemplated service life of the test system, so that the entire life cycle is considered.

The cost model recommended for use in determining cost-effectiveness of the onboard test system is the one given in MIL-STD-1591 (On-Aircraft, Fault Dignosis, Subsystems, Analysis/Synethesis Of), as shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost} &= \text{C}_{\text{D}} + \text{NC}_{\text{P}} + \text{C}_{\text{aux}} + \text{ZC}_{\text{maux}} \\ &+ (1 - \text{P}_{\text{F}}) \left[\text{N}_{\text{F}} \text{P}_{\text{E}} \text{TZ} \left(\text{MMH}_{\text{i}} + \text{MMH}_{\text{S}} \right) \right] \left(\text{C}_{\text{MH}} \right) \\ &+ \text{P}_{\text{F}} \left(\text{N}_{\text{F}} \lambda \text{P}_{\text{E}} \text{TZ} \right) \left[\left(\text{MMH}_{\text{RP}} \right) \left(\text{C}_{\text{MH}} \right) + \text{C}_{\text{FD}} \right] \\ &+ \text{N}_{\text{F}} \lambda \text{I} \text{TZ} \left[\text{C}_{\text{IFMA}} + \left(\text{C}_{\text{IFMP}} \right) \left(\text{C}_{\text{MH}} \right) \right] \\ &+ \frac{\text{N}_{\text{F}} \text{TZ}}{\text{T}_{\text{DM}}} \left(\text{MMH}_{\text{PM}} \right) \left(\text{C}_{\text{MH}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Where:

 $C_{\rm D}$ = Development cost of the onboard test system.

N = Number of units of onboard test system or units containing onboard test system produced.

C_p = Average production cost of onboard test system (the average
 cost of a single unit).

C_{aux} = Total cost of any auxiliary test or maintenance equipment, external to onboard test system, required to support or complete fundamental onboard test system tasks. (For example, a supplemental piece of test equipment necessary to complete a fault isolation task).

- Z = Number of years the unit onboard test system is contemplated to be in service,
- C = Cost per year of maintaining all repaired auxiliary test or maintenance equipment.
 - P_F = Proportion of prime equipment's faults not detected by applicable onboard test system.
 - N_F = Average number of units of onboard test system or units containing onboard test system in field use at any time.
 - λP_E = Failure rate of prime equipment(s) which onboard test system
 serves (does not include failure rate of ports belonging
 uniquely to onboard test system), in failures per flight hour.
 - T = Flight hours/unit onboard test system/year
- MMH_i = Average maintenance manhours required for initial fault detection
 and isolation by onboard test system (NOTE: If fault detection
 and isolation is fully automatic, MMH_i = 0).
- MMH_S = Average maintenance manhours required for secondary isolation (to determine which is the malfunctioning LRU in those cases where initial isolation is ambiguous).
- C_{MH} = Cost per maintenance manhour.
- MMH_{RP} = Average maintenance manhours required for manual troubleshooting to isolate to an LRU in those cases where a failure is not detected by the onboard test system.
 - C_{FD} = Average cost to determine that a failure has occurred.
 - λI = Failure rate of onboard test system.
- C_{IFMA} = Average cost per onboard test system failure (material, spares, etc.).
- C_{IFMP} = Average number of manhours required to repair an onboard test system failure.
 - $T_{\begin{subarray}{c} PM \end{subarray}}$ = Flight hours between preventive maintenance actions for onboard test system.

MMH_{PM} = Average maintenance manhours per onboard test system preventive maintenance action.

The cost model elements can be identified and more simply defined as follows:

- 1. Cost of development.
- 2. Average cost of production unit.
- 3. Cost of TMDE.
- 4. Cost of maintaining TMDE.
- 5. Cost of manhours for failure detection (detectable failures).
- 6. Cost of manhours for failure isolation (detectable failures).
- 7. Cost of manhours for failure detection (nondetectable failures).
- 8. Cost of manhours for failure isolation (nondetectable failures).
- 9. Cost of maintaining onboard test system.
- 10. Cost of preventive maintenance on onboard test system.

It is apparent that the costs are basically those related to the cost of hardware (test system, TMDE, spare parts) and to the cost of maintenance manpower. Reductions in cost can only take place in these two general areas. Normally, an increase in the capability of an onboard test system to detect and isolate failures could be expected to increase the cost of developing and producing the test system hardware, while reducing the cost of TMDE (less TMDE required) and maintenance actions. Thus, the cost comparison of an existing onboard test system to an improved system is less likely to show a dramatic cost savings than is the comparison of a ground test concept to an onboard test system.

A study of the cost effectivity of an advanced version of CITS for the B-1 aircraft versus a ground test system to accomplish the same level of testing showed that for 111 aircraft over a period of 20 years, a total of \$293,120,000 would be saved by installing the CITS. It was found that the lower cost of the CITS approach was primarily due to the fact that fault detection and fault isolation testing is performed in parallel with normal flight operations wherein

the ground test concept requires ground operating time to test and determine the health of the aircraft. This additional ground test time significantly increases aircraft system operating time, thereby increasing aircraft hardware failures. The cost of this additional testing time (maintenance manhours) and the repair and replenishment cost of aircraft spares contributed more than 60 percent of the cost difference.

3.4.3 FINAL SELECTION

After the various alternate possibilities of test configurations have been compared by cost analysis, the one configuration which comes out as most cost effective would normally be documented and implemented. However, the cost differentials may be small enough to warrant consideration of one or more of higher detection assurance, higher isolation confidence, greater availability, or better maintainability. In other words, the customer may be willing to pay a little more for increased performance benefits. Therefore, the customer must be fully apprised of the results of all cost analysis and alternate configuration capabilities so that the final selection is either made by him or receives his total approval.

3.5 DOCUMENTATION

After the process of evaluating functional requirements, specifying these requirements for procurement, evaluating supplier responses, and making a final selection of a test configuration has been completed, the results must be documented.

To be of maximum utility, documentation must be carefully assembled so that the total test configuration description is not only complete and accurate, but is presented in a clear and logical manner. Even though separate documents will be prepared describing test system hardware, aircraft subsystem hardware, test software, and support equipment, it should be kept in mind that the readers of the test requirements document will include those with widely varying interests.

Primarily, the information would be of greatest interest to the software designers who must translate the test requirements into a software program. However, portions, if not all, of the information would most certainly prove to be helpful to maintenance personnel, aircraft subsystem designers, logistics personnel, TMDE designers, flight crews, flight test analysts, and customer personnel involved in the evaluation of not only the onboard test system but of the aircraft subsystems as well.

3.5.1 CONTENT

The basic content of the test requirements document will be a description of the test configuration. This configuration consists of the individual tests selected as necessary to satisfy the functional requirements. However, the presentation of this information necessarily requires various types and quantities of other supporting information. It is recommended that this supporting information be such that a complete background of the reasoning and processes leading to the selection of the particular tests is provided, as well as an explanation of the theory and structuring of the tests themselves. This may include block diagrams, perspective drawings, equations, schematics, wiring diagrams, illustrations, and logic diagrams. Care should be taken to confine the use of these types of supporting data to only those portions pertinent and directly applicable to avoid confusing the reader with unnecessary or unimportant facts.

A description of the aircraft subsystem under test should be included to provide the reader with an understanding of the physical aspects of the subsystem and the functions and operation of the subsystem, including the subsystem performance criteria used in developing the tests selected. This would then support a description of the test approach and rationale, which would follow.

An actual explanation of each test should be given in the text, following the same sequence as is used in the test logic diagram. The test logic diagram is a pictorial, or diagrammatic, representation of the tests encompassing the test requirements. This type of presentation is described in paragraph 3.2.2.4.4 of Section 3 and illustrated by figure 3-9.

The use of the test logic diagrams requires a list of the aircraft subsystem LRU's and a list of the test parameters associated with the particular tests. These lists are described and illustrated in Section 3 (paragraphs 3.2.2.4.2.1 and 3.2.2.4.3).

3.5.2 FORMAT

Normally, the quantity of information to be included in the documentation of test requirements would preclude the use of a single document for the overall aircraft test configuration. It is recommended that the documentation be prepared in separate volumes, each of which addresses the testing of a single aircraft subsystem.

The sequence of presentation of the contents of each volume should be the same and should follow a logical pattern. Based on the content described in the previous paragraph, it is recommended that the following format be used:

- A. Aircraft Subsystem Description
 - 1. Function
 - 2. Performance
 - 3. Operation
- B. Test Approach
 - 1. Basic Subsystem Test Requirements
 - a. Criteria
 - b. Rationale
 - 2. Test System Application
 - a. LRU list
 - b. Parameter List
 - c. Failure Detection Tests
 - d. Fault Isolation Tests
 - e. Test Logic Diagrams

Although the parameter list could be included as a part of each volume, it is felt that a separate document listing all test parameters for the entire aircraft test configuration would be of greater use. Therefore, a reference to such a document in each separate test requirement document would replace the parameter list.

3.6 SUMMARY

The development of a set of tests to be conducted by an onboard test system involves an orderly process whereby given tasks are conducted and accomplished in an established sequence. The process involves four basic tasks: 1) Evaluation of functional requirements, 2) Specification of requirements for subcontractors and suppliers, 3) Evaluation of subcontractor/supplier data, and 4) Documentation of the final test configuration. The first two tasks require separate examinations of the requirements imposed on the onboard test system and of the requirements impacting the design of aircraft systems interfacing with the test system. Candidate test configurations are derived from data submitted by subcontractors/suppliers, after which the contractor conducts cost analyses on each alternate configuration prior to selecting and recommending a final configuration for the customer's consideration/approval. Agreement on the test configuration to be implemented prefaces the task of documentation, whereby not only are the tests described, but relevant information is presented to give an insight into the process and reasoning behind the formulation of an optimum test selection.

Appendix D, "B-1 CITS Implementation Summary". is provided as a qualitative evaluation of test mechanizations resulting from the OBTS requirements analysis process.

Section 4

TEST SYSTEM HARDWARE DESIGN

4.1 DERIVATION OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

When implementing an onboard test system, design of the test system hardware and its interface with the various subsystems under test must be defined, developed, and implemented in parallel with the development of the prime weapon system. The test system hardware must provide the basic functions of acquisition, processing, and dissemination of the test data. The test system designer has to determine what analyses and various trade studies are needed to select hardware, or combination of hardware, to best suit each of the three basic test functions for his particular application. In addition, the test system designer must determine what test parameters are needed to perform the test functions and how the test system will be mechanized to access the test data. When needed test signals are not available to the test system, the designer must add these interfaces to the weapon system through the addition of unique test sensors. When selecting existing test signals or when adding new test interfaces the test technique should, when possible, utilize test parameters that provide more than one piece of test data. The test technique should also make use of available operational signals to the maximum extent possible. Finally, the designer must consider what test techniques and hardware best supports testing of off-the-shelf hardware utilized by the subsystems under test and what test techniques and interfaces should be implemented in hardware being newly designed, or modified, for the weapon system.

4.1.1 GENERAL HARDWARE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY

The following represents general hardware design philosophies which the designer should utilize when analyzing and performing trade studies to develop an onboard test system.

1. Input/Output Signal Isolation

The onboard test system should be isolated from the system under test to insure that any failure in the test system will not propagate to the system under test and interface with the functional operation.

2. Stimulus Signals

Test stimuli should be at minimum levels to insure that there are no extraneous system responses, other than expected.

3. Interface Circuitry

Whenever possible existing interfaces should be utilized in order to minimize the added test circuitry impact on the systems under test.

4. Common Test Points

Optimization of testing is enhanced by the selection of test points that provide multiple test parameters. This will minimize the input/output circuitry of the test mechanization.

5. Test Hardware Reliability

The reliability of the test hardware should exceed the reliability of the system under test. If this is not done the occurrence of failures in the test circuitry could exceed the number of failures occurring in the system under test.

6. Test Hardware Simplicity

The test hardware complexity should be minimized in order to reduce the probability of failure and increase reliability.

7. Maintainability

This factor affects cost, weight, and the physical characteristics of the entire test system. Affected physical characteristics include:

- A. Coupling requirements for power and cooling.
- B. Access of the black boxes of the test system by maintenance personnel.

C. Ease of replacing used materials such as lighting elements, recorder tape cartridges, and hardcopy printer paper.

4.2 TEST SYSTEM CONTROL

The test system must have the means of controlling the processing of test data and performing the logical steps developed to to test the aircraft subsystem. Within the context of this design guide, system level implementation is provided and is not to be interpreted as LRU BIT which is discussed in many other design guides written on that subject. Basically, there are two general approaches to test system control: (1) with a centralized computer system or (2) with a distributed computer system. The following discusses these two methods with regards to the advantages, disadvantages, and selection guidelines.

Although the centralized and distributed computer system approaches are each discussed below, it must be noted that a combination of these approaches may be the optimum solution in a particular application. This is especially true when some systems under test require a dedicated computer for functional purposes.

4.2.1 TYPES

4.2.1.1 Centralized Test Control

The centralized test system control involves the use of a central computer or processor which has total control over the test system operation. The central computer tells the devices used for data acquisition what data to access and when to send the data to the computer. It also directs and controls the devices used to transmit the data to the system operator and data storage devices. Finally, the central processor has stored within its memory real-time test programs for analyzing aircraft system operation and determining when a system is malfunctioning.

The following discusses some of the more important advantages and disadvantages of designing/implementing a centralized approach to onboard testing.

4.2.1.1.1 Advantages

- 4.2.1.1.1.1 Conservation of Software. The number of software instructions needed are reduced in the centralized test approach because the executive and control programs are shared by all of the test programs, therefore reducing time and money expenditures in developing and maintaining one main software program versus several individual programs required by a distributed type system.
- 4.2.1.1.1.2 Test Mechanization Placement. The centralized test approach enables the transfer of the test mechanization from the individual system LRU, which may use hardwired or PROM test logic, into the test system computer. This reduces the circuitry in these devices to what is necessary for operational functions and the provisions to provide conditioned test parameters to the test system. The reduction in circuitry ultimately reduces the weight of the system/LRU while increasing the system/LRU reliability. In addition, if the test circuitry/logic is hardwired in the LRU, changes to the device are more costly and require much longer time spans to incorporate. During the initial definition of the B-1 CITS, a study was conducted on the Mark II avionics system to determine its effect on centralized testing. It was determined that implementing the test logic within the Mark II hardware would cause as much as a 30 percent increase in weight and a resultant decrease in reliability of 18 percent. When the centralized concept was examined relative to Mark II hardware impact, it was determined that the circuitry required to access and condition the test parameters for CITS testing purposes added approximately a 5 percent increase in weight and a resultant decrease in reliability of 3 percent.

- 4.2.1.1.3 Technical Risk. During the development of the systems under test many problems arise and full attention has to be given to their solution. If the test logic function is contained in each subsystem, many system/test logic interrelated problems could arise which would increase the technical risk of the timely advancement of both the test system and operational system development. By limiting only test parameters to be implemented into the system design, and not test logic circuitry, development of both systems can be done relatively in parallel with one another.
- 4.2.1.1.1.4 <u>Common Test Control/Systems Status Panel</u>. The centralized approach affords the design option of using a common test control/systems status panel presentation of all system statuses to the flight crew. In a distributed BIT system the failure indications are displayed on multiple control/status panels distributed throughout the crew station. The distributed display configuration would make a quick-look system status capability difficult.
- 4.2.1.1.5 Equipment Additions. The centralized test approach utilization of a common data bus affords the designer the options of easily adding failure maintenance data storage devices, hardcopy printers, and additional DAD's if the test requirements warrant them.

4.2.1.1.2 Disadvantages

The one disadvantage with the centralized approach is the need to preprocess (i.e., change the order of the parameters in the computer memory to be able to perform the software tests in an optimum manner). The parameter order in the computer is dictated by the order in which the signals are wired to the DAD. The wiring of signals to the DAD is dependent on system location in the aircraft, density of signals to be acquired from any one location, and accessibility of a DAD in that location. There are two solutions to this problem.

- 1. Perform system-by-system planning of test interface requirements to the DAD to minimize preprocessing requirements by:
 - A. Assignment of DAD input/output channels to minimize need to reorder data.
 - B. Placement of DAD to optimize pin assignments to input channels to the test system.
- 2. Off-load the central computer task of parameter reordering to the DAD by the incorporation of a microprocessor in the DAD.


4.2.1.2 Distributed Test Control

Distributed test system control differs from centralized control in that all of the common functions, such as data acquisition, scaling, parameter isolation, processing, and failure/system status display, have to be incorporated or duplicated in each system under test. This comparison is illustrated in Figure 4-1. Although there is test hardware duplication in the distributed approach, there are certain advantages to this type of mechanization.

4.2.1.1.2.1 Advantages

When hardware test logic is used, test data aging is minimized because the acquisition time is minimized due to the signals being isolated, scaled, and directly fed into the LRU logic circuitry.

4.2.1.2.2 Disadvantages



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Distributed VersusCentralized Omboard Test Philosophies Figure 4-1

- 4.2.1.2.2.1 Weight. The weight increase for the distributed approach is usually greater than for the centralized case. Both techniques require that test signals be conditioned, scaled, and isolated. In the centralized case these would be done within the system LRU and fed into the central computer via DAD's for processing, utilizing common software and hardware. The distributed system would require repeated hardware/software logic and display apparatus to be added to each system to accomplish the test function, thus adding a greater complexity to each system LRU.
- 4.2.1.2.2.2 <u>Failure Analysis</u>. The distributed test approach inhibits maintenance failure analysis. The functional parameters utilized by the BIT are usually unavailable for data recording purposes, which decreases the effectivity of a maintenance ground processing system prediction of incipient failures. By eliminating this prediction capability maintenance action cannot occur before failure of the LRU for those systems where failure predicting/trending is feasible.
- 4.2.1.2.2.3 <u>Logic Changes</u>. If the distributed system uses and hardware logic to perform the test function, changes to the test logic would be very costly and time consuming.

4.2.2 SELECTION GUIDELINES

The task of selecting a centralized test system or a distributed one involves many trade studies and evaluations. Items to be considered are discussed in the following paragraphs.

4.2.2.1 Weight

The designer must estimate the total weight impact of each type of testing scheme and decide which has the advantage in his application.

4.2.2.2 Cost

Cost trade studies are required to determine which approach, centralized or distributed, provides minimum total costs, including flyaway and life cycle, and still meets contract requirements.

4.2.2.3 Reliability

The reliability factors are the most nebulous of all the considerations made. The designer will have to get his estimates from people who specialize in the area of reliability and weigh this against what the alternatives are for not adding test circuitry to his operational black box.

4.2.2.4 Implementation Time

The designer will have to estimate the total design, development, and testing times necessary for each test technique and compare this to his total aircraft development schedule for feasibility.

4.2.2.5 Air Crew

The air crew has limited time to status system health. The designer would have to estimate the time constraints in this area and decide which method complies with the needs of the air crew.

4.2.2.6 Space Availability

For either of the two test methods discussed, centralized or distributed, these would be a delta to space usage. The designer would have to estimate the space required by both methods and compare this to the space available.

4.2.2.7 Support Equipment (SE)

The type of SE procured for field operations purposes would differ depending on what type of test system is implemented. These pieces of equipment

and their usage are part of the overall maintenance plan which is specified by the contractor.

4.2.2.8 Contractor Requirements

In some instances the contractor may dictate to the designer certain required capabilities. These all have to be analyzed and traded off with the previously discussed factors and presented to the contractor for approval.

4.3 DISPLAY


An onboard test system acquisitions data, performs tests, and displays the results for the flight and maintenance crew. The presentation of test results to the crew requires means for providing clear and easily understandable descriptions of detected faults by the onboard test system. Display devices available vary from single light emitting devices, with display messages engraved on the surface, to large cathode ray tubes presenting full page alphanumeric messages or symbols. The display is subject to standards for human interface requirements which include visibility, color, standard abbreviations (language), techniques of interaction with manual controls, operation position, available space, and systems environmental conditions such as ambient light, vibration, and temperature.

4.3.1 TYPES

In this section two types of displays will be discussed: 1) a dedicated legend display such as used on the B-1 CITS system and 2) a cathode ray tube display. A description of the B-1 CITS display is provided for the first display type and the reasons for choosing the display elements are given.

4.3.1.1 CITS Control and Display Panel (CCD)

The following presents a description of the CCD (see Figure 4-2) provided for the B-1 aircraft in order to comply with the contract requirement



B-1 CITS Control and Display Panel (CCD)

Figure 4-2

of displaying the aircraft status to the crew continuously during aircraft operation both in-flight and on the ground.

A CCD, located in the aft crew station, is provided as part of the CITS subsystem. The CCD simultaneously indicates status of the subsystems and/or modes of operation of the subsystems while in-flight or on the ground. Subsystem operation outside of performance limits is indicated by illuminating a visual display and subsystem operation within performance limits is indicated by the absence of a visual display. No special catalogs or handbooks are required, and no understanding of special, complex coded language required of the crew to interpret the CITS status display. The display is sized to accommodate air vehicle and avionics subsystem status with a 10 to 15 percent growth capability. Controls are provided for mode selection and display control. Capability to reset the illuminated legends by the crew is also provided. A multipurpose alphanumeric display is provided for readout of pertinent maintenance information in abbreviated English messages. Control is provided for active ground testing of each aircraft subsystem by insertion of a system test code through a data entry keyboard. Preflight data, (such as tail number, engine serial number, aircraft data, etc.) is inserted by keyboard entry prior to flight for entry onto the maintenance recorder and hardcopy printer for tracking purposes.

The description given for the CITS CCD provides an example of a device which includes several different methods of man-machine interfaces. The first is the illumination of an engraved message panel to convey the failure message to the operator. This method is the most commonly used technique, in military aircraft, to communicate caution and warning to pilots. The second technique utilized is the alphanumeric display which used incandescent type elements to make up the individual letters. The rationale for using an incandescent device in lieu of Light Emitting Diodes (LED) is that the LED's are only available in colors of red and green, while human factors requirements, as specified in MIL-STD-1472, requires amber colored lighting to be used.

In general, when requirements demand restricted weight, low power consumption, capability of being visible in direct sumlight, and high reliability. LED display devices should be chosen where color is not a factor. When the incandescent light elements were chosen for the dedicated legend displays to meet the color requirements they were designed to utilize two bulbs per device so that a single filament failure would not cause loss of the failure indication. The alphanumeric display was made up of many incandescent elements creating the numbers or letters. It was felt that when one element of the letter or number was lost, improper interpretation by the crew would be at a minimum, therefore dual elements were not utilized. The third type of interface device used was switches (on/off, mode selection, and pushbutton matrices). These devices give the operator control of the system operation. For the CITS application the mechanical contact type devices were chosen because when inputting data into the system, the operator would receive feedback that his individual actions have been completed in that he can feel contact was made in the switch.

The CITS CCD exemplified a dedicated onboard test display panel which poses two advantages. The major advantage to using the dedicated type of display is the ability to provide redundancy where a single filament failure will not cause loss of the failure indication. The second advantage is that a total aircraft status is displayed at all times similar to a caution and warning panel.

4.3.1.2 Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)

In the area of information output the CRT device has a higher density of data per a specified space than any other known device and does not have to be physically modified to accommodate minor changes in the test system output requirements. A disadvantage with CRT's is that the electronics which supply it information is more complex, therefore subject to higher failure rates than those supplying information to a device such as the B-1 CITS CCD.

Another disadvantage with the CRT is the total loss of display with a single failure in the CR tube.

The CRT device is basically developed from vacuum tube technology. The basic nine inch (diagonal) CRT requires approximately ten thousand volts to illuminate the screen, which produces electromagnetic fields, possibly affecting instruments onboard the aircraft. These effects are controllable by incorporating shielding material around the high voltage power supply and CRT. These disadvantages should not be taken to supersede the fact that the most flexible choice for an output device would be a CRT.

When designing the display for an onboard test system the designer would have to perform trade studies to be able to choose between a multifunction device such as a CCD and single function (display) device such as a CRT. The designer would have to analyze the trades concerning weight, cost, volume, power consumption, and software coding necessary to perform the display function.

4.3.2 SELECTION GUIDELINES FOR DISPLAYS

4.3.2.1 Aircraft Type

The aircraft type and operational requirements would influence the display requirements for the onboard test system. A test system being developed for a small aircraft may only require priority coded failure data to be presented to the pilot and therefore could timeshare an existing multifunction display with other aircraft systems. A larger, more complex aircraft may require a dedicated display to provide continual aircraft system status. If the aircraft is required to operate out of austere and dispersed bases, the control and display device chosen must accommodate both flight and ground crew usage by displaying system failures to the flight crew to determine remaining mission capability and maintenance data relating to maintenance actions required by the ground crew. In order to determine the method of display

best suited for a particular application, analysis and trade studies need to be conducted with respect to the following elements:

- A. Operating environment of the display.
- B. Operational requirements of the aircraft.
- C. Amount of data to be displayed at one time.
- D. Contract requirements for the display.
- E. Format and content of displayed data.
- F. Reliability of display device chosen.
- G. Effect of failures on display requirements.
- H. Advantages/disadvantages of time sharing displays with other aircraft systems.
- I. Human factor requirements such as cone of vision and crew access.

4.3.2.2 Space Allocation

The available space for the test system control and display device in combination with the amount and format of the data that must be displayed to the user, highly influences the type of display selected. If the space is limited, the designer needs to select the display device that affords him sufficient flexibility in its display output. This requirement could be met with a multifunction display, an alphanumeric display, or a CRT display. The designer, therefore, must trade off the different options available to him that can be accommodated in his allocated space and select the one that is most effective.

An example of a space allocation trade study is the following:

In the original design concepts of the B-1 CITS, two displays were planned: 1) a crew status display and 2) a maintenance control and status panel. Analysis showed that a large number of functions were common to both panel requirements. A cost and weight trade study was conducted to determine the effect of providing a single panel for both flight and maintenance crew usage. The study indicated that for a slight increase in crew station panel space

allocation, significant savings in cost and weight could be realized. As a result of this study, the panel space allocation was increased and both panel functions were combined into a single panel.

4.3.2.3 Human Engineering Requirements

The human engineering requirements carry a high priority when designing equipment where man-machine interfaces are involved. Human engineering requirements have to be accounted for in the selection and final design of the display device. Human engineering requirements include:

- 1. Panel legend design.
- 2. Cone of vision of crew to display panel.
- 3. Crew reach access to panel.
- 4. Size and shape of pushbutton and switches.
- 5. Color and brightness of displays.

4.3.2.4 User Skill Level Requirements

User level requirements represent those guidelines defining the intelligence, training, and experience of the user of the test system. These requirements play an important role in the design of the display in a manner of setting the ground rules for establishing the content and overall configuration of the display such that the information presented can be easily understood by the user level specified by the customer.

4.4 DATA ACQUISITION

The basic function of an onboard test system is to detect and isolate failures in the aircraft systems. To perform this function, the test system must acquire the necessary subsystem signal parameters required to conduct the various test algorithms for each system tested. The major sources for these signal parameters are: operational signals, existing LRU test parameters, individual LRU BIT status, and added test interfaces and sensors.

The test system must interface with these signal sources, which may be analog, discrete, or serial digital, and convert these signals to a format compatible for transmission to the test system data processor(s). Test system hardware must be developed to access each test parameter, process the data, and provide the test results to the flight and maintenance crews. Methods for performing these functions are therefore discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of each method is provided.

The acquisition of test data can be costly both in weight and dollars if not done properly. Past experience indicates that the "at-the-source" data acquisition technique satisifies these two criteria of minimum added weight and minimum dollars because the acquisition unit utilizes common conversion circuitry which is shared by all systems under test. The DAD would serve three separate but related functions: 1) data acquisition of monitored parameters from system, 2) conversion of the signals to data bus format for transmission to central computer, and 3) an isolation device which enables the test system hardware or software failures not to interfere with the normal operation of the system under test.

4.4.1 SIGNAL TYPES

There are three basic signal types used for onboard testing purposes:

- 1. Analog
- 2. Discrete
- 3. Serial Digital

4.4.1.1 Analog Signals

Analog parameters can be monitored by the test system as:

- 1. Force
- 2. Stress
- 3. Torque
- 4. Pressure

- 5. Translational Velocity
- 6. Strain
- 7. Temperature
- 8. Displacement
- 9. Flow Rate
- 10. Angula: Velocity

The above parameters can be monitored as voltages by means of electronic conversion circuitry situated in the LRU's of the system under test, or in the DAD of the onboard test system. The test system designer must analyze the systems he is testing, both off-the-shelf and new designs, in order to decide what voltage ranges are most prevelant so that he can specify these for his test system analog interfaces. These parameter ranges most likely would be one or more of the following:

- 1. OV to + 10V
- 2. -10V to +10V
- 3. OV to + 28V
- 4. OV to + 5V
- 5. -5V to + 5V

The designer should also perform a trade study on cost incurred when designing for any of the voltage ranges he is considering in order to obtain the most cost effective design. The B-1 CITS program used the 0-5V range because circuitry costs were less than for other ranges and zero to five volt scaling circuitry is readily available, thus keeping development costs to a minimum.

When utilizing many analog signals from one system LRU, the designer should consider a serial analog interface in order to reduce the number of input/output circuits necessary to acquire the system data for testing purposes. This type of interface would involve using a serial digital address channel to request the parameters to be sampled, one at a time, and a common analog input circuit for sampling the requested signals. The one problem in this

technique is the time required to sample large quantities of signals when comparison tests are being utilized in the test logic. The data samples taken would have aged enough that a comparison between the parameters would occasionally result in a false indication by the test system.

Another area of concern when using analog signals for system testing is the implementation of sample and hold circuitry in the DAD. The sample and hold function enables the designer to effectively have a multiparameter simultaneous sampling function. The following are examples of when this function can be used:

- 1. To check redundant subsystems by measuring the same test point in each of the redundant circuits and comparing them.
- 2. In the area of engine testing, the same test points for all engines can be checked against each other for comparison.

4.4.1.2 Discretes

4.4.1.2.1 Input Discretes

Input discretes can represent one of the following states:

- 1. Open or Closed
- 2. High or Low
- 3. In or Out
- 4. On or Off

These signals can be provided by switch closures, proximity switches, and discrete voltage levels.

Normally a voltage discrete signal is zero volts for logic zero and five volts for logic one, but they also could be:

- 1. OV = logic 0, + 28V = logic 1
- 2. OV = logic 0, + 10V = logic 1

The designer would have to perform studies to determine which is the optimal form for him to use related to the type of equipment used on the aircraft.

The resultant DAD design should have the capability of accepting both ON/OFF voltage discretes and switch closures, depending on the neede establisted by the designer's studies of the number and type of discretes needed for testing purposes.

The input discretes obtained by the test system are used to either obtain failure information directly or establish preconditions for a test on a system.

4.4.1.2.2 Output Discretes

When the contractor's maintenance concept requires verification of maintenance action by test, additional testing capability beyond passive system monitoring is necessary. The added testing capability would involve stimulating a system, on the ground only, by means of discrete signal outputs from the test system. The usage of these type of output discretes would be to activate those circuits which would not be active during normal ground operations.

When implementing this type of active testing in such systems as flight controls or avionics where either aircraft surface movement or high intensity radio transmission is possible, certain safety precautions have to be taken. To implement such a test the designer, working with the safety analysts, would study the precautions necessary in order that: 1) the active test can never occur while the aircraft is in-flight and 2) the ground crew can execute the test safely. To solve the problem of safety in ground testing the B-1 CITS personnal developed a scheme to lock out testing if certain preconditions were not present in the aircraft. The following example is posed to illustrate how this function is executed in a system.

The example deals with the B-1 aircraft AICS. This system, when stimulated by CITS, simulates changes in aircraft Mach number and, via the AICS controller, moves the variable surfaces of the inlet duct to the engine. The movement of these surfaces is very hazardous to anyone inside the duct, near the duct sides, or near the front opening. To insure safety of this test a triple software and triple hardware lockout mechanism was developed. The triple software lockout was comprised of the CITS establishing three conditions to be present on the aircraft before the output discrete could be used to the AICS for test commencement. The three conditions were:

- 1. Landing gear squat switch closed (aircraft is on the ground).
- 2. Parking brake on.
- 3. Stimulus switch on CCD manually depressed (closed).

The triple hardware lockout would be similar but would be implemented within the system LRU under test to insure redundancy of the safety lockout.

A significant aspect of the lockout mechanism is the stimulus switch on the control/display panel. The switch enables the operator to have the option to terminate the test if conditions surrounding the aircraft take a sudden change, possibly endangering the ground crew.

4.4.1.3 Serial Digital

The serial digital interface is the most economical of all the input/output circuits when many signals are required from a single LRU. The capability of being able to transmit many signals on a single pair of wires reduces weight in aircraft wiring and the amount of test system and LRU input/output circuitry.

Another advantage the serial digital interface has is in the area of fixed analog values and accuracy during transmittal. When the signal originates as an analog within a system black box it is in a low noise environment. At the source it is converted to a digital signal, fixing it at a particular

value and accuracy. The fixed value is then transmitted on request along a pair of wires to the DAD.

For new system designs, the designer would first have to determine how many signals are required from a single LRU. He would then perform a study estimating the cost and weight impact of hardwiring all of the signals and implementing a serial digital interface between the LRU and the DAD. When these estimates have been prepared the designer would weigh them against the aircraft design constraints and decide between the hardwired or serial digital interfaces for implementation.

4.4.2 SELECTION GUIDELINES FOR DAD

4.4.2.1 Aircraft Signal Location Density

Aircraft signal location density is an extremely important factor in the design of the onboard test system because it not only determines where and how many DAD's are necessary for the onboard test system, but also if a single DAD design is feasible for all locations or whether the design will require different configurations of the DAD's. Examples of low and high density areas on aircraft are listed below:

- 1. High signal density locations
 - A. Engines
 - B. Electrical generators
 - C. Hydraulic and fuel pumps
 - D. Engine controls
 - E. Pneumatic controls
- 2. Low signal density locations
 - A. Cargo and weapons bays
 - B. Outer wing areas

The low and high density areas for a particular aircraft would be determined when an overview of the aircraft systems is prepared. In low signal density locations, one may find that rerouting signals to a more dense area is more efficient than installing a DAD in that area. After the layouts of system installation are prepared, preliminary locations for DAD's near the high density centers would then be selected for design studies and spares allocations. The test designer would then determine the quantity and type of signals for each LRU located in each equipment location. After the above step is completed, the total number of each type of signal is determined in order to size the channel requirements for a given DAD location. In order to utilize a common DAD design, the DAD is sized for the quantity of each signal type for the most dense location for that signal type.

Tradeoffs relating weight, cost, and spares can then be made to determine if more than one DAD in a location would be more effective in order to maximize the used/spare channel requirements.

4.4.2.2 Timing of Samples

When the system test design requirements are written, analysis of the system response rate determines what data sampling rate is required for testing. In order to utilize a serial digital interface, all data obtained for testing purposes must be converted to serial digital form within the LRU from which the interface is made.

An example illustrating some of the restrictions that are involved in timing of data samples is shown in the following:

As an example, if one were to use sixteen samples per second for the test rate, the analog to digital converter would have to perform to a certain time span for conversion of the analog signals in order to complete its tasks in time for the test to be performed on the system. For this example assume that 100 analogs have to be converted in order to do a sixteen times per second test. Each time slot would have 62.5 milliseconds. This means the DAD would have

62.5 milliseconds to sample and digitize 100 analog signals, at 0.625 milliseconds per signal. Analog to digital converters range from conversion times of microseconds to milliseconds. For this example one would pick a conversion time of less than 0.625 milliseconds, which by state-of-the-art methods is easily met, but for amounts of signals in the thousands, finding A/D converters with the proper speed and accuracy is more difficult.

4.4.2.3 Signal Isolation Requirements

Another important factor in the design of the DAD is the signal isolation, through the DAD, from the system under test. Depending on what type of interface is involved, (discrete, analog, serial digital) the isolation techniques would differ. These techniques are discussed in paragraph 4.7.1.1.2.2.

4.4.2.4 Data Acquisition Accuracy

When acquiring serial digital, discrete, or analog data from a system under test, it is important to specify the accuracy of the test parameters for each of the systems under test. If not done, testing capability would be compromised, due to signals which are not accurate enough to detect subtle changes due to failures in the systems under test. When making decisions on obtainable signal accuracies, tradeoffs which have to be made involve the accuracy required to test the systems, and the cost of implementation. In onboard test systems, the test results are as accurate as the signals that are used. It is for this reason that the DAD hardware designer must specify the A/D conversion, analog, serial digital, and discrete accuracies that satisfy the performance requirements of the test system.

4.5 DATA RECORDING

Onboard recording of data acquired by the onboard test system provides the means for ground analysis of airborne malfunctions which cannot be

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duplicated on the ground, for extremely complex malfunctions beyond the scope of the onboard test system, and for engine and primary systems trending data during flight operations. The data recording capacity must be sufficient to provide time correlated maintenance data for failure events, for evaluation of subsystem accuracies, failure prediction, and reliability tracking of subsystem performance.

An onboard test recording capabilty provides the system designer with a means of increasing the efficiency of both the onboard test system and the aircraft systems during the development cycle. Data recording capacity is a function of failure rate predictions, average number of words recorded per failure, average mission flight times, and the types and numbers of trending blocks to be recorded. There are several types of recording devices and related selection guidelines which will be discussed in this section.

4.5.1 TYPES

4.5.1.1 Analog

Analog recorders are usually used when maximum resolution is desired to investigate system performance characteristics. These types of devices have multiple channels, recording one signal per channel. Analog recorders are not selective in what times are recorded, in that the recorder must be turned on and off to select when data would be recorded. In addition, when the recorder is wired for specific signals to be recorded, the only way to change signals is to rewire the device.

For an onboard test recording application, the analog method is not practical because of the limited capability to record many signals at any one time. In addition, the signals recorded are fixed and difficult to change, because of the hardwired configuration.

4.5.1.2 Serial Digital

The serial digital format is the most popular and practical form for recording data from an onboard test system. This method enables all data to be recorded on a four wire interface, with the capability of changing what is recorded via the software program in the test system. Serial digital recorders are lighter in weight than the analog type because common circuitry is used by all signals incoming from the test system, rather than having a separate channel for each.

4.5.2 HARDWARE

There are three basic types of data recording devices:

- 1. Disc Drive
- 2. Memory Drum
- 3. Magnetic Tape

In the following paragraphs the three devices are discussed with respect to their advantages and disadvantages as recording mechanisms for onboard test applications.

4.5.2.1 Disc Drive

4.5.2.1.1 Advantages

- 4.5.2.1.1.1 <u>Data Access Time</u>. In the areas of data reduction or data retrieval, this device excels beyond memory drums and magnetic tapes because the recording head has immediate access to the entire magnetic recording surface.
- 4.5.2.1.1.2 <u>Bit Density</u>. The disc drive has the capability of higher bit densities than the other two devices considered in this section.

4.5.2.1.2 Disadvantages

The disc drive is susceptible to vibration because the flat recording disc spins on a perfectly balanced shaft at very high speeds and the recording head must maintain a precise air gap between itself and the recording surface. Due to the inherent precision required for proper operation, current designs of disc drives are not adequate to withstand the rapid changes in vibration levels which are inherent in aircraft flight conditions.

4.5.2.2 Memory Drum

The memory drum device provides the maximum recording capacity of the three devices compared, and the least susceptible to data loss due to magnetic fields. There is one major area of concern and that is the mechanization of recorded data extraction. The memory drum itself is not removable from the device enclosure which would require the entire recorder to be removed from the aircraft and taken to the data processing station for data extraction. Utilization of this type of recorder would increase the amount of spares necessary to sustain a full-up flight ready configuration.

4.5.2.3 Magnetic Tape

Today all aircraft which utilize data recording, both military and commercial, have chosen magnetic tape devices for their application. The magnetic tape data recorder has the following advantages and disadvantages.

4.5.2.3.1 Advantages

4.5.2.3.1.1 <u>Airworthiness</u>. The magnetic recording head is fixed, whereas the disc drive has a movable head, thus enabling proper operation in a varying environment.

- 4.5.2.3.1.2 <u>Maintainability</u>. The hardware involved is the least complex of the three devices compared.
- 4.5.2.3.1.3 Reliability. Hardware simplicity leads to high reliability.
- 4.5.2.3.1.4 <u>Cost</u>. The probability of procuring an off-the-shelf magnetic tape recorder is high compared to a disc drive or memory drum device.

4.5.2.3.2 Disadvantages

- 4.5.2.3.2.1 Access Time. This is due to the inherent operation of the magnetic tape recorder in that to access a piece of data the tape has to wind or unwind to that point in the tape.
- 4.5.2.3.2.2 <u>Recording Capacity</u>. The available magnetic material for recording on a tape is less than that of a disc or memory drum.
- 4.5.2.3.2.3 <u>Bit Density</u>. The density of magnetic material on the tape is less than the other two devices compared.
- 4.5.2.3.2.4 <u>Impact of Disadvantages</u>. The above areas of concern have been overcome with high efficiency playback devices for access time improvement, multirecording tracks and special recording patterns for data density and capacity capabilities.

4.5.3 SELECTION GUIDELINES FOR RECORDING DEVICES

When selecting a recording device for a particular onboard test system application, the following factors must be considered before a selection is made:

- 1. <u>Airworthiness</u> This is the ability of the recording device to withstand the environment of vibration, temperature, and acoustic noise in which it must operate.
- Maintainability. These requirements would include such areas as ground crew access, ease of reloading, and ease of cleaning recording heads.
- 3. Accuracy. This pertains to the ability of the recorder to load the data onto the magnetic surface of the medium implemented with minimum errors.
- 4. Reliability. The reliability requirement has to be augmented by the mission completion reliability in order to establish what the recorder should perform to.
- 5. Cost
- 6. Weight
- 7. Recording Capacity. See paragraph 4.5.3.1.
- 8. <u>Bit Density</u>. This is a factor necessary in determining how much magnetic surface is necessary to record the required amount of data for one flight.

4.5.3.1 Recording Capacity Required

When the system test requirements have been established, including all test signals and sample rates, the data recording device can be sized for the task of recording by accounting for the following factors:

- 1. Number of failures per operating hour of the aircraft.
- 2. Number of total aircraft parameters to be recorded when a failure is detected.
- 3. Frequency of non-failure recordings of aircraft parameters.
- 4. Engine and general system trending data points, both frequency and quantity of signals.

- 5. Number of crew initiated aircraft data recordings per flight.
- 6. Maximum flight hours for a mission.

The following example illustrates what calculations are necessary to estimate the total recording capacity required for an onboard testing system.

For this example assume the following:

 N_f = Number of failures/hour = 2

 $N_{\rm p}$ = Number of parameters recorded/failure = 1,000

 f_p = Frequency of non-failure recordings/hour = 2

 f_e = Frequency of engine parameter recordings/flight = 5

 $N_{\rm p}$ = Number of engine parameters recorded = 500

 N_c = Number of crew initiated recordings = 5

t = Maximum flight hours = 24

Total recording capacity =
$$(N_f)$$
 (N_p) (t) + (f_p) (N_p) (t) + (f_e) (N_e) + (N_c) (N_p)
= (2) $(1,000)$ (24) + (2) $(1,000)$ (24) + (5) (500) + (5) $(1,000)$
= $48,000$ + $48,000$ + $2,500$ + $5,000$
= $105,500$ 16 bit words of data
= $105,500$ words x 16 bits/word
= 1.69 mega bits

For the above example test system a recorder with a minimum recording capacity of 1.69 mega bits would be required.

4.6 HARDCOPY PRINTERS

The purpose of the hardcopy printer is to print the results of the onboard test for quick-look data to be used by the ground crew immediately upon the landing of the aircraft.

4.6.1 PRINTER FEATURES

4.6.1.1 Printer Heads

4.6.1.1.1 Thermal

The thermal printer head prints by means of heating, in dot patterns, special paper in order to record the test result information. This technique is limited to room temperature or cooler environmental conditions. Extreme heat conditions would turn the special paper to a purple color and would be unusable for printing purposes.

4.6.1.1.2 Impact

This printing technique involves the characters being printed by impact either on special no-carbon paper or by means of an ink ribbon. If the ribbon were not used special paper coated with encapsulated ink modules would be used. When struck these capsules break and the ink would spread to the paper forming the struck characters. This special paper is restricted to room temperature or above because at cold temperature the ink will not flow, thus when struck no imprint is made.

4.6.1.1.3 Vaporization

This method involves a spark discharge, in dot patterns of the characters, to vaporize the zinc oxide coating, of specially coated paper, down to the black colored background. The special printer paper will work for a wide temperature range and has a long shelf storage life with minimal degradation. This particular technique was used for the B-1 CITS system because of its wide operating temperature range.

4.6.1.2 Paper Feed Mechanization

4.6.1.2.1 Strip

This style of paper is similar to ticker tape. The paper is approximately a half inch wide and would be fed through the printer via a reel-to-reel mechanism. The strip style paper feed mechanism was implemented on the B-1 CITS because of two main reasons: 1) the printer unit was essentially off the shelf and 2) it met all the operating environment requirements.

4.6.1.2.2 Roll

This technique poses a problem when utilized in an aircraft in that when the paper is printed on and is being unrolled, the gathering and storing of the used paper is difficult.

4.6.1.2.3 Page

This technique would utilize a mechanism which would feed a stack of perforated pages through the printing head. Storage of the unused and used paper would be a problem for aircraft applications.

4.6.2 SELECTION GUIDELINES FOR HARDCOPY PRINTERS

The following represents those factors to consider when selecting a hardcopy printer for onboard test applications.

4.6.2.1 Printing Speed

This factor is related to the amount of information to be printed. The designer would have to estimate how much will be printed and evaluate the printer on the basis of speed of output.

4.6.2.2 Character Set

The system test requirements would dictate what characters are needed for output of test results. The designer would evaluate the printer on the basis of capability of printing all of the different characters needed.

4.6.2.3 Environmental Suitability

The main evaluation the designer must make is to determine if the chosen printer can meet the environmental requirements. The two major concerns are operating temperature range and vibration. The criteria established for environmental conditions concerns the printer outputting legible characters throughout the temperature and vibration ranges.

4.6.2.4 Weight

The controlling factor in weight of the total printer device is dependent on the type of printer head chosen, because of the electromechanical complexities inherent in each one. The impact type head is the heaviest of the three because of its mechanical complexity, whereas the vaporization type head has the lightest impact to weight.

4.6.2.5 Reliability

The reliability of the printer is mainly due to the paper feed mechanism complexity, therefore the least complexity would produce the lightest reliability.

4.7 INTERFACES

The performance of testing systems onboard an aircraft is dependent on proper connection of the test system and its interfaces. These interfaces include data signals (serial digital, analog, and discrete), power, and cooling. The following will discuss serial digital, analog, and discrete signal interfaces; sensor types and selection guidelines; noise and methods of filtration; signal accuracy and repeatability; power; and cooling.

4.7.1 DATA SIGNALS

Data signals are the source of system performance information needed by the onboard test system to perform the fault detection/isolation testing. The following will discuss aspects which the designer would focus his attention on in order that an optimum design can be developed.

4.7.1.1 Signal Types


4.7.1.1.1 Serial Digital

There are three main format types for serial digital data:

- 1. Manchester
- 2. Bipolar Return to Zero
- 3. Bipolar Non-Return to Zero
- 4.7.1.1.1 <u>Manchester</u>. Manchester code is a bi-phase level non-return to zero type format. The bi-phase level interpretation of the zero, one bit pattern is described as follows:

Level changes occur at the center of every bit time period, by which a "one" is represented by a "one" level with a transition to the "zero" level, and a "zero" is represented by a "zero" level with a transition to the "one" level. An illustration of this format is given in Figure 4-3.

- 4.7.1.1.1.1 Advantages. The following paragraphs list the advantages of implementing this data format.
- 4.7.1.1.1.1.1 <u>Ease of Transmission</u> Capable of transmitting on long lengths of communication lines because of the automatic redundancy characteristics of the signal.
- 4.7.1.1.1.1.2 <u>Redundancy</u> Redundancy is inherent because the Manchester bit information is created by the signal transition about the zero volt line,



Serial Digital Signal Format Types Figure 4-3

and is not solely dependent upon the magnitude of the peaks of the square waveforms.

- 4.7.1.1.1.1.3 <u>Readability</u> Redundancy characteristic enables the equipment to read the Manchester format even if half of the waveform is lost.
- 4.7.1.1.1.1.4 <u>Noise Sensitivity</u> This format enables the signal to be inherently insensitive to surrounding electrical noise.
- 4.7.1.1.1.1.5 <u>Synchronization</u> Manchester is self clocking which eliminates the need for a synchronization signal in the receiver. Circuit synchronization signals are used to enable both transmitter and receiver to be in time with each other with respect to starting and stopping message transmission.
- 4.7.1.1.1.2 Disadvantages. The following paragraphs list the disadvantages of using Manchester coded serial digital signals.
- 4.7.1.1.1.2.1 <u>Implementation Cost</u> This format incurs the highest cost of implementation of the three formats discussed in this section.
- 4.7.1.1.2 <u>Bipolar Return to Zero</u>. The Bipolar Return to Zero (RZ) coded signal, as shown in Figure 4-3, is shaped such that the last half of the bit information width is always at a zero volt level. The receiving circuit recognizes the bit information as a delta, either plus or minus, from the zero volt line.
- 4.7.1.1.2.1 Advantages. This format has the lowest cost of implementation of the three formats discussed in this section.

- 4.7.1.1.2.2 Disadvantages.
- 4.7.1.1.2.2.1 <u>Noise Sensitivity</u> The noise sensitivity is higher because of the method of detection of a logic one or zero, which is dependent on the signal voltage levels in the RZ waveform.
- 4.7.1.1.2.2.2 <u>Ease of Transmission</u> Due to the sensitivity to voltage levels for logic interpretation, the transmission line length is limited to curtail excessive capacitance, impedance, and noise reception.
- 4.7.1.1.3 <u>Bipolar Non-Return-to-Zero</u>. The third digital format that can be utilized is Bipolar-Non-Return-to-Zero (NRZ), as shown in Figure 4-3.
- 4.7.1.1.3.1 Advantages. This format will withstand long lengths of transmission lines without distortion to the signal shape.
- 4.7.1.1.3.2 Disadvantages. This type of format has a higher sensitivity to electrical noise. The noise sensitivity is affected by the logic zero and logic one detection method.
- 4.7.1.1.4 <u>Selection Rationale for B-1 Aircraft</u>. The B-1 CITS utilized two of the previously discussed signal formats Manchester and RZ. The Manchester signal format was selected for the communication data bus link between the CITS dedicated computer and the CITS peripherals because of the length requirement of the data bus on the aircraft, accuracy, interface protocol, and noise rejection characteristics.

The RZ data format was selected to interface between the CITS DAU's and the aircraft systems under test because the length of the data links were less than twenty-five feet, the cost of the interface hardware was low, the

availability of the hardware was off-the-shelf, and the higher error rate (due to electrical noise) was manageable with the CITS three-pass software filter on detected failures.

The B-1 CITS was designed prior to the development of the MIL-STD-1553 specification. For future design applications for the B-1 CITS, MIL-STD-1553 version of the Manchester data bus architecture is recommended to replace the B-1 Manchester data bus because MIL-STD-1553 input/output hardware is available as off-the-shelf technology/hardware whereas the B-1 Manchester input/output hardware is custom designed. For interfacing with aircraft systems, it is still recommended that the lower cost RZ interface design be retained.

4.7.1.1.1.5 Serial Digital Design Requirements.

4.7.1.1.1.5.1 Timing. The timing requirements are dependent on how much data is anticipated for monitoring and how many tests have to be performed during a one second period. An example of this timing requirement can be seen in Appendix C, Figure 8. This example is taken from B-1 CITS system Bipolar RZ (Self-Clocking) Serial Digital Output/Input Signal. It can be seen that the pulse width for logic zero and logic one, and dead time widths are critical to proper signal interpretation by the receiver circuitry. Another example of timing can also be seen in Appendix C, paragraph 3.2.1.3, Data Rate. The Standard Signal Interface Specification requires that the serial digital signals be transmitted at a one megabit rate plus or minus 0.1 percent. This timing requirement is congruent to the timing requirements of the pulse widths shown in Appendix C, Figure 8. The one megabit rate is based on the required amount of data related to how many tests are to be executed and the time period that all tests have to be completed for a one second time slot.

4.7.1.1.5.2 Signal Magnitude. When one is considering magnitude requirements both input and output characteristics have to be designed separately.

In Appendix C, paragraph 3.2.4.4.5.1, the output voltage requirements are shown to be five plus or minus one volt for logic "O". The input circuit should be able to accept a wide range of voltages in order to account for noise effects, signal ringing, mismatched impedances, and improper wire types. The input circuit signals magnitude requirements can be seen in Appendix C, paragraph 3.2.4.4.5.2. Logic "I" is shown to be plus two and one-half to six volts and logic "O" is shown to be minus two and one-half to minus six volts. These voltage ranges were widened to accommodate discrepancies, already discussed, and enable more acceptance to serial digital data without malfunctioning. These examples are developed from experience gained from the B-1 CITS program.

4.7.1.1.5.3 Signal Shape. The idealized signal shape of serial digital data is a square waveform. The actual shape of the waveform seen in the hardware is generally a square configuration, but the peaks are somewhat rounded off. This rounding-off effect is defined by the rise and fall times of the digital circuitry producing the waveform. The excessive rise and fall times are caused by excessive capacitance, inductance, and impedance mismatches. When procuring such circuitry, requirements for rise and fall times must be defined so the hardware designers know that restrictions are levied on the resultant serial digital interface design. An example of this type of rerequirement can be seen in Appendix C, paragraph 3.2.4.4.5.1.

4.7.1.1.5.4 Data Bus Architecture. The data bus architecture is determined by:

4.7.1.1.5.4.1 <u>Data Bus Impedance</u> - Choosing the proper wire type for construction of the test system data bus is important because if the impedance is not correct it would cause attenuation of the magnitude of the serial digital

pulse-modulated signal such that it could be vulnerable to electrical noise (i.e., ringing). An example of a recommended data bus wire type is one that was used on the B-1 CITS system. The wire was teflon coated twisted shielded pair and had a 72 ohm impedance at one kilohertz, with a capacitance of 20 picofarads per foot, and wire size of 24 gauge. This wire type is recommended because it will match the interface requirements set by the data acquisition device recommended guidelines and will result in an almost lossless line effect.

- 4.7.1.1.5.4.2 <u>Data Bus Termination Devices</u> There are two devices which are used for termination of serial digital interfaces. The devices used are transformers and operational amplifiers. The transformer interface is used on the transmitter side because of low impedance and capability of driving a longer transmission line. The serial digital signal is a harmonic made up of frequencies ranging from 250 kilohertz to five megahertz. The transformer interface has to be designed to transmit the entire range of frequencies. The other type of serial digital interface used is an operational amplifier specially designed for serial digital interfaces. This special type of operational amplifier is used in the receiver circuit because of its high input impedance. It is always important when transmitting signals down a line to go from a low impedance to a high impedance to minimize reflections on the line which would affect the transmitted waveform shape.
- 4.7.1.1.5.4.3 <u>Selection of Data Bus Format</u> When selecting the data bus format to be used for a particular application, the following characteristics should be considered:
 - A. Accuracy
 - B. Electrical Noise Sensitivity
 - C. Length of Transmission Lines
 - D. Clocking

- E. Cost of Implementation
- F. Reliability
- G. Compatibility With Off-the-Shelf Hardware
- H. Interface Protocol Complexity
- I. Hardware Complexity

Table IV-1 illustrates a trade study the designer would have to perform in order to select the proper data bus format for his particular application.

4.7.1.1.5.5 Isolation. As in interface devices, the transformer and operational amplifier also serve as very efficient isolation devices when building serial digital interfaces. The function of an isolation device is such that when a failure, open or short, exists in the onboard test system, the failure is not propagated into the system under test. The transformer is excellent in this respect because of its isolation winding structure. The operational amplifier with its special diode arrangement enables only one way direction of signal transmission.

4.7.1.1.2 Analog

An analog signal is an electrical representative of a physical or electrical phenomenon relating characteristics information from an event in time. The onboard test system utilizes many of these type signals. However, they must be converted to a digital form in order that computational or logical functions can be performed. The following describes the analog to digital process and electrical isolation required for the onboard test system.

4.7.1.1.2.1 <u>Conversion Process</u>. When converting analog signals into digital signals, a tradeoff study involving factors such as bit word length, accuracy, repeatability, and conversion time, is required before the final

TABLE IV-1 Evaluation of Data Bus Formats

CHARACTERISTICS FORMAT	ACCURACY	ELECTRICAL NOISE SENSITIVITY	LENGTH OF TRANSMISSION LINES	CLOCKING	IMPLEMENTATION COST	RELIABILITY	COMPATIBILITY WITH OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE	INTERFACE PROTOCOL COMPLEXITY	HARDWARE COMPLEXITY
RETURN TO ZERO	М	Н	М	Y	L	М	Н	L	L
NOV RETURN TO ZERO	М	М	Н	Y	М	М	Н	М	М
MANCHESTER	Н	L	Н	Y	Н	Н	L	Н	Н
MIL-STD-1553 MANCHESTER	Н	L	Н	Y	М	Н	Н	М	М

L = Low

M = Medium

H = High

Y = Yes

process can be chosen. Analog signals are converted into different bit word lengths depending on accuracy and resolution requirements. There are three main techniques available to accomplish this conversion.

The designer selecting the conversion technique must perform an analysis and evaluate not only speed and accuracy, but also hardware availability, cost, weight, internal circuit requirements for the data acquisition device, and number of analog signals to be converted.

- 4.7.1.1.2.1.1 Successive Approximation. This process entails the circuitry to perform the following steps:
 - A. The circuitry counts, in a digital register, a value of one-half of full scale.
 - B. The value is converted to an analog and compared to the input analog.
 - C. If the input analog is greater than the counted value, the second most significant bit is turned on producing a three quarters full scale value, if the input signal is less than the counted value, the second and third most significant bits are turned off and the fourth most significant bit is turned on producing a value five eighths of full scale.

The above procedure is continued until the final value is obtained which compares to the input analog signal within the accuracy limits. The advantages and disadvantages of this procedure are:

A. Advantages

- 1. The A/D conversion is very fast.
- 2. Reasonable accuracy is acquired.
- 3. Good repeatability.

B. Disadvantages

1. The cost of implementation is higher than the integration and counter types.

4.7.1.1.2.1.2 Integration Type. An example of the integration type technique is the Dual Slope Method. This method requires that a capacitor be charged for a fixed time period gaining change to a predetermined value. At the end of the time period the circuitry switches to a negative reference voltage until the comparator in the circuit has reached its threshold. The final converted value is the ratio of the counts of the negative charge time period to the positive charge time period.

The advantages and disadvantage of implementing this technique are:

A. Advantages

- 1. Low cost of implementation.
- 2. High resolution.

B. Disadvantage

- 1. Slow conversion time due to the inherent charge time of the capacitor.
- 4.7.1.1.2.1.3 Counter. The counter method involves a counter to start counting from zero and converted to an analog value compared to the input analog. When the desired accuracy is obtained the count is terminated leaving the desired A/D conversion value ready to be utilized by the test system. The conversion time is dependent on both the bit word length and the magnitude of the analog value to be converted.

The advantages and disadvantage of this technique are:

A. Advantages

- 1. Least complex of the three techniques discussed.
- 2. Lowest cost of implementation.

B. Disadvantage

1. Slowest conversion time.

- 4.7.1.1.2.2 <u>Isolation Schemes</u>. After the designer has chosen the analog conversion process, an electrical isolation technique must be selected. The designer should perform an analysis to choose between two feasible approaches.
- 4.7.1.1.2.2.1 Operational Amplifier. This method would use an operational amplifier with a resistor matrix for fixed gain and short-circuit protection. This technique is used when the system is being designed around new hardware where signal characteristics and interfaces have not been established. This type of isolation scheme has been used successfully on the B-1 aircraft for the CITS system.
- 4.7.1.1.2.2.2 Programmable Gain Amplifier. This type of amplifier is suitable for designs which involve off-the-shelf hardware which would have various interface requirements and voltage ranges. With this type of circuitry the computer would control the gain of the amplifier to match the unique interfaces.

An example of this can be seen in the B-1 aircraft. In the B-1 most of the interface equipment was designed for the special applications of the CITS system where interfacing analogs were zero to five volts or minus five to plus five volts. Therefore, the isolation circuitry situated in the DAU or in the system under test would be a commonly used design of an operational amplifier with fixed gain and short-circuit protection. This application would not be true in smaller aircraft where generally analogs vary from zero to twenty-eight volts and the hardware is off-the-shelf which mandates all isolation circuitry to be within the DAU. This case would lend itself to the programmable gain amplifier. Many different voltage range signals could be multiplexed through the same amplifier and the program could vary the gain for that particular signal at any one time of sampling. During the trade study period the designer must decide where the flexibility is going to be so that he can specify the proper hardware to perform efficient analog signal isolation.

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4.7.1.1.3 Discrete

A discrete signal represents a unique event in a manner of translating information in the form of an "on" or "off" state. The following describes the processing of these type of signals and the isolation techniques needed to satisfy those electrical interface requirements for the onboard test system.

- 4.7.1.1.3.1 <u>Processing/Isolation Schemes</u>. When processing discrete input signals one has to keep in mind that they are small in magnitude and are sensitive to noise from other high power sources. These effects can be minimized when proper interface and isolation circuitry is used. Three examples of isolation interfaces are provided for design consideration.
- 4.7.1.1.3.1.1 Resistor. The designer can consider using a simple circuit of a 10K ohm resistor connected in series with a multiplex circuit and then to a register which would contain the discrete piece of information.

A. Advantages

- 1. Simple.
- 2. Inexpensive.

B. Disadvantage

- 1. This circuit does not provide adequate isolation capability in exessive noise environments.
- 4.7.1.1.3.1.2 Differential Amplifier. The designer would increase the isolation capability of the above technique by adding a differential amplifier between the resistor and the multiplexer.

A. Advantages

- 1. Enables common mode rejection.
- 2. Eliminates cyclic noise.

B. Disadvantage

1. This technique will not filter out electromagnetic pulses (EMP).

4.7.1.1.3.1.3 Optical Isolator. If the designer wishes to eliminate EMP effects, he would replace the differential amplifier from technique number two and replace it with an optical isolator.

A. Advantages

- 1. The optical isolator is an off-the-shelf item.
- 2. Relatively inexpensive and available to the user.
- 3. Reduces ground looping effects.

Another consideration when processing discretes is whether the data is parallel or serial. The preceding techniques apply only to parallel data. When considering serial discrete data a flip-flop circuit has to be used in series with a ten thousand ohm resistor and registers for storage of the serial discrete information. In addition to this circuit the other circuits can be used for minimization of noise.

4.7.1.2 <u>Sensors</u>

When performing the onboard test function, system parameter information is necessary to enable the test system to evaluate the aircraft systems under test. Sensors are used to acquire this information. Sensors are devices that convert electromechanical phenomena into electrical signals which are sent to the test system for processing and testing. There are several types of sensors and guidelines for selecting them to satisfy the testing requirements. These factors will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

4.7.1.2.1 Types

The two basic types of sensors are analog and discrete. The analog type sensor is used to access and measure voltages, currents, frequencies, angular position, linear position, pneumatic pressure, fluid pressure, rotation, and speed. The following defines these types and their individual attributes.

- 4.7.1.2.1.1 <u>Linear Variable Differential Transformer (LVDT)</u>. These sensors relate linear position and motion. An example of an application of this type of sensor can be seen in a jet engine. This sensor can be used to measure actuator stroke on a variable nozzle configuration. The accuracy of LVDT sensors usually run from approximately three to five percent. After condtioning, scaling, and digitizing the resulting electrical signal, the accuracy would be from four to five percent. The reliability/repeatability of this type sensor is good, even in adverse environments.
- 4.7.1.2.1.2 Rotary Variable Differential Transformer (RVDT). This sensor measures angular displacement. A typical application of this type of sensor is in the determination of the amount a valve has opened. RVDT signals can be used to calculate characteristics such as valve opening cross sectional area and the projected flow rate through the valve. The accuracy and repeatability is comparable to the characteristics described for the LVDT device.
- 4.7.1.2.1.3 <u>Pressure Transducers</u>. Pressure transducers are used to measure pneumatic and fluid pressures. There are two basic types of pressure transducers:
 - A. A resistive element with a mechanical wiper to generate the electrcal signal.
 - B. The strain gauge type of pressure sensor with no moving parts.

In most cases pressure measurements involve a very small delta around a fixed pressure reading. Proper application of the two types of sensors is very important. In the B-l aircraft the hydraulic system runs normally at four thousand pounds per square inch of pressure except when an engine start is attempted. In the pressure measurement system a resistive type of sensor was used. This type proved to be a poor choice because the hydraulic pressure varied slightly around the normal pressure most of the time and the constant friction of the wiper would wear in one spot on the resistive element. This

wear caused noise pulses in the output signal when any vibration was applied to the sensor. This problem can be cured by utilizing the second type (strain gauge) pressure sensors because of their solid state characteristics where sensor degradation is minimized. On the B-1 an intermediate fix was implemented by means of adding notch filters to the pressure signal conditioning and distribution unit. This minimized the vibration effects on the pressure signals.

- 4.7.1.2.1.4 Acceleration and Vibration Strain Gauges. Another application of the strain gauge type sensor is the measurement of acceleration and vibration. Strain gauge sensors are accurate devices because of their solid state nature and the fact that measurements are determined from small variations from a fixed reference. These variations can be electronically converted to an acceleration or vibration depending on the particular application.
- 4.7.1.2.1.5 <u>Accelerometers</u>. In addition to strain gauges for the measurement of acceleration and vibration, there are accelerometers. These devices are inductive in nature when a coil and magnet are utilized to generate a cyclic signal related to the sensed acceleration or vibration.
- 4.7.1.2.1.6 Synchros and Resolvers. These type of sensors relate position of an actuator or surface which may be involved in either an open or closed loop control system. Examples of these type of systems can be seen in the B-l aircraft. The engine thrust control system utilizes outputs from synchros to determine engine throttle position. Another example of this type of sensing is the B-l aircraft flight control system where synchro signals are used for testing system health.

4.7.1.2.1.7 Temperature Sensors.

A. Thermocouples - These are used in a wide variety of applications.

There are four types of thermocouples:

- 1. Iron constantan
- 2. Chromel alumel
- 3. Platinum rhodium
- 4. Copper constantan

The chromel-alumel type is most commonly used because of low cost, high reliability, and wide temperature range.

- B. Thermistors These devices are used when space and weight are limited. They are very small and light weight, but have narrow temperature ranges.
- C. Pyrometers Pyrometers are optical devices which sense temperature radiation through a lens which has to be cleaned periodically for proper measurement accuracy. These devices are relatively new in design and have seen application in sensing turbine blade temperature in jet engines. (These devices operate in a high temperature environment starting at about seven hundred degrees centigrade. Their accuracy, including signal processing ranges, is approximately plus or minus twenty degrees centigrade.
- 4.7.1.2.1.8 <u>Voltage Dividers</u>. The voltage divider is used to monitor voltages. This method of monitoring prevents high voltage wires from being spread excessively throughout the aircraft. High voltage wires are always a source of electrical noise. The usual way the voltage dividers are implemented are with resistors forming a bridge circuit. The accuracy and reliability is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the resistors used.
- 4.7.1.2.1.9 <u>Current Transformers</u>. Current transformers are used to measure electrical currents and loads. These devices perform a dual task: Voltage/

current divider, and 2) Electrical isolation from the system under test. Current transformers vary in size and weight depending on voltage, current, and frequency. The reliability of these devices is high due to their solid state characteristics. The one disadvantage with a transformer device when measuring current is the effect temperature has on accuracy of measurement. As the temperature varies, the resistance of the windings change, thus changing the current ratios. The designer should take care when utilizing this device that the environmental temperature is relatively constant such that current changes can only be attributed to the system under test and not resistance changes in the coils.

4.7.1.2.1.10 <u>Tachometers</u>. These devices are used to detect speed of rotating parts with high accuracy and reliability. The accuracy of this device with digital processing can be as accurate as three-tenths of one percent. Applications of this device can be seen in the measurement of fan speeds on jet engines, pump rotation speed in hydraulic systems, and gear train speeds in auxiliary power units.

4.7.1.2.1.11 Quantity Probes. Propulsion systems, fuel systems, and hydraulic systems are typical examples where fluid quantity measurement are required for testing. This is accomplished by using quantity probes. Quantity probes consist of capacitive elements connected in parallel. The fluid level, as it rises and falls, changes the overall capacitance of the device. The monitoring electronics converts these capacitance changes into voltage changes for testing and cockpit display purposes. In aircraft applications where there there are varying accelerations affecting gravity pulls on the fluid and different flight attitudes affecting the level, great care has to be taken to preclude reading the fluid level without taking into account these factors which would give erroneous flight quantity levels. An example of an erroneous

reading can be seen in the B-1 aircraft CITS engine test. At the beginning of the flight test program there were false indications of lube quantity. Analysis indicated that every time the aircraft was exposed to negative vertical acceleration the oil would float to the top of the lube tank above the quantity probe indicating low lube level. This problem was cured by adding a precondition to the lube quantity test of checking for positive vertical acceleration. The accuracy of this device is dependent on how many capacitive elements there are. Past experience has shown this device to be a very reliable unit with good repeatability.

4.7.1.2.1.12 <u>Inductive Coil</u>. This sensor is used for monitoring rotation and frequency whenever reliability and durability are a requirement. These devices are excellent for harsh environments of temperature and vibration.

4.7.1.2.1.13 Discrete Sensors. These devices are used to detect events such as on, off, set points, limits, open, and closed positions. There are disadvantages in using discrete sensors. When using these sensors for set points and limits for monitoring, values chosen are factory set and therefore difficult to change. An example of this problem can be seen in the B-1 CITS fuel system test. The fuel transfer pumps of the B-1 have discrete pressure sensors incorporated to indicate proper operation of the pumps. The hardware limits selected for change of state of the discrete were improper and many erroneous indications occurred. If an analog sensor were used then a software limit could easily be changed to correct the limit selection. The open and closed position application has its drawbacks also. When a valve is monitored with a discrete sensor, the test system never knows whether the valve opens or closes to the proper position, only that the valve is open or closed. The reason this type of device is used in lieu of an analog device is because of weight and test system logic simplicity. Discrete devices are light weight and small in size whereas analog devices are heavier and more complex and

require additional scaling and isolation circuitry before enabling acquisition by the test system.

4.7.1.2.2 Selection Guidelines

There are two classes of sensors utilized on an aircraft equipped with an onboard test system: 1) aircraft systems function (operational) sensors and 2) onboard test system dedicated sensors. When determining the type of operational and dedicated sensors required to perform the onboard test of an aircraft system/LRU to meet both the operational requirements and the maintenance requirements, trade studies must be performed on each subsystem/LRU by both the system designer and the test system designer in order to meet both requirements effectively. The study would provide a base of operational sensors, which would be augmented with dedicated test sensors where needed to meet the fault detection/isolation requirements of the test system. When selecting the additional test sensors, priority should be given to existing test interfaces over adding new sensors for the express purpose of testing. In lieu of adding sensors it may be desirable to use deductive test techniques utilizing existing sensors rather than adding new unique ones. The resultant set of sensors, both operational and dedicated, would be integrated into the onboard test system design.

The following represents those aspects which the designer must consider when selecting sensors for his onboard test system design:

- 4.7.1.2.2.1 Range of Measurement. This is important because if chosen improperly the range of interest could result in a small voltage range such that electrical noise on the transmission line could mask the information needed for the signal.
- 4.7.1.2.2.2 <u>Sensitivity</u>. This factor is the ratio of output to unit input and is important for fulfilling system resolution requirements. When selecting

sensors to monitor this factor for closed or open loop control systems great care must be taken in the selection process. Improper sensor selection can lead to acquiring signals that do not have the same or greater response time than the system under test, thus resulting in an ineffective parameter.

- 4.7.1.2.2.3 <u>Loading Effects</u>. Sensors should be chosen such that loading effects and distortion are minimal so that there is negligible effect on the measured or monitored sources.
- 4.7.1.2.2.4 <u>Sensor Frequency Response</u>. The sensor should have a frequency response equal or greater than the response of the monitored source. If the sensor has a lesser frequency response, subtle changes in system operator that were faster than the response time of the sensor would be missed. This condition would cause a damping effect on the resultant signal, which in some cases may be favorable.
- 4.7.1.2.2.5 <u>Physical Installation of Sensor</u>. The designer must always place sensors in an optimum location in order to promote ease of replacement when failed.
- 4.7.1.2.2.6 Working Environment. The sensor must be tolerant of its working environment. Environment factors such as humidity, vibration, temperature, shock, electromagnetic fields, radiation, and contamination should be considered. An example of how these factors affect sensor selection and placement can be cited from the B-1 engine design: A sensor was needed to relate nozzle pressure, but if a sensor were to be added in that particular area of the engine it would melt due to the extreme temperatures of the exhaust gases. A study was done and it was found that a cooler area in the front of the engine had a pressure which was equal to the nozzle pressure and could house a sensor properly. A sensor was then selected and installed and has given very reliable

and accurate pressure readings throughout the flight test program.

- 4.7.1.2.2.7 Output Electrical Format and Impedance Compatibility. The electrical format and impedance of the sensor chosen must be compatible with the test system in terms of event detection and sensitivity.
- 4.7.1.2.2.8 <u>Reliability</u>. Sensors should be selected that are reliable. If a sensor has to be installed into a relatively inaccessible area in the aircraft, the most reliable sensor available should be utilized. This will decrease maintenance problems when the aircraft is in the field.
- 4.7.1.2.2.9 Accuracy. This factor is always one of the main factors in the selection of proper sensors for the task of testing a system. The accuracy of test results is dependent on the accuracy of the signals used. Inaccurate sensors can result in detected faults which would fall in the gray area of indecision whether a maintenance action is necessary or not.

4.7.1.3 Problem Areas

There are three main problem areas when testing systems in real-time:

1) Electrical noise, 2) Signal accuracy and repeatability, and 3) Reliability of conditioning and isolation devices. The following will discuss the causes of these problems and what can be done to enable the test system designer to minimize these from his initial design.

4.7.1.3.1 Electrical Noise

Electrical noise is a series of electrical impulses which transmit through air and can be received on electrical cables which carry signals containing vital test information from operational systems. The result of noise is a signal which is not compatible to the test system. The direct result which affects the test system is the false indications it causes. The following discusses some

sources and possible ways to reducing the effects to the test system's outputs.

- 4.7.1.3.1.1 <u>Sources</u>. The following describes the two main sources of electrical noise:
- 4.7.1.3.1.1.1 High Power Lines. The major source of electrical noise is high power lines. The noise results in a sinusoidal waveform, normally at a frequency of four hundred hertz or sixty hertz, being added to another test signal resulting in a new waveform which the test system would interpret as a system failure.
- 4.7.1.3.1.1.2 Multiplexing Systems. Another source of noise, which has come about since the advent of electrical multiplexing systems, is a multitude of electrical blips caused by chattering relays, circuit breakers, and solid state logic circuitry. These sources cannot be eliminated because their existence as systems on an aircraft is essential to flight of the vehicle, but there are methods of reducing their effect on the neighboring systems.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2 <u>Method of Eliminating/Reducing Noise Effects</u>. There are two basic methods of reducing the effects of electrical noise on producing false indications by the test system; 1) Filters (hardware and software), and 2) Proper setting of failure limits.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1 Filters
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.1 Hardware There are three basic types of hardware filters:
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.1.1 Inductive Filter The most popular usage of the inductive filter is the smoothing of full waveform signals. This filter is most effective at higher frequencies. The resultant waveform is very smooth with slight peaks and valleys.

- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.1.2 Capacitive Filter This type of er circuit has its highest efficiency at lower frequencies. This method i popular for noise problems because it filters out those frequency ranges most associated with high power lines.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.1.3 L-Section This type of filter is made up of both inductive and capacitive elements. The inductive element has a high impedance for the harmonic terms in the voltage portion of the signal. The ripple produced is very low compared to the ripples produced by the individual inductive and capacitive filter circuits. Multiples of these L-section circuits reduce the ripple even further and would be used when a very smooth signal is necessary for proper test results.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.2 <u>Software</u> When electrical noise affects test signals the variations which occur appear to be periodic in nature. The net effect is test signals which model an intermittent failure. Usually these interferences only occur for very short periods of time. The signal changes cause false indications to be annunciated by the test system. Most of these types of problems can be filtered out by software means. There are two classes of software filtering that can be utilized by the test system designer to overcome this condition.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.2.1 Input Signal Filtering This technique involves inputting multiple samples of each test signal and averaging the halves for the test program.
- 4.7.1.3.1.2.1.2.2 Fault Indication Filtering To implement this type of software filter, programming would have to be added to enforce a requirement that before a failure is annunciated it has to exist for more than "n" sample times for that subsystem under test. To implement this kind of software filter across-

the-board for all subsystems may not be practical. Each system tested must be analyzed for their unique cases to determine what the 'n' number of sample times would be.

4.7.1.3.1.2.2 Proper Setting of Failure Limits. Another method of elimiating/reducing false indications due to signal noise is to properly set failure limits. Past experience has shown that most failure limits are set too close and do not take into account signal accuracy, signal conditioning accuracy, signal acquisition accuracy, and computer accuracy. In addition to those elements the designer should take into account the accuracy effects caused by electrical noise. It is recommended that for systems testing, the systems analyst should set the failure limits fairly broad in order to see, during the flight test portion of the program, exactly what the total inaccuracies are and prevent many false indications from being annunicated in the beginning of the program. When data has been acquired from flight test these limits can be tightened to the actual operating line of the system under test.

4.7.1.3.2 Signal Accuracy/Repeatability

Signal accuracy and repeatability are two important factors to consider when designing an onboard test system. The test algorithms used for the test system can only test the system as accurately as the signals it uses. Repeatability of a signal is also important for the proper identification of a failure in a system. Repeatability is that characteristic by which a signal will always output the same value given the same environmental and internal conditions. This characteristic is important because when the test algorithms are designed and programmed they do not change. The basic assumption made when using fixed logic is that for any one particular failure there will always exist the same signal pattern. Therefore, if the signals were not repeatable, every time the same failure occurred different signal patterns would occur and

one set of logic would not pick up that failure every time. In addition, to insure proper and uniform mechanization requirements the designer should execute a trade study to determine what the minimum requirement for accuracy and repeatability should be and incorporate this into each aircraft subsystem procurement specification.

4.7.1.3.3 Reliability of Conditioning/Isolation Devices

The signals which are acquisitioned by the onboard test system are conditioned and isolated from the sensor prior to being inputted to the DAU. If any one of the elements in the chain should fail, the entire signal would be lost. This means the conditioning and isolation devices would require the same reliability standards that the sensor would have. One problem associated with this type of circuitry is that it usually resides with the system's LRU. In some cases during an aircraft's flight test program there is a tendency not to replace an LRU if the signal failed is a dedicated onboard test parameter, and the LRU is still operating properly. This results in a nuisance fault indication to the crews. To reduce the effects of these human tendencies the designer should perform a trade study to determine: 1) What is the highest reliability of conditioning and isolation circuitry available within cost restraints and 2) What is the cost tradeoff of attaining higher reliability by implementing redundancy in this area. Another factor to consider is the simplicity of the circuitry used. If the result of the trade study is to maintain non-redundancy, the designer should analyze simplicity with respect to reliability and cost to obtain the most optimum design to assure the minimum number of failures.

4.7.2 POWER

All electronic equipment require power supplies for their operation. The electronic components internal to the onboard test system are made up of computer memories, digital registers, A/D and D/A converters, and linear analog

amplifiers. These devices require very low current, thus resulting in low current demands for the entire test system. The power supplies for test system applications would have the following three critical areas of concern:

4.7.2.1 Output Voltage Regulation

This is critical to total system operation. Digital circuits are very sensitive to any fluctuations in source power, thus resulting in many false indications and if left unchecked would cause extensive damage to the circuits themselves. From past experience, to maintain digital devices in good working order, a voltage regulation of less than one percent should be used. This will insure that the powered devices are not operating at an under or over voltage.

4.7.2.2 Power Supply Package Design

This factor is important because if not done properly high temperature areas (hot spots) can occur. Hot spots in the power supply are very real problems and special attention should be focused on these during the initial design effort. These hot spots usually occur around high power transistors, output voltage regulators, and power transformers. Heat problems normally arise from improper heat sinking, of the three types of devices previously mentioned, and when high temperature items are placed too close to one another. When hot parts are too close to each other the temperature build-up is accelerated, therefore, high and low temperature parts should be intermingled evenly on the circuit board to distribute the temperature more evenly.

4.7.2.3 Short-Circuit Protection

Short circuits across the power supply not only can damage the power supply, but can cause current surges to be inputted to the circuitry of the test system. These current surges will cause severe damage or possible electrical fires in the exposed circuitry. The power supply must have short-circuit protection in order that these high currents will not persist.

4.7.3 COOLING

The basic need for cooling in electrical equipment is to extract excess heat generated in the equipment. To determine the cooling requirements for any piece of electrical equipment a thorough thermal analysis must be performed. The analysis would include heat dissipation efficiency of heat sinks and total LRU enclosure environment, total heat generated by heat generating parts, and total heat generated by the entire LRU. All of these factors would be considered in the determination of what temperature cooling air is needed, what air flow rate is required, and where it should be inputted and exited from the LRU. The designer is alerted to the fact that if the thermal analysis and cooling configuration design are not performed properly, the LRU may have overheating problems when operating in the aircraft.

4.8 SUMMARY

The design of onboard test system hardware involves not only compliance with weapon system onboard test requirements but also consideration of cost, weight, space, reliability, maintainability, schedule, power, cooling, air crew interface, and systems-under-test interface. The basic function of the test system hardware is test data acquisition, data processing, and display of the status of the systems-under-test. Selection guidelines are given for these hardware functions as well as additional functions such as data recording and hardcopy printing.

Section 5

SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS

5.1 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

5.1.1 GENERAL ELEMENTS OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

According to Air Force Regulation (AFR) 800-14, all computer programs, including onboard test systems and real-time programs, must be planned, designed and tested in accordance with a Computer Program Development Plan (CPDP). The elements of this plan should include provisions for objective definitions, tasks, breakdown organization, resources, standards, and configuration control. The CPDP should be prepared only after trade studies, life cycle studies and risk analysis have been completed. The following describes the major phases convered by the CPDP:

- a) Analysis Phase During this phase, the functional performance requirements for the computer program are defined. Included also is the definition of the functional interface and possible design constraints. This phase usually begins with the release of system specifications and ends with a PDR.
- b) Design Phase In this phase, a program design including functional and detail flow charts is developed and subsequently presented to Critical Design Review (CDR) in the form of a preliminary product specification.
- c) Coding and Checkout Phase Following completion of CDR, coding and checkout begin. This phase usually consists of the "unit testing" of individual program modules and involves a combination of software simulation and laboratory testing and may be considered complete when the correct outputs are generated when using predefined inputs. This leads into the integration phase.
- d) Test and Integration Phase During this phase, the Computer Program

- is tested against the requirements contained in the Computer Program Development Specification. The testing may extend through formal qualification testing.
- e) Installation Phase This phase includes loading and running of the computer program, in this case on the aircraft, and includes total operability and compatibility testing.
- f) Operation and Support This phase includes making updates, corrections and deletions and requires retesting. New programs would require reiteration of all the above phases.

5.1.1.1 Software Requirements

Software requirements are generated during the analysis phase, as previously described, and is one of the most critical aspects of the software development. Unless a complete, unambiguous and feasible set of requirements are produced, difficulties may arise in subsequent phases. Systems engineering studies, in support of producing the requirements, should be conducted to define interface, performance, design, "man in the loop" considerations, quality assurance and safety. It may also be necessary to develop functional simulations to define inputs, outputs, and logic for each functional requirement. At the completion of this effort, the program should be temporarily fixed in configuration, establishing a baseline for future changes, and reflected in a software design specification.

5.1.1.2 Software Design

The organization and development of software for an onboard test system should be made immediately visible to both upper management and the customer at the start of the program. Top-down development and requirement traceability concepts should be laid out early for review. This requires the coordination and participation of software designers and system designers through the requirements definition, program design, implementation, integration, and test and


validation phases. Structured top-down design is recommended as a basic approach. This implies that the top level functions can be allocated to programs and subprograms in a highly modular fashion (see Figure 5-1). The software architecture of the onboard test program is a key element for early review. This includes communication and structuring of program modules. The time sequencing (execution timir—of these program modules in a meaningful time line (as well as executive techniques to communicate within the time line) is important to assess adequacy of software design. Descriptions of data flow and data based architecture to support the program modules must be reviewed in depth.

The concept of shared resources such as shared programs, tables, and input/output data must be analyzed for ease of development and maintenance. All of the above must be done at a systems engineering level in order to assure that proper tradeoffs have been made in the overall design. This evaluation tests the architecture for modularity, flexibility, modification capability, communicativity, and preliminary timing and is the top subject for review early in the program and throughout the program.


5.1.1.2.1 Top-Down Design

Based on experience with CITS it is recommended that the design of onboard test system, real-time computer programs, be developed using hierarchical processes which may be represented by design trees. Design trees represent the software architecture. They clearly show the relationship between the individual modules and the controlling hierarchy. An example of a design tree is given in Figure 5-2. Preferably no more than three levels of software modules should be represented per tree. The activation sequence is top to bottom, left to right. Therefore, referring to Figure 5-2, RTE activates RETCON, MODER, PITCH, YAW, ROLL, INNER, AND BACKG in sequence. The double arrow depicts activate and return. The "feet" shown at the lowest level shows that the tree continues in subsequent pages. Nodes in design trees reflect design modules and show program modularity. High level modules in the tree should be

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Modular Structure Figure 5-1



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Real Time Executive Invocation Tree Figure 5-2

designed before subordinate low-level modules.

5.1.1.2.2 Modular Concept

It is also recommended that the design of onboard test system real-time software be modular in structure as previously discussed. The software should be organized to allow grouping based on function, timing, and memory usage. The fundamental goal of such a modular design is to achieve functional independence of modules. Every design module should be implemented as a separate and identifiable computer program. All modules should have a single entry and exit point, if possible. Control and/or data should be completely specified and each module designed so that they provide outputs given specified inputs. Definition of each module should be such that their function and organization are easily comprehended and logically complete. Compilation and assembly of modules should be performed in such a manner as to reduce external references and allow memory organizations which enable modifications to the program to be incorporated with minimum impact.

5.1.1.2.3 Module Interaction

Linkage between program modules and common subroutines should be standardized. Conventions for subroutines linkage should be defined along with consistent conventions for the storage of data and address register contents. Program modules should respond to the following: (1) Sequential execution, (2) Interrupts, or (3) Traps. Subroutines should be implemented such that there is only one entry point and one return to the first executable instruction following the "call" or branch instruction, and should never directly or indirectly call or branch back to themselves. The capability should exist to nest subroutines to at least four levels.

5.1.1.2.4 Guidelines for Structural Programming in Assembler Language

Structured programming techniques can be applied to assembler language programs by utilizing the macro facility of the assembler to generate the structured programming constructs or by simulating the constructs by annotation. The discussion below describes the annotation technique. The assumptions made are that the assembler language program is already structured to accommodate the constructs:

- a) Process
- b) If-Then-Else
- c) Do-While
- d) Do-Until
- e) Case

In addition, unconditional branches are utilized \underline{only} to satisfy the constructs.

The notation used is:

asc - assembler source code

cond - condition to be tested

c - comments

Each construct is delineated below.

A. PROCESS

Annotate each process by partitioning and identifying the process code as follows:

Proc

$$y = f(x)$$

0

o

O

asc for process

0

0

END PROC

Partition nested subprocesses (or other constructs) and identify by indentation or enumeration. Note that subprocess does not imply every line of code.

B. IF-THEN-ELSE

Annotate each if-then-else construct by partitioning and identifying as follows:

If Cond,

o

0

O

asc for test and branching

0

0

0

Then

0

0

0

asc for then process

0

0

0

E1se

0

0

0

asc for else process

0

0

Endif

Partition nested if's (or other constructs) and identify by indentation or enumeration.

C. DO-WHILE

Annotate each do-while construct by partitioning and identifying as follows:

Do-While cond

0

0

C

asc for condition testing and branching to END DO

0

0

O

Do-Proc

0

0

0

asc for Do-Process

0

0

0

End-Do

Partition nested Do-While (or other construct) and identify by indentation or enumeration.

Alternate Do-While:

Do-While cond

0

asc for unconditional branch to condition testing

0

```
Do-Proc
         0
         o
      asc for Do-Process
         0
         0
         o
      Do-Test
         o
         0
         o
      asc for condition test and branching to Do-Proc
         o
      END-DO
DO-UNTIL
Annotate each Do-Until construct by partitioning and identifying as
 follows:
      Do-Until
                  cond
         0
         o
      asc for do-until process
         0
         0
         0
```

```
Do-Test
            0
            0
          asc for condition test and branching to do-until process
            0
            0
         END-DO
    Partition nested do-until (or other constructs) and identify by
    indentation or enumeration.
E. CASE
    Annotate each case construct by partitioning and identifying as
    follows:
         Case variable
            0
            0
          asc for variable testing and branching
            0
         Variable = Case 1
            0
            0
          asc for Case 1
```

Variable = Case 2

o
o
o
o
Variable = Case n
o
o
asc for case n
o
o

o End case

Partition nested case (or other constructs) and identify by indentation or enumeration.

5.2 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA

5.2.1 PROGRAM ORGANIZATION - SERVICE MODULES


The organization of an onboard test system, real-time computer program should be based upon the computer selected (in the case of CITS-IBM AP-2) and what the program has to do. The basic requirements for the B-. CITS program were as follows:

- (1) Monitor and test non-avionic subsystems in the air and on the ground.
- (2) Provide displays for system and the isolated line replaceable unit.
- (3) Record selected parameter values.
- (4) Print failure information on a strip printer.
- (5) Provide inputs to a crash data recorder and flight test recorder.

(6) Interface with and service the Avionics Control Unit Complex (ACUC). The following is a typical analysis to be performed based on the above requirements. In order to implement the system test requirements, the CITS System Computer Program had to provide within its structure the functions shown in Figure 5-3, the mechanization requirements shown in Table V-1, and the data requirements in Table V-2. Test requirements which have the greatest influence on the organization of the computer program relate to the real-time nature of test data acquisition, quantity of data, frequency (rate) required, and the time constraints for testing.

Three different software structures were considered for the B-1 CITS Program.

- (1) Fixed rate/straight line This method is characterized by performance of the program functions in a linear fashion at a fixed rate. Therefore, the entire program must be repeated at the highest rate required by any function. The structure is linear and is, therefore, relatively easy to construct, code, and document; however, it is inflexible for the purpose of modifications and updates. It is not a good candidate for future growth purposes. (see Figure 5-4).
- (2) Interrupt Control This method utilizes many interrupts to terminate one part of the program and enter another. The interrupts are assigned priorities which enable execution of a desired function at the occurrence of a specific event. This method is applicable for real-time operation of a small number of functions, but keeping track of several levels of interrupts and associated data for reentry may pose a serious problem. Real-time checkout may be an extremely complex task due to the unpredictable nature of the program (see Figure 5-5).



CITS Specified Requirements Block Diagram Figure 5-3

; ;*

TABLE V-1 CITS MECHANIZATION REQUIREMENTS

DERIVED REQUIREMENTS

Functional Rate and Time Base

DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE

Certain subsystems require monitoring 8 times per second minimum to verify performance, while others may not require monitoring more frequent than every 4 seconds or a greater interval. The frequency of required monitoring is set by individual subsystem need. The in-flight performance monitor test requires constant monitoring of subsystems. In order to meet the requirement, the program structure must be based on a cycle, within which all monitoring and processing are done to meet all individual subsystem time requirements. For the functions which may not be needed except under special conditions, such as fault isolations functions, there must be means to provide them only when needed.

 CITS Hardware and B-1 Subsystem Compatibility Some subsystems require warm-up or settling/
filtering time prior to actual testings.
Certain subsystems require others to provide
inputs or power. A failure in one could
result in a failure indication in the other
erroneously. A malfunction in CITS could
cause a wrong indication of a subsystem
status. The program must be able to minimize generation of such false-alarm/no-go
indications by providing appropriate time
and test control logic.

TABLE V-1 CITS MECHANIZATION REQUIREMENTS (CONT)

DERIVED REQUIREMENTS

CITS Initialization Recovery, Regression

DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE

In order for the program to function correctly, the computer must be properly initialized prior to entry to computation.

When an operational mode change is commanded, the program must be adjusted to suit a new operational mode. The program must be able to recover from an occurrence such as an exposure to EMP or power interruptions and to re-enter the operational state. The program must be capable of operating under adverse conditions with possibly less than full hardware capabilities. These adaptabilities must be incorporated into the program.

4. Operator Suitability

For the control and operation of the CITS, manual operations must be minimized and the operational procedure must be simple and straight forward. Display and indication should be clear, without ambiguity, and easy to understand.

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



TABLE V-2 CITS DATA RATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HARDWARE FUNCTIONS


FUNCTION	DESCRIPTION	RATE	REASON
Test Data Acquisition	Test data acquisition in	As required	Sampling rate
(Input)	time correlated parameter	1/sec. to	for testing
	blocks.	8/sec. rate.	subsystem.
Test Data Request	Request for parameter	As required	Printing and
(Output)	data.	1/sec. to	recording.
		1/sec. rate.	
Test Data Process	Processing of data for	As required	Rate for
	status verification in	1/sec. to	testing sub-
	predetermined time.	8/sec. rate.	system.
Maintenance	Operational control and	As required.	
Recorder	recording data output.		
Printer	Operational control and	As required.	
	alphanumeric code out-		
	put.		
Display	Displays and updates.	4/sec.	CCD update.
Mode and Commands	Commands for tests and	As required	Operator in-
	displays, operational	4/sec.	put.
	mode changes.		

TABLE V-2 CITS DATA RATE REQUIREMENTS FOR HARDWARE FUNCTIONS (CONT)

FUNCTION	DESCRIPTION	RATE	REASON
Peripheral Status	Request for peripheral	As required.	
Request Acquisition	equipment status words.		
Stimuli Generator	Stimuli generation for subsystem ground test.	As required.	
Crash Data Recorder	Recording data.	As required	
		1/sec. to	
		8/sec.	Recording
Flight Test Recorder	Recording data.	As required	requirement
•	·	1/sec. to	
		8/sec.	



Fixed Rate Straight Line Program Structure
Figure 5-4



CONDITIONS

INTERRUPTS ARE PRIORITY ASSIGNED
INTERRUPTS ARE INTERRUPTABLE BY HIGHER PRIORITY INTERRUPTS

Interrupt Control Program Structure Figure 5-5


5.2.1 Program Organization - Service Modules (Cont'd)

(3) Multi-Rate, Fixed Cycle, Modular - This method is typified by its structure of modular subprograms which are grouped by function and subsystem test rate. The modular structure makes for an easily constructed program which simplifies coding, checkout, and documentation. Modifications can be accomplished with relative ease with changes to one module generating minimum impact on the remaining program. Grouping with respect to function and rate allows use of common subroutines which improve efficiency, process time, and reduce memory requirements for the overall program structure; however, it is relatively complex and requires close coordination efforts. (See Figure 5-6).

An analysis to implement system test requirements results in a method which incorporates the optimum features.

A CITS Program Organization Alternate method summary is given in Table V-3. The method which offered the best combination of features for the CITS onboard test system was the multi-rate, fixed cycle, modular structure for the following reasons:

- (1) Relative ease of construction, coding, and documentation.
- (2) Modifications and future growth incorporated with minimum difficulty.
- (3) Ease of maintaining real-time control.
- (4) Efficient use of memory by sharing common subroutines.
- (5) Ease of checkout due to modular structure.
- (6) Multi-rate scheduling enabled functions to be assigned at best suited duty cycles.
- (7) Modular structure enabled functions to be developed simultaneously.



EXECUTIVE CONTROL SCHEDULES I/O'S AND PROCESSES AT DIFFERENT FIXED RATES

Multi-Rate Fixed-Cycle Modular Program Structure Figure 5-6

TABLE V-3 CITS COMPUTER PROGRAM ORGANIZATION ALTERNATE METHODS SUMMARY


ARCHITECTURE	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Fixed Rate Straight Line	Relatively easy to construct, code, and document. Predictable. Requires less data storage.	High duty cycle. Inefficient usage of memory. Inflexible and difficult to change. Real-time control and system synchronization difficulties. Difficult to checkout.
Interrupt Control	Inherent priority organization. Fast real-time control for small number of jobs.	Inherent priority organization complex - non- predictable. Real-time control difficult for larger jobs with many interrupts. Data-save and re-entrant problems. Extremely difficult to checkout (large jobs).
Multi Rate Fixed Cycle	Relatively easy to code, document at modular level. Predictable. Efficient use of memory and process time. Easy to modify and check- out.	Relatively complex structure - (overall). Need closer coordination in programming/integration.

In summary, the CITS Program consists of modular multi-subprograms grouped by functions and subsystem test rates. The module scheduling is fixed priority, multi-rate, fixed cycle and non-reentrant. The fixed cycle is one per second, divided into sixteen time slots. Input-output and processing are time phased for balanced and more efficient usage of each time slot. The real-time test modules are in four (4) groups: One (1) per second; two (2) per second; four (4) per second; and eight (8) per second. A diagram of the CITS program organization is shown in Figure 5-7.

5.2.1.1 Executive

The primary function of an executive module is the selection and subsequent execution of program tasks and the integration of the total system by effectively utilizing the computer and peripheral capabilities in meeting the demands of the system. In doing so, the executive module is the master controller of the entire software system. In performing the scheduling and dispatching of functions the executive module requires a data base usually in the form of one or more tables containing such information as location of task programs, priority relationships, conditions, and restrictions under which each program should be operated, and many other system related facts and figures including bringing in needed data from auxiliary storage if necessary.

In addition, the executive module usually contains a routine to start-up or initialize the system, a routine to shut down the system in an orderly manner, and error handling routines to allow expedient handling of system problems via interrupts. The criteria used for designing an executive module for an inboard test system real-time program depends heavily upon application information. This information can be obtained by evaluating systems requirements based upon a standard set of objectives, such as the following:



CITS Program Block Diagram Figure 5-7 5-25

- 1. A list of the total number of distinct operational tasks including:
 - A. Magnitude of instructions and data memory requirement.
 - B. Execution timing.
 - C. Expansion requirement.
- 2. The characteristics of each task including:
 - A. Priority relationships.
 - B. Functional relationships.
 - C. Sequential dependency.
- 3. A list of the desired goals and constraints including:
 - A. Memory goals.
 - B. Modes of operation.
 - C. Percent of storage expansion needs.
 - D. Executive memory allocation.
 - E. Program organization.
- 4. Peripheral characteristics such as usage rates and transfer rates.
- 5. Critical response timing.
- 6. System integrity and degradation.
- 7. Security needs.

5.2.1.1.1 CITS Executive Design Criteria

As previously described under Program Organization - Service Modules (paragraph 5.2.1) the CITS operational program is a fixed cycle, multi-rate, variable-task, real-time program operating under overall control of an executive scheduler.

The following describes the CITS executive as a typical executive based upon that structure, residing in a typical airborne compute: (IBM AP-2).

The basic rate at which the system operates is 16 times per second. Tasks assigned to the system are performed at rates of 16, 8, 4, 2, or 1 time per second depending on the task. An exception to this is tasks that are not executed in a real-time mode. These tasks are the system on/off function, which provides a start-up or securing point for the entire program, and the system initialization function, which insures the operational integrity of the CITS system prior to entering the real-time domain.

A second exception to this is the I/O servicing function. This function is the software driver for the CITS common data bus over which all I/O transactions between the prime CITS peripheral equipments and the CITS computer take place. Due to the hardware design of this data bus and its associated I/O control (IOC), and the nature of some of the peripheral equipments the I/O service function is executed at a rate of 64 times per second.

Time control of the overall real-time system and the I/O service rate is accomplished by means of two countdown counters. One (counter number 1) is chosen as the primary counter and the other (counter number 2) is chosen as the secondary. These counters decrement at identical rates of 100 microseconds and generate interrupts which 'trap' to specific locations in core. Two separate interrupt routines are used. One is the executive real-time counter control routine and the other is the I/O service routine.

The executive real-time counter control routine is executed at the primary rate of 16 times per second, while the I/O service routine is executed at the secondary rate of 64 times per second. The selection of a primary counter rate of 16 per second and a secondary counter rate of 64 per second was chosen to allow for incremental adjustments to the secondary counter countdown value without affecting the primary countdown time and consequently the overall system timing. Phasing between the two rates is maintained by using the executive real-time counter control function to 'drive' the I/O


service routine initially and then letting the I/O service routine generate the next three sequential 64 per second interrupts via the secondary counter. This effectively 'locks' the two rates together due to the simultaneous countdown feature of the two counters.

System simplicity is maintained by using constant time values for both the counters. For a basic rate of 16 per second, the primary counter time value is 62.5 milliseconds. The secondary counter time value for a rate of 64 per second is 15.625 milliseconds. This time value is unobtainable due to the decrementation rate of 100 microseconds, therefore a value of 15.6 milliseconds is used. Selection of this value results in the secondary counter underlapping the primary counter by no more than 100 microseconds every 62.5 milliseconds. (4 X 15.6 msec = 62.4 msec.) This underlap time is used for execution of the executive real-time counter control function. Figure 5-8 presents the generalized timing scheme used.

Each 1/16 of a second time duration generated by the primary counter interrupt is referred to as a time slot while each 1/64 of a second time duration resulting from the secondary counter interrupt is referred to as a service interval.

Tasks assigned to specific rate groups are normally executed in specific time slots in accordance with figure 5-9. Since all tasks are executed in real-time, those tasks executed in a specific time slot must be completed within the time interval of 62.5 msec. As can be seen from Figure 5-9, tasks from two rate groups, 16 per second and 8, 4, 2, or 1 per second are executed in any one time slot. Also, 1 per second rate tasks may be executed in either of two time slots; 8 and 16. This feature is useful, since a large percentage of the operational tasks execute once per second.

The task load may be distributed more evenly between time slots by the expedient of offsetting tasks from their normally assigned time slots. Thus, if the load in the 2 per second time slots (4 and 12) were excessive, some tasks could be moved over to two of the 4 per second time slots, provided that



Primary and Secondary Counter Timing Interface Figure 5-8

TIME SLOT	1	2	3	4	2	9	2	8	6	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
16/SEC TASK	x	Х	x	×	х	×	x	x	×	х	×	х	х	×	Х	×
8/SEC TASK	×		×		×		х		Х		х		Х		Х	
4/SEC TASK		х				X				×				X		
2/SEC TASK				×								х				
1/SEC TASK								×		···						×

Task Rate Versus Time Slot Matrix Figure 5-9

5-30

the rate integrity is kept, i.e., the task is executed every 8th time slot. A simplified diagram of the executive control interface is shown in Figure 5-10.

5.2.1.2 Input-Output


Data acquisition for an onboard test system is performed by some type of data acquisition unit (DAU). Similar to CITS, these might co-exist with various types of numbers of data dissemination units depending on the required display, print, and recording capability. All of these units are usually strategically located on the aircraft. In tune with today's technology, and as an improvement to current CITS, acquisition and storage of data in the DAU memory can be typically accomplished under microprocessor control. When requested by the main computer, selected messages are transmitted via the data bus. Microprocessor control of DAU functions eliminates the requirement for the main computer to send out a "test point address word" for each word of data acquired. One current word from the main computer is the only command required to transmit selected data. Input-output bus traffic can be significantly reduced and simplified. Figure 5-11 reflects a typical DAU design to meet the needs of a typical onboard test unit.

There are three basic types of input-output (I/O) according to the method of controlling and synchronizing data transfer.


- 1. Program controlled I/O.
- 2. Interrupt controlled I/O.
- 3. Direct memory access I/O.

The type of input-output used in a particular onboard test application depends on three main factors:

1. Data rate required.



Executive Control Interface Figure 5-10



Typical DAU Design Figure 5-11

1:1

- 2. Acceptable time delay between device readiness-to-transmit and the actual data transfer.
- 3. Feasibility of interleaving input-output with other operations.

For an onboard test system application input-output is required to take place at a particular instant in time and/or periodically within a given time frame. The operation of the data acquisition or dissemination unit must, therefore, be synchronized in real-time. This synchronization may be achieved by using "real time counters" some or all of which may be programmable. The program may then be interrupted periodically with a known time between interrupts. There are three basic types of interrupts.

- 1. External interrupts generated from one or more I/O devices.
- 2. Internal interrupts generated by the computer system itself to indicate a particular event.
- 3. Simulated interrupts generated by software to assist in program debugging or interrupt testing.

The different sources of interrupts have different servicing requirements. Some will accept a delay while the current task is being completed while others will require immediate attention. Therefore, the interrupt service procedure should:

- 1. Differentiate between the various interrupt sources.
- 2. Prioritize the interrupts.
- 3. Save and restore the contents of registers to assure program continuity during the servicing of multiplex interrupts.


Some onboard test system applications call for several interrupt request lines, each with their own unique trap address. The problem of recognition may be solved by assigning only one source of interrupt to each line. This approach may also be used to differentiate between internal, external, and simulated interrupts.

In the majority of applications, several I/O devices must use the same interrupt request line. Two methods of recognizing the source are commonly used:

- 1. Device polling the interrupt causes a jump to the service program via the trap address. The service program then checks the status word of each device in turn to determine which has caused the interrupt (see Figure 5-12).
- Vectored interrupts the interrupt control logic recognizes the interrupting I/O device. Each I/O device is assigned a unique "device interrupt" address. Upon recognition, the interrupt control logic requires the interrupting I/O device to transmit its address. This address is then used to generate a unique interrupt trap address for the device. The trap addresses are usually located sequentially in program memory forming the "interrupt vector." Each location in the vector contains the start address of a particular device service program. The contents of the particular interrupt trap address are loaded into the program counter and program control is automatically transferred to the service program.

In some systems the I/O device may be required to transmit a single byte instruction after the interrupt request has been acknowledged. The interrupt control logic would then automatically load the instruction into the instruction register and normal operation resumes by executing this instruction. "Interrupt vectoring" is achieved by the use of special purpose, single byte instruction which derives the jump address from a part of the code itself. Using the device interrupt address to specify this bit field, a unique jump address may be defined for each device. Device recognition is performed by hardware.

With several interrupt sources there is always the possibility of one or more interrupt requests occurring during the servicing of an earlier interrupt



Device Polling Figure 5-12

request. In the simpler interrupt systems, the mask bit is automatically set when the first request is recognized. Subsequent interrupt requests join a queue and wait until servicing of the first interrupt has been completed. The order in which the queued interrupts are recognized is a critical factor in determining the time delay before being serviced. The "priority" may be dictated by software or by hardware.

- Software priority after recognizing an interrupt request, the service program polls the I/O device in an order which follows the interrupt priority of each device. Therefore, the highest priority devices are polled first and serviced first.
- 2. Hardware priority interrupt control logic can be used to send out an external signal which would control the interrupt request logic in each of the I/O devices. The control signal passes through each device in turn and always reflects the state of the interrupt mask bit. If the mask is set, the signal will prevent all devices from generating at a device which has no interrupt request pending, the signal is simply passed on to the next device. When arriving at a device which is waiting for interrupt service, interrupt logic in the device prevents the signal from passing on to the next device and generates an interrupt request. The position of a device along the control line determines its priority. When more than one device awaits service, the device which received the control signal first will be serviced first.

The problem of maintaining program continuity in a multiple interrupt environment may become complex especially where nesting of interrupts occurs. Measures must be taken to save and subsequently restore the contents of all registers, including the return address held in the program counter for each of the interrupt requests which are currently being serviced. Each "level" of service requires its own unique storage locations in which the information

can be saved. The save and restore operation may be implemented in one of the two basic ways:

1. Program controlled save and restore.

The contents of the registers are transferred to a unique area of memory under program control in a "non-interruptable" section at the start of each interrupt service program before the interrupt mask is reset to allow recognition of higher priority interrupts. This information may be similarly restored at the conclusion of each service program.

2. Automatic stacking.

The interrupt control logic automatically stores the contents of the registers and advances a pointer whenever an interrupt request is recognized. Upon completion of servicing, a "return from interrupt" instruction restores the registers and decrements the pointer appropriately.

5.2.1.2.1 CITS Input-Output Design Criteria

Design requirements of the CITS input-output may be considered a typical design for a fixed cycle, multi-rate, variable tasks, real-time program for an onboard test system.

The I/O program provides for the transfer of data between the CITS computer and the CITS peripherals via a common data bus. It consists of a program submodule and a data submodule.

The program submodule consists of the I/O scheduler which performs the overall control functions required to schedule the data transfer operations and the I/O service program which issues the necessary commands to the I/O Controller (IOC) to effect the physical transfer of data on channels 1 and 2.

The data submodule is the I/O data which contains all of the buffers for data acquired from or transmitted to the peripherals. The data submodule

is arranged such that the most efficient operation of the overall CITS computer program is realized.

The overall I/O program operation is time phased in a manner to meet the requirements of the operational program modules and the peripheral equipments. It is a partially double-buffered function. This technique was chosen to eliminate interference between the processing operations and the data transmission operations. It also considerably reduces the operational program housekeeping and decision operations.

The I/O Scheduler is a regularly scheduled function invoked by the CITS Executive Control function. It schedules channel 1 I/O for the next sequential time slot. The scheduler consists of the following scheduling functions under control of a primary scheduler:

1. Self Test Schedule Function

Schedules the required I/O transactions based on the time slot and data requests from the Self Test module.

2. Data Schedule Function

Schedules the input parameter acquisition and stimuli issuance transactions based on the time slot and requests from operational programs.

3. Control and Display (CCD) Schedule Function

Schedules I/O for the CCD, based on the time slot.

4. Power Control (PC) Schedule Function

Schedules status request and commands for the PC Module.

5. Printer Schedule Function

Interrogates and schedules output to the Airborne Printer.

6. Crash Data Recorder (CDR) Schedule Function

Schedules the required input/output transaction based on the time slot and recorder availability. In the event a CDR hard failure occurs, all CDR functions are descheduled except the recording function.

The I/O Schedule functions construct a temporary Transfer Initiate Command (TIC) stack in core for execution in the next time slot by the I/O service program. They further construct the required Channel Control Words (CCW) used to start the IOC operation for each block of TIC's.

All schedule functions examine the hardware status to determine if a data transaction with that device is to be scheduled. Channel 2 TIC scheduling and CCW construction is a function of the Maintenance Recorder (MREC) module and avionics module.

The I/O service program submodule is an interrupt type program. It is initiated by the Executive Real-Time Counter Control function which occurs every 62.5 milliseconds and thereafter via the secondary real time counter interrupt. The I/O service function is executed 4 times in one time slot for a maximum rate of 64/second.

The Maintenance Recorder is statused controlled and serviced, if required, each execution.

The number of messages and the number of control and data words transmitted and received in one service interval are limited to preclude the use of the IOC end-of-transmission interrupt. These limits are not more than 64 messages or 584 control and data words in one service interval, whichever is greater. These figures are chosen to take advantage of the maximum number of messages that can be chained together and to limit the total transmission time such that the IOC will be available at the next service interval.

The operation of the I/O service routine is as follows:

- 1) An Interrupt counter is reloaded.
- 2) Counter interrupt bit in the Interrupt Level Status Word (ILSW) is reset.
- 3) If it is the first service interval:
 - a) The I/O Service error flag and channel termination bit is reset.

- b) If the current Channel 1 channel control word (CCW) location is non-zero, both channel 1 and 2 CCW's are issued. Otherwise, only the channel 2 CCW is issued.
- 4) If it is other than the first service interval:
 - a) If the I/O service error flag is set all channel 1 transmission scheduled for the remainder of the time slot is descheduled.
 - b) If the I/O service error flag is not set the ILSW channel 1 terminated bit is checked. If channel 1 has terminated, the ILSW bit is reset and the channel 1 CCW is issued. If the channel has not terminated, the IØ service error flag is set and all transmission for the remainder of the time slot is descheduled.
- 5) The internal counters and pointers are incremented for the next service interval.
- 6) A check of the service interval count is made. If it is the 4th one in the time slot, the same actions as 3) above are taken to preclude further interrupts.
- 7) Prior to the return to the interrupted operation, the interrupt status bit is reset. This action is always performed prior to the final exit. The return is via the 'old' PSW.

The I/O program stacks are ordered into functional groups. Each stack consists of two segments, TIC words and data words. These segments are contained in separate areas of core. Stacks containing the TIC's and data words to input the test parameters to support both inflight and ground testing and fault isolation are assigned to each subsystem. Stacks are also assigned to the remaining peripherals that have permanently scheduled input and output operations.

Non-Permanently scheduled data (e.g., stimuli and control, maintenance recorder, special self test requests) have core allocated to hold the

generated starks during execution of the I/O service function. These areas are reusable after use. Another temporary area is assigned to hold the previously scheduled TIC words during the I/O service function execution.

Several software safeguards were designed into the stimuli-generating logic of the I/O program to prevent the inadvertent issuance of stimuli to an aircraft subsystem.

- No stimuli may be issued whatsoever on the ground unless the "STIMSTOP" flag is non-zero. This flag is controlled by the test select and sequence control module (TSSC) which also determines the aircraft mode (ground or flight).
- 2. All stimuli is reset upon reinitialization of the program to ascertain that no stimuli were "left on."
- 3. In the air and on the ground all stimuli are "filtered" through a series of registers which ascertains that only the stimuli that were requested is issued.

NOTE: There is also a hardware interlock (stimuli button) on the CCD which must be depressed (and held) for all critical stimuli.

5.2.1.3 Control, Display and Recording

The basic elements of a typical onboard test system include operator intervention and failure and fault isolation display and recording capability.

The interface between CITS and the operator on the aircraft is the control and display panel (CCD). The CCD provides visual outputs indicating the status of the aircraft's operating subsystems, test signal values and identification of failed equipment to both aircrew and groundcrew. This information is presented using fifty (50) split-screen illuminated-legend switch (DELTA) indicators, two hundred and forty-eight (248) illuminated-legend (STATUS) indicators, and a twenty (20) character alphanumeric display. The

operator can request changes in test mode and display options as well as enter special data such as engine number, date, etc., for printing and recording purposes. The CCD panel is interrogated and updated four times a second for status changes. This frequency allows the operator to read toggling information via the alphanumeric display using the parameter monitor function and also surpasses any reaction times needed for operation intervention. The delta and status indicators do not toggle. The CITS recording function retains the ground and flight data for post flight analysis.

5.2.1.3.1 CITS Control, Display, and Recording Design Criteria

Several service modules were designed to handle the control display and recording function for the CITS onboard test system program. The following describes these modules and their tasks:

(1) Data Entry and Display (DEAD) Module

The DEAD module provides the method by which the CITS operator may enter and display the following information.

- A. Data Entry. Any numerically coded data of ten characters (5 HW) for the print and recorder modules.
- B. Engine Serial Numbers. Any numerically coded data preceded by engine location, i.e., one left outboard, four right outboard.
- C. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) numbers. APU serial numbers one left, two right.
- D. Aircraft Identification. Aircraft tail number.
- E. Parameter Monitor. Enter and display any subsystem parameter or memory location.

Functional operation of the DEAD module is briefly as follows:

1. The dead module interfaces with input/output data to determine what mode has been selected and whether the display switch is in keyboard or computer position.

- 2. With the switch in the keyboard position the keyboard entry is processed and verified to perform the requested task which is to store or display data.
- 3. With the switch in the computer mode the selected operation is displayed on the alphanumeric display.
- 4. In parameter monitor mode the keyboard data is formated for use by the input/output program to obtain the selected parameter. Depending on the type signal requested there are certain lock-outs that are utilized to keep from displaying erroneous data or turning on a subsystem stimulus inadvertently. The selected parameter is updated on the CCD display four times per second.
- (2) Test Select and Sequence Control (TSSC)

The CITS onboard test system operates in one of several modes depending upon whether the aircraft is on the ground or in the air and what the mode selection input by the operator is. The modes that CITS recognizes are:

- 1. Ground ready.
- 2. Ground fault isolation.
- 3. In-flight status.
- 4. In-flight fault isolation.
- 5. Parameter monitor.
- 6. Date.
- 7. APU number.
- 8. Engine number.
- 9. Aircraft identification.
- 10. Data entry.
- 11. Automatic Power Control (spare).

The TSSC module determines the mode of operation and processes test request initiated by the operator. The module also determines what the "true" mode should be as compared to what the operator selects by determining whether the

aircraft is on the ground or in-flight by monitoring such parameters as weight on wheels, engines, off/on, etc.

When in the air, the in-flight mode indicator is set and subsystems are prevented from receiving commands for active tests (which are only conducted on the ground). An indicator is also set instructing the input/output module to inhibit the issuance of stimuli during the flight mode.

During the ground mode, TSSC first checks the "test stop" switch which concludes the current or previous test and instructs the input/output module to reset stimuli for that test. It then checks the true mode and sees if an active test is being commanded. The test number is stored and, if in the next time slot conditions remain valid for an active test to begin, the active test bit for that particular test is set. The test is still not initiated, however, until a final check is made to see that the "stimuli" button is depressed by the operator if critical stimuli are being issued.

(3) Subsystem Status Interpreter (SSIN)

The subsystems status interpreter function monitors the results of the subsystem test modules for a change in status. The monitoring of each given subsystem test module is scheduled at either the module execution rate or by direct request from the given submodule. The CITS self-test function is to be treated as a module.

Both old and new subsystem status are contained within the given module. New failures detected by the subsystem test modules during the current time slot are indicated by logical "1" bit settings in the appropriate bit positions in the new subsystem status words. Old reoccurring failures, already verified by the subsystem status interpreter during some previous time slot, are indicated by logical "1" bit settings in the appropriate bit and word position in the old subsystem status words. The subsystem status interpreter compares the old subsystem status words with the new subsystem status words to determine number of consecutive new failures. After the required number of consecutive

failures, SSIN leaves a logical "l" bit set in the appropriate position in the new subsystem status strings.

Part way into the development of the CITS program it was discovered that a significant number of false alarm failure indications were occurring for specific subsystems due to spurious failures at initial stimuli application and/or noise in the system. The problem was solved by designing a "variable pass" filter in lieu of the three pass filter as was used up to that time. The variable pass filter contains logic to allow the number of consecutive out of limits responses which would constitute a failure to be unique for each of the subsystem modules.


Upon determining that these consecutive new failures have occurred, the subsystem status interpreter also determines for each new failure whether or not appropriate display and print queues have been previously set to a logical "1". If the appropriate queues have not been previously set, SSIN will set them. The display and print assemblers utilize these queues to locate new failure and LRU messages for display and/or printing.

The subsystem status interpreter monitors a dedicated legend string in the same manner as the subsystem and LRU status strings except for two differences: (1) the status bits in the dedicated legend string are to be monitored by rate group instead of by subsystem and (2) after detecting three consecutive new failures, the corresponding status bits in the CCD output buffer are set to a logical "1".

The SSIN function determines completion of CCD operator selected ground readiness tests by processing status condition data. SSIN sets a flag to illuminate the CCD 'TEST COMPLETE' legend.

(4) Display Assembler (DISP)

The DISP module sequence of operations diagram (Figure 5-13) describes the display assembler design. Message (alphanumeric and LRU) to be displayed on the CCD panel are indicated by the subsystem modules in subsystem dedicated



Display Assembler Sequence of Operations. Figure 5-13 5-47

bit strings. Each bit in the string represents a unique message. The status interpreter processes the indications and passes the indications to the display assembler module. When a new message is required for display, the status interpreter also sets a dedicated bit in another bit string (display hi-level queue) to indicate the particular subsystem which has a failure. The display assembler uses the hi-level queue to determine when new failures have occurred.

To process the subsystem strings the display assembler uses four primary routines and a main line program. The drivers maintain the CCD status and deltas and call the primary routine when required.

The message assembler routine is called when the driver has determined that a message must be displayed. The message assembler is given the assembly location, the subsystem in which the message is, and the bit number within message string as parameters. The message assembler uses the subsystem number as an index in a pointer table, which in turn points to the block of message seeds for the particular subsystem. The message bit number index down the block of message seeds to obtain the seed for the particular message to be displayed. To obtain the true message, the message seed is used to index into a dictionary of words. The words are assembled into the buffer location indicated by the driver. This method was chosen due to core limitations which precluded the use of pure look-up tables.

The Work Unit Code Assembler (WUCASM) is called when the driver determines a work unit code must be assembled. The WUCASM routine is given the assembly location, the failed subsystem and the work code bit number as parameters. The WUCASM obtained the group number via indexing into a table with the subsystem number. The group number is moved to the indicated buffer location. The work unit code bit number is transferred into a three character ASCII number and assembled in the buffer.

The STATSID routine is used to convert a CCD status and delta switch to

the corresponding subsystem. The STATSID routine is given a bit number within the CCD input buffer. The bit number is used to index into a table structure to obtain the corresponding subsystem. The subsystem number is passed back to the driver for use.

The SCANJQ routine is used to search the subsystem message string for bits that are on. The SCANJQ routine is given a string code and subsystem identification as parameters and returns a fullword bit number and fullword address and "no bit on" flag. The subsystem identification is used to index a subsystem message string address table to obtain the message string address and fullword length for that subsystem. The string is then scanned by fullword from right to left and from left to right within the fullword. The interleaved structure of the message string is also condensed in the SCANJQ routine.


Failure messages to the airborne printer are generated in the same manner. See Figure 5-14 for the display/print design relationship.

(5) Maintenance Recorder Assembler (MREC)

The MREC module provides a means of assembling CITS parameter data, maintenance data, and performance data for recording on the CITS Maintenance Recorder (CMR). The data is assembled in predefined blocks (records or frames). The process of assembling each block of data shall hereafter be referred to as a job. The maintenance recorder assembler schedules the jobs in job queues by interfacing with the service modules and the test modules. Interfacing control blocks are contained in Status Condition Data (SCDATA), MREC, Print Assember (PRINT) and Avionics-ACUC (AVIONIX) modules. Jobs will be assigned priorities by consideration of job deferability which is determined by data and time "freshness" requirements of the particular jobs. The maintenance recorder assembler shall execute jobs by branching to individual job routines which assemble the data in identical buffers (IOMRO1 and IOMRO2) in IODATA.

The contents of IOMROL and IOMRO2 each constitute a long logical record.

Jobs will not span buffers (records) in IODATA during normal "real time"



*

1

Printer and CCD Display Interface Diagram Figure 5-14

processing. The end of valid data in a record is indicated by an end of record data frame. The recording of an assembled record is accomplished by flagging the Maintenance Recorder Driver module (MRDRIVER) with a "buffer full" indication. The MRDRIVER will have the record output and reset the "buffer full" indication. If both buffers are full and jobs remain to be completed, the maintenance recorder assembler reschedules the job in the next time slot. MREC includes the scheduling and assembling of the following jobs:

- 1. End of File (EOF).
- 2. Manual Data Entered (MDATA).
- 3. Permanent Manual Data Entered (PMDATA).
- 4. Failure Message (FAIMSG).
- 5. LRU Status Message (LRUMSG).
- 6. Snapshot Data (SNAP).
- 7. Engine Trend Data (TREND).
- 8. Engine Parameter Monitor (ENGPARA).
- 9. Engine Status (ENGSTAT).
- 10. CITS Status (CITSTAT).
- 11. Powered Time (PWRTIME).
- 12. CITS Calibration (CITSCAL).
- 13. End of Record (EOR).

Figure 5-14 shows the relationship between the control, display, and recording modules.

5.2.1.4 Avionics

The relationship of CITS with avionics, typifies a possible requirement for a remote computer based system to perform testing of its associated subsystems. B-1 avionics subsystem testing is accomplished by the avionics computers in conjunction with the CITS onboard test system computer. The avionics computers send test results to the CITS computer for display on the CITS CCD panel for printing on the airborne printer and for recording on the maintenance recorder. The CITS computer also processes operator inputs to avionics via the CCD. The interface/communication relationship is such that the CITS computer is the control or master computer and the avionics computers are the response or slave computers.

5.2.1.4.1 CITS/Avionics Design Criteria

The CITS Dedicated Computer (CDC) interfaces with the Offensive Avionics Control Units (OACU) and the Defensive Avionic Control Unit (DACU) via the "AMUX V" communication channel. The OACU is made up of the Weapons Delivery Avionics Control Unit (WDACU) and the Guidance and Navigation Avionic Control Unit (GNACU). Communication is serial digital and is under control of the CDC.

The CITS/avionics communication interface provides the Avionics Control Units (ACU) with access to CITS equipment in the performance of avionics CITS functions. This utilization of CITS equipment must be provided in a manner which will prevent avionic and CITS conflicts in their usage. This interface provides the ACU's with CITS parameters and data required by avionics in the performance of its CITS functions; and provides CITS with avionic acquired parameters and data required by CITS in the performance of its functions. It also provides CITS with avionic acquired crash recorder data. Failures detected in the performance of these functions is displayed and recorded on the CITS peripherals.

When CITS is in a ground mode, the CDC communicates with the WDACU whenever it is on and the GNACU has not been selected as part of the ground testing baseline. When CITS is in a flight mode, the CDC shall carry out near continuous communication with the offensive avionic and the defensive avionic separate and independent, however the message sequence and structure with both are similar.

Communication is accomplished using 23 data messages. Each message is assigned a unique and fixed position in the message sequence. Each message is assigned a unique identification correspondence to a Transfer Initiate Command (TIC). Messages normally cycle through the complete message sequence, in TIC number order, at a rate of 16 times per second. These messages and their TIC identification are defined in Table V-4. During normal communication, the control word for each message is issued in each message. However, data word portions may or may not be transmitted in each message. Data message lengths are not variable; they either are the defined length for the message or of zero data word length.

In non-ground modes, except for status interrogation, message addressing by the CITS CDC is determined by the functional status of the ACU's. Communication with the offensive avionic is with only one ACU at any one time. The offensive ACU with which communication is to be carried out is determined on a priority basis. The priority of the offensive ACU addressing is: (1) WDACU and (2) GNACU. The CDC uses the ACU status indications from EMUX to determine when to attempt communications with an ACU. If CITS is in a ground mode and an avionic power controller baseline has been selected, the CDC will only attempt to communicate with the ACU's corresponding to the selected baseline. At any other time, when the CDC determines that an ACU is on, the proper communication has not been established with the other ACU, and CDC will attempt to establish communications with the ACU. After 30 seconds following the detection of the ACU on indication, proper communication has not been established, the CDC indicates there is a communication fault.

Each message is initiated by the CDC issuing a control word. The Transfer/Receiver (T/R) bit status of each control word shall be checked by the addressed ACU for agreement with the T/R status expected for that message. The CDC sets the control word count to zero when data transmission is not required.

TABLE V-4

AVIONICS/CITS MESSAGE TIMING RELATIVE TO CITS INTERNAL TIMING STRUCTURE

23									!	į								
ĺ	MESSACE			ļ	5	CDC 1/16 SECOND TIME	SEC 9		TIME	SLOTS			Ī					
		1	2	3	4	5	9	7	8	6	ន្ទ	=	12	13	7	15	2	8
10.10	AVIONICS STATUS - PRIMARY, AVIONICS PARAMETER & CDR	Ţ	Т	Т	Т	Ŀ	Η	H	Т	Ŀ	H	H	H	H	T	H	Н	
-	CITS STATUS & CITS PARAMETERS	R	R	æ	æ	æ	æ	æ	œ	æ	R	æ	R	×	K	R	æ	
רז	AVIONICS DISPLAY (FRAME 1)	T				Т				Ţ				Т				
	AVIONICS DISPLAY (FRAME 2)	Ţ				T				Ŀ				[_				
	CCD CONTROL			×			R					۳				<u>ح</u>		
	AVIONICS PRINTER																	H
	CONFIGURATION NO. 1								<u> </u>									۳
	CONETGIBATION NO. 2																	Т
	AVIONICS RECORDER NO. 1	_																Ţ
	7 7 7																	4
			$oldsymbol{\perp}$						L									
	>																	\
	S RECORDER NO. 15																	Li .
Z Z	AVIONICS RECORDER NO. 15																	

⊗ 14

UNSCHEDULED MESSAGES
TRANSMITTED FROM AVIONICS TO THE CDC
TRANSMITTED FROM THE CDC TO THE AVIONICS

There are four control words for each TIC, the third and fourth of which are dummy words to insure a minimum of at least 24 microseconds between transmission of consecutive control or data words to a given ACU.

Data indicating communication status with the ACU's and flight test recorder shall be handled on Channel number 1. All ACU/CITS interface data is handled on Channel number 2.

5.2.1.5 Ground Readiness Tests (GRT's) and Power Control (PC)

The following typifies an approach to ground testing as accomplished by the onboard test system.

GRT's (active) are performed utilizing the CITS to verify system performance and to reverify system operation after a maintenance action has been performed on the aircraft. These GRT's are automatically conducted under CITS computer control and require between one second and five minutes to conduct. The ground crew can run the GRT's in either one of two modes of operation. The first is the manual power control mode in which the aircraft test configuration is manually set up by the ground crew. This is accomplished by opening/closing circuit breakers and positioning cockpit dials and switches to enable system under test and supporting systems operation. This mode is used when the aircraft is being supported by ground power and cooling carts. In this mode, other testing can be performed in parallel with the CITS GRT. In order to comply with the self-sufficiency requirements necessary for an advanced manned strategic aircraft, a second mode, automatic power control, of running GRT's is required. In this mode, the CITS computer sets up the power and cooling configuration of the aircraft by controlling the operation of the B-1 EMUX system through its Boolean logic equations. When the aircraft is in the automatic power control mode, CITS, through EMIX, automatically sets up the aircraft baseline power and cooling configuration. When the CITS operator wants to conduct a particular subsystem test, he enters the subsystem code into the CITS computer using the control and display

keyboard. The computer then reconfigures the aircraft power and cooling to support the test selected. As soon as the power and cooling is configured to support the selected test, an operator message 'Test Power Configuration Set" is displayed on the control and display alphanumeric display, and the operator can then proceed to conduct the test. At the conclusion of the test, the power and cooling is returned to the aircraft baseline configuration. The automatic power control mode is designed to allow aircraft subsystem testing to be accomplished supported by the onboard electrical power, hydraulic power, and equipment cooling. Because of this, the total power and cooling load must always be maintained within the limits of the secondary power system. Of prime importance in using the CITS concept is getting the system into use by field test personnel as quickly as possible during the flight test program. This allows interface problems to be identified and corrected while the subsystems are still in the development stage. During the flight test program, equal importance for test and troubleshooting time must be given the onboard test system as any other major onboard system. Without this consideration, onboard test system hardware/software development will be lagging and test results will not be available to evaluate the effectiveness of the onboard test system.

5.2.1.5.1 CITS GRT's and PC Design Criteria

The PWRCNTRL module performs several functions to accomplish the module requirements.

There are three PC modes which can be established: 1) Passive Testing Mode, 2) Pseudo Power Controller Mode, and 3) True Power Controller Control Mode.

When a passive testing mode or psuedo power controller mode is determined, the test modules ompatible with the existing load management mode for passive testing are scheduled after a ten second delay.

When a true PC control mode is determined, the aircraft baseline state for the power controllers is established for the left and right EMUX by issuing commands which disable them, enable them, or turn them on or off. Commands for the left and right side are issued to establish load management mode 5. Next, a bit is set to have the CCD display indicate "AIRCRAFT BASELINE." Then the CITS test modules compatible with the aircraft baseline are scheduled after a 10 second delay.

The PWRCNTRL mode tests a code entry from the CCD keyboard for validity and for function. CCD keyboard entries are accepted for checking when the CCD mode select switch is found in either the ground ready or the ground fault isolation position, and the CCD test switch is found to be placed in the STOP position, and then when the CCD select switch is placed in KYBD position.

After these initial checks, analysis occurs regarding entry validity and entry function.

If an aircraft test code or an avionics baseline set or reset code has been entered, and the entry is found invalid, or the configuration is incompatible with the power source, the CCD display will show the word "INVALID" and the invalid entry. The module will then await the next function or entry for analysis. If the entry is found to be valid, and the configuration is compatible with the power source, the CCD display will show the word "VALID" with the valid entry. Then, when the CCD select switch is placed in the CMPTR position followed by the CCD test switch placed on START, the active aircraft test or an avionics baseline set/reset shall occur.

5.3 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

It is essential to be able to estimate the time phasing and size of the onboard test system program early in the development process. The following discusses some estimating approaches based, for the most part, on the experience gained from the CITS program.

5.3.1 TIMING

A time-phasing analysis was made soon after the start of the CITS program. This analysis serves here as a recommended approach to evaluating the data input, processing and output timing approach for a typical onboard test system, real-time computer program. In the case of CITS, the data transfers considered were between the computer and the air vehicle non-avionics subsystems and CITS peripherals which include the control and display, airborne printer, and maintenance and crash data recorders.

The general requirements, using CITS as an example, are as follows:

The CITS Computer Program shall, at required real-time rates, control test modes, test sequencing, rates, timing, test data acquisition, processing and transfer, and test results display and recording to:

- A. Test and verify the RDT&E air vehicle subsystems both in-flight and on the ground. The test frequency rate of functional tests shall provide a continuous indication of subsystem performance to the aircrew.
- B. Display to the aircrew, subsystem failure information.
- C. Provide onboard identification and isolation of LRU's.
- D. Provide selected test data and test results for identification and isolation of a failed LRU on the ground.

The quantity of data (16 bits per word) transferred between the CITS processor and CITS peripheral equipment are as follows:

- A. Thirty-three words of output at a cycle rate of 4 times per 1 second cycle from the processor to the CITS control and display for display of the status of air vehicle subsystems tests.
- B. Ten words of input at a cycle rate of 4 times per 1 second time cycle from the CITS control and display to processor for test selection and mode control.
- C. Two characters per word, 25 characters per second maximum are output from the processor to the CITS printer.

D. Six thousand two hundred and fifty words per second maximum are transferred from the processor to the maintenance recorder.

The quantity of test parameters transferred from the air vehicle subsystems to the processor are listed in Table V-5 by signal type for the inflight performance monitoring mode. Similar lists should be made for each mode of operation.

The test data representing the test control and stimuli are output to the air vehicle subsystems as required. The quantity of stimuli required for each subsystem is listed on Table V-6.

The air vehicle subsystems test parameters are monitored by CITS at the data cycle rates listed on Table V-7.

5.3.1.1 Analysis

The CITS Computer Program inputs, processing, and output operations are time-phased as shown in Table V-8. Each time cycle is 1 second and is divided into 16 time slots. Each time slot is 62.5 ms. The time phased operations are as follows:

- A. Data is input in time slot t.
- B. This data is processed in time slot t + 1.
- C. Data required to be output as a result of the processing is accomplished in time slot t + 3.

All scheduled real-time functions in each time slot must be completed within the time slot.

In this analysis, the data input, processing and output times will be determined for each time slot based on currently available information.

Table V-9 lists the time required to input test parameters from the non-avionics subsystems in time slots 1 through 16. This information is based on an input/output simulation program which determines the time required to input test parameters from each subsystem based on input/output data size, input/output stack size, and number of messages.

TABLE V-5 A/V SUBSYSTEM TEST INPUT PARAMETERS LISTED BY SIGNAL TYPES AND QUANTITY FOR IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE MONITORING

TABLE V-6 STIMILI AND CONFROLS OUTPUT TO A/V SUBSYSTEMS

SUBSYSTEM	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	GROUND READINESS	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND	TOTAL
RGA	0	9	0	0	9
FLIGHT DIRECTOR COMPUTER	0	0	0	0	0
LANDING GEAR & DECEL.	0	S	0	0	2
ELECTRICAL POWER DIST.	7	7	0	0	14
E-MUX	0	0	0	0	0
HYDRAULIC POWER	0	0	0	С	0
SECONDARY POWER	0	0	0	0	0
BLEED AIR	0	0	0	0	0
AIR COND/PRESSURE	0	0	0	0	0
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION	0	0	0	0	0
ESCAPE SYSTEM	0	0	0	0	0
LIFE SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0
ENGINE INSTRUMENTS	0	0	0	0	0
AIR INDUCTION CONTROL	0	&	0	0	0
FUEL SYSTEM	0	0	0	0	0
ENGINES	0	0	0	0	0
GINE THRUST CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0
ENGINE ANTI-ICING	0	2	0	0	7
FIRE PROTECTION	0	0	0	0	0
PITCH AFCS/SCAS	0	4	0	0	4
ROLL AFCS/SCAS	0	9	0	0	9
YAW SCAS	0	10	0	0	10
AIR DATA SYSTEM	0	12	0	0	12
GYRO STABILIZATION SYS	0	0	0	0	0
WING SWEEP	0	0	0	0	0
FLAPS AND SLATS	0	œ	0	0	∞
STRUCTURAL MODE CONTROL	0	9	0	0	0
SPOILERS	3	3	0	0	9
LAUNCHERS, RACKS, & DOORS	0 5	0 2	olo	Old	0 0
IOLAL	70	//	D	o	%

TABLE V-7 A/V SUBSYSTEM DATA CYCLE RATES PER SECOND

SUBSYSTEM	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	GROUND READINESS	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND
RGA		7	H	-
FLIGHT DIRECTOR COMPUTER	1	-	-	H
LANDING GEAR & DECEL.	1	_	-	-
ELECTRICAL POWER DIST.	1			-
E-MUX	8	∞	∞	∞
HYDRAULIC POWER	1	-		7
SECONDARY POWER	1	7	г	1
BLEED AIR	1	~ i		1
AIR COND/PRESSURE	1	-		7
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION	1	-	-	1
ESCAPE SYSTEM	1	-	-	1
LIFE SUPPORT	1	H	1	Н
ENGINE INSTRUMENTS	0	7	0	1
AIR INDUCTION CONTROL	1	-	- [7
FUEL SYSTEM	7	-	-	-
ENGINES	4	4	4	4
ENGINE THRUST CONTROL	4	4	4	4
ENGINE ANTI-ICING	1	П	7	1
FIRE PROTECTION	1	-	-	1
PITCH AFCS/SCAS	1	∞	-	∞
ROLL AFCS/SCAS	0	∞	0	∞
YAW SCAS	7	∞		8
AIR DATA SYSTEM	1	-	-	1
GYRO STABILIZATION SYS	1	1	-	П
WING SWEEP	1	٦	1	H
FLAPS AND SLATS	2	2	2	2
STRUCTURAL MODE CONTROL	&	H	∞	1
SPOILERS	1	∞	1	∞
LAUNCHERS, RACKS, & DOORS	2	-	2	1

TABLE V-8

11

CITS COMPUTE TIME CYCLE

	40 81	1AP	16
	AI		15
	1C 81 80	4P	14
	86 41	8P	13
	40 81	10P 2P	12
	10 81 80 21 40 81 80	8b	=======================================
	18 01	4P	10
	81 80 11 40 81 80 41	&	6
	40 81	11P	∞
	8Ø 11	8b	7
	1BØ 8I	4Þ	9
	8Ø 4I	8 b	2
<u>e</u>	4	1BP 2P	4
Start of one Second Time Cycle TS	89 41 1A9 81 89 2I	8P	3
cart of cond Ti	140 81	4P	2
\$ 8 V	80 41	8p	1
	10P-	Z-6	SI -NST

Input/Output Program
Real Time Program
Time Slot Number
Time Slot - 1/16 sec = 62.5 ms
Iteration Rate per Second
I per Second Alternate

End of one second Time Cycle

Input Data Output Data Process Data 11 11 11

TABLE V-9 ESTIMATED CITS PROGRAM MODULE EXECUTION TIMES

Module		Execution Time (MS) Per Time Slot
Executive		0.4
Test Select and Sequence Contr	ro1	2.0
System Error Control		1.5
Back-Up Mode Control		0.5
I/O Program		5.0
Data Enter and Display		1.5
Flight Test Data Driver		0.5
Subsystem Status Interpreter		3.0
CITS Self-Test		2.0
CITS Computer Monitor		1.0
Display Assembler		4.0
Print Assembler		1.5
Maintenance Record Assembler		1.0
	Total	23.9

TABLE V-9 (CONT)

SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND READINESS	GROUND
Engines	10	14.31	8.80	14.31	8.80
RGA	12	0.03	0.01	0.87	0.26
Bleed Air	12	1.15	1.75	1.15	1.75
Environ Prot	12	0.28	0.11	0.28	0.11
Escape System	12	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01
AICS	12	10.14	3.04	4.54	1.36
Flaps and Slats	12	3.42	1.03	3.42	1.03
Launchers, Racks,	12	1.43	0.43	1.43	0.43
Doors			1		
Total		16.48	6.38	11.72	4.95
Engines	14	14.31	8.80	14.31	8.80
Land Gear	16	0.48	0.42	0.48	0.42
Electric Power	16	4.76	1.43	4.76	1.43
Eng Instrum	16	0.00	0.00	0.87	0.26
Fuel	16	7.70	2.31	8.40	2.52
Eng Thrust Cont	16	0.62	0.78	0.62	0.78
CADS	16	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.05
SS	16	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
Total		13.62	5.02	15.22	5.50

Table V-10 lists the time required to output stimuli and controls in time slots 1 through 16 and identifies the time required for each subsystem. The time figures were obtained from the input/output simulation program.

Based on sample algorithms for air vehicle subsystems performance test and using programming instructions for IBM Model AP-2 Computer, the average processor time required for processing test parameters was estimated to be as follows:

Parameter Type	Processing Time
Discrete (Multiple of 16)	30 microseconds
Digital	140 microseconds
Analog (DC)	140 micorseconds

Based on the above processing rates, the processor time required for processing test parameters was calculated using the test data parameter list. The calculated figures are listed in Table V-11 and are grouped by time slot. The figures listed under in-flight fault isolation and ground fault isolation are the time required to process additional test parameters for fault isolation routines.

Table V-12 lists the estimated execution times for each program module other than the subsystems performance tests. This is the approximate time required in each time slot for in-flight and ground tests.

Having computed the time for test parameters input, output and processing in each time slot, all input/output data can be summarized in time slot shown in Table V-13.

5.3.1.2 Analysis Summary

In sequential operation, the input, processing and output occur in sequence; when one is active, the others are idle. In overlapped operation, input/process or output/process may occur concurrently. Thus in overlapping operation, the total time required for input/output and process will be less than for sequential operation. The time required for sequential and overlapped operations are listed on Tables V-14 through V-17.

TABLE V-10 TIME REQUIRED TO PROCESS A/V SUBSYSTEMS TEST PARAMETERS IN TIME SLOTS 1 THROUGH 16

1

SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND READINESS	GROUND
Decel Pitch	1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15	4.23	1.27	4.23	1.27
Roll		0.00	0.00	0.28	00.0
Yaw		1.57	0.47	2.27	0.68
Struc Mode Cont		0.03	0.32	0.03	3.12
Spoilers Total		5.74	1.72	5.74	7.58
Engines	2	14.31	8.80	14.31	8.80
FDC	4	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01
Hydraulic Power	4	3.92	1.18	3,92	1.18
Fire Plot	4	2.30	0.69	2.30	69.0
Wing Sweep	4	2.55	0.77	2.55	0.77
Flaps and Slats	4	3.42	1.03	3.42	1.03
Launcers, Racks,		1.43	0.43	1.43	0.43
Total		13.65	4.11	13.65	4.11
Engines	9	14.31	8.80	14.31	8.80
E-MUX	8	6.16	1.85	6.16	1.85
Secondary Power	8	2.08	0.62	2.08	0.62
Air Cond and Press		1.04	3.56	1.74	3.07
Life Support	œ	0.45	0.14	0.45	0.14
Engine Anti-Ice	œ	0.31	0.12	0.31	0.12
Total		10.04	6.29	10.74	5.80

TABLE V-10 (CONT)

SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND READINESS	GROUND
Crew Escape Environ Prot Bleed Air RGA AICS Flaps and Slats Launchers, Racks, Doors	14 14 14 14 14 14	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.45	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tota1		0.0	0.0	1.35	0.0

TABLE V-11 TIME REQUIRED TO OUTPUT STIMULI AND CONTROLS TO A/V SUBSYSTEMS IN TIME SLOTS I THROUGH 16

SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION	GROUND READINESS	GROUNT) ISOLATION
Decel Pitch Roll	1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15	0.0	0.0	0.10	0.0
Yaw Struc Mode Cont		0.0	0.0	0.65	0.00
Spoilers Total		0.25	0.0	0.25	0.0
Fuel System	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Engine Instrum	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Electric Pwr Dist	7 2	0.0 0.45	0.0	0.3	0.0
SSS	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0:0
CAUS	2	0.0	0.0	0.75	0.0
ing Ihrust Cont Total	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Engines	4,8,12,16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fire Protect	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
Wing Sweep	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Flaps and Slats	9	0.0	0.0	0.45	0.0
Hydraulic Power	9 '	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
riight Direc Computer	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Launchers, Racks, Doors	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total		0.0	0.0	0.45	0.0

TABLE V-11 (CONT)

SUBSYSTEM E-MJX	TIME SLOT NO.	IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 0.0	IN-FLIGHT ISOLATION 0.0	GROUND READINESS 0.0	GROUND ISOLATION 0.0
Engine Anti-Ice 10 A. Cond and Press 10 Secondary Power 10	10 5 10 10	0.0	0.0	0.2 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Life Support Total	10	0.0	0.0	$\frac{0.0}{0.2}$	0.0
	SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	NO.	TIME (MS)	
	Landing Gear	15		0.50	
	Elec Pwr	15		1.85	
	Eng Instru	15		0.50	
	Fue1	15	٠.	3.20	
	Eng Thrust Cont	15		0.65	
	CADS	15		0.30	
	GSS Total	15		$\frac{0.15}{7.15}$	

TABLE V-12

Time required to input test parameters from A/V subsystems in time slots 1 through 16. Applicable to in-flight performance in-flight fault isolation, ground readiness and ground fault isolation test. Time figures are in milliseconds.

SUBSYSTEM	TIME SLOT NO.	TIME (MS)
Engines	1	7.30
Decel Pitch Roll Yaw Struc Mode Cont Spoilers Total	2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16	1.85 1.00 0.20 1.00 1.60 2.30 7.95
Flight Direc Comp Hdraulic Power Fire Protect Wing Sweep Flaps and Flats Launch, Racks, Doors Total	3 3 3 3 3 3	0.15 1.50 1.05 1.20 1.55 0.75 6.20
Engines	5	7.30
E-MUX Secondary Pwr Air Cond/Press Life Support Engine Anti-Ice Total	7 7 7 7 7	2.30 1.00 2.00 0.30 0.35 5.95
Engines	9	7.30
RCA Bleed Air Environ Prot Escape Sys AICS Flaps and Slats Launch, Racks, Doors Total	11 11 11 11 11 11	0.70 1.05 0.20 0.35 3.90 1.55 0.75 8.50
Engines	13	7.30

TABLE V-13 TIME REQUIRED TO INPUT AND OUTPUT DATA FOR IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND FAULT ISOLATION.
TIME FIGHRES ARE IN MILLISECONDS

	DATA OUTPUT TO CDR TIME						•										,	17.82 335.93
_	DATA INPUT FOR CDR	1.96	1.54	0.86	1.54	1.96	1.54	0.09	1.54	1.96	1.54	0.61	1.54	1.96	1.54	1.54	1.54	23.26
LIME FIGURES AND IN MILLEISECONES	OUTPUT TO MAINT. RECORD PRINTER	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	1.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	160.00
IIME FIGURES	CONTROL § DISPLAY I/O	0.85	0.00	0.00	2.10	0.85	0.00	0.00	2.10	0.85	0.00	0.00	2.10	0.85	0.00	0.00	2.10	11.80
	STIMULI	0.25	0.45	0.25	00.00	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	2.45
	IN-FLIGHT PERF. § FAULT ISOL.	7.30	7.95	6.20	7.95	7.30	7.95	5.95	7.95	7.30	7.95	8.50	7.95	7.30	7.95	7.15	7.95	120.60
	TIME SLOT NUMBER	-	7	κ,	4	Ŋ	9	7	œ	6	10	11 '	12	13	14	15	16	TOTAL

In overlapping operation, a delay may occur in honoring memory access request due to cycle stealing by the input/output. Therefore, the processing time was increased by 10 percent.

The total time required in each time slot of 1 second time cycle is summarized in Tables V-16 and V-17 for In-Flight Performance Monitoring and Fault Isolation and in Tables V-14 and V-15 for Ground Readiness and Fault Isolation Tests.

The total time shown is for worst case condition where primary mode and fault isolation routines are to be performed on every subsystem scheduled in that time slot and data is to be outputted to the printer, recorders, and CITS control and display.

Tables V-14 through V-17 indicate that for both in-flight and ground tests, the 62.5 ms time period is exceeded in some time slots if the operation is sequential and that overlapped operations will allow the completion of the scheduled operations within the 62.5 ms period with some slack time. Further indications are that optimum utilization of time will be accomplished if some adjustments are made in the data cycle rates where possible.

5.3.1.3 Conclusions

The following conclusions are arrived at from this example:

- A. Overlapping of processing and input/output functions is required to adjust time load between time slots.
- B. Adjustment of test rates is required to equalize input/output and processing time per time slot.
- C. Optimization of input/output is necessary.

The time structure shown in Tables V-15 and V-17 is the design point for the CITS computer program.

TABLE V-14 OVERLAPPED OPERATIONS (I/O AND PROCESSING) FOR GROUND READINESS AND FAULT ISOLATION

TIME SLOT NUMBER	PROCESSING TIME (PROCESS BOUND)	CYCLE STEALING	TOTAL I/O PROCESS TIME
1	46.87	4.68	51.55
2	47.66	4.76	52.42
3	46.87	4.68	51.55
4	41.92	4.19	46.11
5	46.87	4.68	
6	47.66	4.76	51.55
7	46.87	4.68	52.42
8	40.47	4.04	51.55
9	46.87	4.68	44.51
10	47.66	4.76	51.55
11	46.87		52.42
12	41.13	4.68	51.55
13	46.87	4.11	45.24
14		4.68	51.55
	47.66	4.76	52.42
15	46.87	4.68	51.55
16	45.13	_4.51	49.64
TOTAL	734 . 25	73.33	807.58

TABLE V-15 SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS (I/O AND PROCESSING) FOR GROUND READINESS AND FAULT ISOLATION

TIME SLOT NUMBER	DATA I/O TIME	DATA PROCESS TIME	TOTAL I/O PROCESS TIME
1	23.34	46.87	70.21
2	22.49	47.66	70.15
3	20.29	46.87	67.16
4	22.25	41.92	64.17
5	23.34	46.87	70.21
6	21.44	47.66	69.10
7	19.27	46.87	66.14
8	21.66	40.47	62.13
9	23.34	46.87	70.21
10	21.19	47.66	68.85
11	22.34	46.87	69.21
12	22.06	41.13	63.19
13	23.34	46.87	70.21
14	22.34	47.66	70.00
15	21.92	46.87	68.79
16	22.77	45.13	67.90
TOTAL	353.38	734.25	1087.63

TABLE V-16 OVERLAPPED OPERATIONS (I/O AND PROCESSING) FOR IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE AND FAULT ISOLATION

TIME SLOT NUMBER	PROCESSING TIME (PROCESS BOUND)	CYCLE STEALING	TOTAL I/O PROCESS TIME
1	42.44	4.24	46.68
-	47.66	4.76	52.42
3	42.44	4.24	46.68
4	41.92	4.19	46.11
5	42.44	4.24	46.68
6	47.66	4.76	52.42
7	42.44	4.24	46.68
8	40.26	4.02	44.28
9	42.44	4.24	46.68
10	47.66	4.76	52.42
11	42.44	4.24	46.68
12	47.32	4.73	52.05
13	42.44	4.24	46.68
14	47.66	4.76	52.42
15	42.44	4.24	46.68
	43.05	4.30	47.35
TOTAL	702.71	70.20	772.91

TABLE V-17 SEQUENTIAL OPERATION (I/O AND PROCESSING) FOR IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE AND FAULT ISOLATION

TIME SLOT NUMBER	DATA I/O TIME	DATE PROCESS TIME	TOTAL I/O PROCESS TIME
1	19.78	42.44	62.22
2	21.44	47.66	69.10
3	18.49	42.44	60.93
4	22.25	41.92	64.17
5	21.54	42.44	63.98
6	20.99	47.66	68.65
7	17.47	42.44	\$9.91
8	21.66	40.26	61.92
9	21.54	42.44	63.98
10	20.99	47.66	68.65
11	20.54	42.44	62.98
12	22.06	47.32	69.38
13	21.54	42.44	63.98
14	20.99	47.66	68.65
15	20.12	42.44	62.56
16	22.77	43.05	65.82
TOTAL	334.17	702.71	1036.88

5.3.2 MEMORY

A CITS computer memory sizing analysis was made soon after the start of the CITS program. This analysis serves as a recommended approach to evaluating the memory required for a typical onboard, real-time computer program.

The basic considerations for this study involved the following general requirements:

1. The CITS Computer

A general purpose, small-scale airborne computer capable of performing the functions described below.

2. The Program Requirements

Performance functions of test mode control, test data acquisition and transfer, test data processing, and test result display. Also, to contain test logic, test sequencing in real-time, go/no-go decision data, necessary computational routines and peripheral equipment controls.

3. Program Structure

Simple and functional, constructed in modular form to simplify software development and functional verification, with multi-rates to meet various timing requirements.

5.3.2.1 Sizing Methodology

Analysis of storage requirements was accomplished by identifying the various program functions, program design, and test requirements data, defining the functions, applying appropriate estimating methods, and performing the necessary calculations.

5.3.2.1.1 Assumptions and Conditions

The following assumptions and conditions were made regarding the program environment and characteristics:

- 1. A real-time program using a small-scale general purpose airborne digital computer utilizing a 16-bit word format.
- 2. Easily modifiable program, compatible with future hardware.
- 3. Modular constructed program, fixed cycle, multi-rate.
- 4. No assumed unique capability or characteristics of a computer which may not exist at a later date.
- 5. Where data or requirements are not definitized, available information and engineering judgement employed to derive best estimate to base the analysis.
- 6. Approximately 25 percent of total memory allotted for inaccuracies in preliminary analysis and for future growth.
- 7. Inefficiency due to utilizing less than 16-bits per word for computer operation considered and accounted for.
- 8. Assumed LRU specified in work unit code documentation.
- 9. Display messages as indicated in requirements documentation.

5.3.2.1.2 Sources of Information

The factors used in the estimating process were derived from the following sources:

- 1. The program requirements as defined in CITS requirement analysis package.
- 2. The data requirements as represented by the subsystem parameter data, the display and recording requirements, and constants required for special functions such as interrupts, control words, initilization, parameter limits, and computations.
- 3. The airborne computer characteristics from the manufacturers manuals.

5.3.2.1.3 Methods

Two basic methods were utilized in estimating the amount of storage required by the CITS program.

- 1. Calculation method used where the requirements are relatively definitized. The following steps outline the method:
 - A. Determine test algorithms from program requirements and tabulate by similar functional process groups.
 - B. Using generalized instructions available in any computer determine a base for required number of instructions to perform the particular functions.
 - C. Multiply these numbers by the number of repetitions for the function to derive the total for a type of process.
 - D. Sum the processes to obtain the total requirement for a sub program.
- Estimating method used where the requirements are not definitized.
 The steps for using this method are outlined below:
 - A. Use best available information and engineering judgement to estimate the number and type of process required.
 - B. Estimate the number of computer words required to implement each process.
 - C. Multiply the number of words for each process by the estimated number of repetitions.
 - D. The sum of the memory requirements for each process will give the estimated memory requirement for each subprogram.

Subprograms, such as utility routines, can be estimated from existing programs for similar type computers executing similar functions.

5.3.2.2 Sizing Analysis

An outline of a typical onboard real-time test program, by subsystem modules, can be described as follows:

- 1. Program Execution Modules
 - A. Service Routines
 - B. Subsystem Test Routines
 - C. Utilities and Subroutines

- 2. Data and Working Storage Area.
 - A. Machine Reserved
 - B. Data Storage
 - C. Input/Output Data Area
 - D. Data Buffers for:

Input/Output

Display

Printer

Recorders

- E. Working Storage
- 3. Area Reserved for Growth

Each of the above are discussed separately. The method used and the factors involved in the CITS computer sizing analysis are included as examples: At the time this study was made some subsystem requirements were relatively firm, while others were in the development stage, so both methods were used for estimating memory requirements for the CITS program.

5.3.2.2.1 Program Execution Module

5.3.2.2.1.1 <u>Service Routines</u>. Service modules consist of such routines as the Executive, Input/Output, Message Assemblers, Status Testing, and Computer Self-Test. All functions and routines except the individual subsystem testing and utilities are included in this category.

In estimating the size, each module was considered separately. The various functions were enumerated. Sample block diagram flow charts were used to determine typical processes to be executed, and the average number of instructions determined for each process. These were then multiplied by the estimated usage. In the absence of firm requirements for some methods, the usage was determined from an examination of the functions to be performed.

the data to be processed, the required displays, and data to be recorded. The storage estimates were summed for each subprogram module, and the estimate for the service routines was determined by summing each of these modules. The number of instructions required for each of the identified processes was determined from the instruction set for a typical general-purpose computer that could be used for a CITS-type application.

Typical processes considered in the study, together with the estimated number of words required for each, included the following:

Subroutine calling sequences 4 words
Calling function 2 words
Parameters 2 words
Discrete or flag testing 4 words
Acquisition 1 word
Masking or unpacking 1 word
Branching 1 word
Testing 1 word
Discrete or flag setting 4 words
Acquisition 1 word
Mask 1 word
Updating 1 word
Storing 1 word
Data block initialization 8 words
Loop or value initialization 3 words
Storage 2 words
Loop and branch control 3 words
Setting multiple flags or discretes 10 words
Setting one discrete or flag 4 words
Multiply by average number(2.5)
Testing Multiple Flags or Discretes 10 words
Testing one discrete or flag 4 words

5.3.2.2.1.2 <u>Subsystem Test Routines</u>. The primary purpose of the subsystem test routines is to evaluate the state of the subsystem signals, and, in case of a failure, send a signal to the service modules for processing.


When making the sizing analysis for the CITS program the following methods were used. In subsystem tests where test flow diagrams were available, the flow diagram information was used to determine the processes needed to implement each operation, and the number of instructions required to execute each process. It was assumed that constants, such as limits, were stored in the data area. Typical processes used in these signal tests were upper and lower level checks, one limit check, and discrete checks. Figure 5-15 and 5-16 illustrate typical flow diagrams for making these tests.

In subsystems where sufficient detailed information was unavailable, the data from the parameter list was used to estimate processes necessary for each mode/test. In this case the following lumped estimates were made:

For each discrete check ------ 4 words
For each analog, digital check ----- 6 words
For each processing ------ 10 words

Some preprocessing of data was required for signals packed in an input word, so additional instructions were included for these cases.

ONE LIMIT CHECK



UPPER/LOWER LIMIT CHECK





Figure 5-15 5-84

DISCRETE CHECK

METHOD 1






Figure 5-16

Many discretes could be checked simultaneously and more efficiently if those discretes relating to the same subsystem and requiring the same type of test were packed in the same input words. The memory requirements could then be adjusted depending on the percentage of such occurrences. However, some additional instruction might be required to differentiate between individual signal failures. In the case of the B-1 CITS it was assumed that these conditions were exceptions due to the undefined nature of many of the subsystem requirements at the time the discrete assignments were made. Common subroutines were not used because it would be necessary to include instructions to branch out to the location of the common routine and where to re-enter after completion of the test; to load test criteria, such as limits and tolerances, for different groups of tests; flag bit position or location where masks were stored; and store re-entrant points when there are more than one exit from the routine. The routine would have to be longer in words than the number of words to control branch-out operations to effectively save memory locations.

Where there were known or assumed commonalities and parallels, the memory requirements were adjusted to reflect this. This can happen when ground ready and performance monitoring tests or fault isolation air and ground have tests in common.

The total memory requirements were estimated the same way as in the service modules by summing the memory requirements for each subsystem test.

5.3.2.2.1.3 <u>Utilities and Subroutines</u>. The utilities and subroutines used by the CITS program included: Binary to ASCII conversion, ASCII to binary conversion, I/O processor, load bits, and some mathematical functions such as square root, etc. The storage requirements necessary for these routines were estimated based on existing programs for similar type computers executing similar functions.

5.3.2.2.2 Data and Working Storage Area

- 5.3.2.2.1 <u>Machine Reserved Area</u>. The low numbered memory area assigned by computer hardware design for special functions such as interrupts, control words, initialization, etc., is not available as a storage area for general program use. The number of words required by the CITS program was determined from the computer documentation.
- 5.3.2.2.2 <u>Data Storage</u>. This area is defined as storage for subsystem and LRU status, past and present, CITS conditions, mode, time slot, and flag information; also, single and double limits for parameter tests, masks for discrete tests and flag settings, mathematical constants, etc.

For the CITS program the memory space required for this type of information was derived from the subsystem test requirements which define the number and type of parameters processed, and the number of flags and indicators for display and recording information. Mathematical constants were estimated from computational requirements in the various subprogram modules.

- 5.3.2.2.3 <u>Input/Output Data Area</u>. This area was reserved for storage for input/output related constants such as fixed groups of addresses, control words, and codes for each parameter. The amount of memory required for this type of data was determined from the input/output data requirements.
- 5.3.2.2.4 <u>Data Buffers</u>. Temporary storage area was required for data to be printed, recorded, displayed, and for I/O operations. This buffering was necessary to coordinate the timing of the various devices. The amount of storage required for this function was computed from analyzing the recording requirements of the program taking into consideration the timing constraints of the various devices and the frequency of transmission of the data.

5.3.2.2.2.5 <u>Working Storage</u>. A small scratch pad area was included for intermediate computations and temporary storage. The amount of required space was estimated from the computational requirements of the program.

5.3.2.2.3 Growth Area

A percentage (25 percent) of the memory capacity was reserved to compensate for inaccuracies in preliminary analyses and for future changes. The amount varied as the program requirements became finalized.

5.3.2.3 Conclusions

The sizing method discussed in this section is based on the CITS computer memory sizing analysis made early in the B-1 program, and was used for evaluating CITS computer memory requirements. The initial study was based on requirements that were not completely definitized. As the requirements became firmer, and as new tests were introduced, updated versions of this document were issued.

From the experience gained from the study it was determined that the degree of accuracy c' the estimate varies with the degree of finalization of the program requirements. However, it was determined that the 25 percent growth area was not adequate to cover the undefined portions and the increased or revised requirements generated during the development of the program. A more realistic allowance would be 100 percent. This was demonstrated during the development of the B-1 CITS, where memory requirements increased from an original estimate of 23,081 halfwords to a final program size for A/C-4 of 51,306 halfwords, necessitating an increase in the size of the computer memory. However, this method can be used early in a project for a gross initial estimate of the memory size required to perform the functions desired in the program.

5.4 LABORATORY TESTING AND VERIFICATION

The following discusses real-time software testing of the onboard test system and associated activities as they should occur during the development process. Noted is the fact that a well planned test program starts at the requirement generation stage and continues through acceptance testing. It describes the activities and responsibilities of the test group and discusses their interaction with other groups. Three levels of testing are discussed.

5.4.1 UNIT TESTING

In general, the first level of testing is performed by people who have developed the software and may be called "unit testing." The intention here is to determine that the design has been implemented correctly, as compared to the software requirements, and that limit checking, logical operation, etc., have been tested. This level of testing includes the usual programmer debugging and stand-alone testing. Its intention is to give confidence that the software is ready for the next level of testing.

5.4.2 INTEGRATION TESTING

The second or intermediate level of testing, integration testing, consists of integrating the individual software modules to form a complete system which accepts input data, produces output data and appears to operate properly. The goal of integration testing is to provide those who are going to perform the third level of testing, software that functions and will cycle when formal testing is initiated.

5.4.3. VALIDATION TESTING

The third level of testing, validation testing, is intended to prove that the performance requirements are satisfied as expressed in the requirements specification and that the integrated real-time program really does meet system level demands. This level of testing may be most effectively performed by an independent testing group. Acceptance testing, undertaken to demonstrate

that the real-time software meets the <u>customer's</u> requirements, is at the same level as validation testing.

Test activities should begin with test requirements generation to allow the testing group to work in parallel with the requirements group. This eliminated ambiguous requirements since the test group can review them before they are finalized to determine that they can conceive of a test to demonstrate compliance with each requirement. An early start for the test group will also enable the generation of requirements for a "test driver", i.e., combination of hardware and software which will test the operational program. This is not a trivial undertaking if testing a real-time program is reactive, closed-loop mode.

A test plan should be generated early in the program to form a solid base for future activities. The test plan should contain the purpose, goals, and an overall description of the testing that is to be performed. The test plans may be reviewed and approved at Preliminary Design Review (PDR).

5.4.4 CITS TESTING APPROACH AND EVALUATION

The following is an overview of the CITS engineering programming support system including an evaluation and recommendation.

5.4.4.1 Support Hardware Description

5.4.4.1.1 AP-2 Computer Tester

The AP-2 Computer Tester consists of a Common Computer Support Equipment (CCSE), a Computer holding fixture, a power and cooling unit. All units are mounted on a table console. The CCSE is the Computer controlling unit with provisions for displaying and loading computer memory and registers.

5.4.4.1.2 Test Adapter Controller (TAC)

The TAC consists of a SP-1 Computer, a CCSE which serves the same purpose for the SP-1 as the CCSE does for the AP-2, and an Input/output Unit (IOU). The IOU interfaces the SP-1 Computer to the CITS data bus and the SP-1 to the

mag tape, line printer, and keyboard display peripherals. The IOU interface with the CITS data bus by means of a standard CITS Interface Unit (I/U) which is common to the CITS Air Vehicle configuration. The primary functions of the TAC are to allow near real-time checkout and control of the CITS Computer program and control the STE-6511.

5.4.4.1.3 Data Acquisition Interface Test Unit (STE-6511)

The STE-6511 provides the equivalent Air Vehicle discrete, analog and digital interfaces to the DAU's. Signals at this interface are controlled and/or changed by the TAC programming of the STE-6511. The TAC drives the STE-6511 programming data by reading test case records from a test Data Base Tape. The STE-6511 consists of two racks holding five signal coupler panels, which provide the electrical and physical interface for Data Acquisition Units (DAU's), Airborne Printer (A/P), and CITS Control & Display (CCD).

5.4.4.1.4 Digital Voltmeter

The digital voltmeter is used basically for verifying DC voltages out of the STE-6511 and the CITS DAU's.


5.4.4.2 Support Software Functional Description

5.4.4.2.1 STE 6510 Debug Simulation Program (DSP)

The DSP is used to provide:

- 1. Operator interface with the CITS operational flight program (OFP) for test and debugging.
- 2. Functional Simulation of peripherals interfacing with the CITS Computer on board the aircraft.
- 3. Loading of the STE-6511 with the required data values required for testing of the CITS operational program.

The functional interfaces of the DSP and the support hardware are shown in Figure 5-17.



1

The DSP provides the primary control/response functions of the TAC. The DSP consists of the following functions.

<u>Power-Up/Initialization</u>. The DSP, upon application of power to the TAC and/or reset of the SP-1, starts execution at a predefined location. The initialization routine resets both IOUs, load the IOU RAMs, which control the direct peripheral simulation modes, clear the display terminal, clear all internal control flags, reset the AP-2 via the AP-2 CCSE, perform an initial SP-2 self-test and pass control to the executive provided the self-test passed.

Executive. The Executive executes in a closed-loop mode. It determines the function to be performed per a predefined order and executes that function. Upon completion of all functions, the executive returns to its starting point. Functions to be performed are either fixed or variable functions performed as required. The fixed functions are execution of the SP-1 self-test and a call to the CITS Airborne Printer (A/P) simulator. This self-test differs from the initial self-test in that the core-sum routine sums 250 words at each pass rather than the entire check sum area and also that the program is not halted at the detection of an error. The error is flagged to the operator via a display on the TAC CCSE. The A/P simulator will execute provided discrete switch 3 is set, the Line Printer is available and ready, and the A/P simulation is enabled. If any of these conditions are not met, the A/P simulator will set printer busy in the appropriate status register word in the SP-1 for eventual transmission to the AP-2.

The variable functions are executed depending on the desired mode, CITS control and display (CCD) simulation or DSP operation. Discrete switch 7 selects the mode, with the CCD simulation mode enabled by setting the switch (up position).

The DSP also provides automatic functions not directly selected by the operator. Included in this category is the Avionics Control Unit (ACU) simulation.

<u>CCD Simulator</u>. The CCD simulator is executed whenever discrete switch 7 is set. The DSP functions are overridden when in this mode because the entire LSI 7700 display is used for this mode and the keyboard is locked out to prevent operator interference with the display.

General operation of the CCD simulator consists of display of the CCD input data in a format similar to the actual CCD and processing of operator requests. The entire display is written out at the initial entry with changes being displayed for subsequent entries. The operator may simulate any switch on the CCD by depressing the INT key on the keyboard which freezes the display update, positions the cursor to the required point on the display, and enables the keyboard. Directives to simulate switches on the CCD always begin with an alpha character while CCD keyboard entries are always numeric (up to 10 digits). The ECM, RETURN, and SEND keys on the LSI 7700 are depressed in that order to issue the directive to the CCD simulator function. The LSI 7700 keyboard is then locked and the directive/data placed in the appropriate output buffer for eventual transmission to the AP-2. Timing and interlocks within the CCD are simulated to as high a degree as possible.

When discrete switch 7 is turned off, the DSP mode is enabled and the CCD display is cleared, provided all functions within the simulator are completed. Should any function that spans entries to the simulator (e.g. entry of directives) be incomplete at this time, CCD simulation mode shall remain in effect until completion of the function. The function in progress may be terminated and the DSP mode enabled by depressing the interrupt (INT) key on the LSI 7700 with discrete switch 7 down.

Avionics Control Unit (ACU) Simulation. The ACU simulation is completely automatic provided the AP-2 is requesting communication with any ACU via I/O channel 2 and the specified ACU(s) simulation is enabled. The present version provides simulation for two ACU's, the weapons delivery (WD) and guidance and navigation (GN) ACU's. The simulation technique is a combination of TAC hardware and software and operates as follows:

- a. Receipt of a predefined control word from the AP-2 initiates an interrupt within the DSP, provided bits 5 through 10 of the data field in the received control word match bits 4 through 14 of a simulator control word in the random access memory (RAM) associated with I/O channel 2 simulation. The specific word within the RAM to which the comparison is made is determined by the address field in the received control word.
- b. Control is passed to an interrupt processor routine which updates counters within the data to be transmitted to the AP-2 via I/O channel 2. The processor routine further checks portions of the last received data and sets/resets appropriate "handshaking" control parameters. An example of this is the transfer of printer data from the ACU simulator to the AP-2. A print message request is made by setting the print request word to non-zero value. This is usually done by reading the appropriate input data record on the base tape.

When the AP-2 operational program has received the print message, it responds by returning a print knowledge. The interrupt processor routine will reset the request upon detection of the acknowledge. The acknowledge is then reset by the AP-2 operational program.

c. The interrupt processor returns control to the interrupted point at completion of its function.

The TAC hardware automatically processes I/O messages to and from the AP-2 once a valid control word is received. Received control words are checked to correct peripheral device address, transmit/receive bit state, and data word count. If an error is detected, the TAC resets for receipt of the first control word of the message sequence. No further action takes place until receipt of word.


Messages within the sequence are either fixed, time scheduled or demand scheduled. The control word for each message is always transmitted from the AP-2 regardless of the message type. The TAC hardware counts each control word and when the count reaches a value predefined in the RAM simulator control word, the TAC resets to expect the first AP-2 control word in the message sequence. Fixed messages always have one or more data words included. Time scheduled and demand scheduled messages contain data words only when they are scheduled. Scheduling is controlled by the AP-2 operational program. Data for scheduled messages must be available prior to its transmission. The TAC does not error check control words with a word count of zero, but it does update the message counter.

Fixed scheduled messages typically contain status and handshaking information required to maintain synchronous flow of data between the AP-2 and ACU(s). They may also contain data required on a continuous basis. Time scheduled message typically contain data required on a periodic basis. Some examples are CCD messages and subsystem test data acquired by one computer and used by the other. Variable scheduled messages typically contain test oriented data such as printer and maintenance recorder data or power controller command blocks.

5.4.4.2.2 DSP Functions

The DSP functions are defined as input/output to the TAC peripherals, CITS peripheral simulations, AP-2/TAC communications, and operational directive processing. The DSP functional interface is shown as Figure 5-18.

- 5.4.4.2.2.1 TAC Peripheral Input/Output. TAC peripheral input/output (I/O) operations are handled by issuing specified commands to pheripheral as required by the sequence of processing and setting program flags to indicate the I/O operation in progress. As each device completes its specified operation, it enables an interrupt to the SP-1. The interrupt processor in turn clears the I/O in progress and sets the I/O complete flag for the device being communicated with. In addition, the interrupt processor will set additional or command operations depending on the specific interrupt. Some examples of this are: Restarting the AP-2 if it was halted for a magnetic tape operation, enabling the keyboard after reading the data from the display terminal, or resetting directive control flags upon direction of a keyboard interrupt in the DSP mode.
- 5.4.4.2.2.2 <u>CITS Peripheral Simulation</u>. CITS peripheral simulation is hardware executed by the TAC IOU under program control.
- 5.4.4.2.2.3 <u>AP-2 TAC Communications</u>. The AP-2/TAC interface is via the channel 1 data bus. Directives to the AP-2 debug program, residing in the AP-2 as part of the operational program, are placed by the DSP in a dedicated buffer area in the SP-1. This buffer is transmitted to the AP-2 upon its direction by a control word from the AP-2 with a Device Address = 12, T/R bit = 1, Mode Code other than 2, and a Word Count = 4. The AP-2 Debug will the process the directive and respond with data (if requested) contained in a message via channel 1 data bus preceded by a control word with a Device Address = 12, and T/R bit = 0. The mode code and word count are dependent on the type



Debug Simulation Program Functional Interface Figure 5-18

and quantity of data sent to the TAC. This response data is further processed by the DSP and displayed as required by the operator.

5.4.4.2.2.4 Operator Directive Interface. Operator directives are entered into the DSP via the TAC CCSE discrete switches and/or LSI 7700 display terminal keyboard. Normally, specific actions are requested via the LSI 7700 while DSP operating modes are selected via the CCSE discrete switches.

5.4.4.2.2.5 Operator Directive Processing. The DSP processes operated-entered directives via a command decode (CMDC) subroutine and subordinate command subroutines (CSR). The entered data is validity checked by CMDC, and if it is valid, sets the operation in progress flag and branches to the appropriate CSR. There is one CSR for each directive available. CSR's are one of two types, single pass and multiple pass. Single pass CSR's will complete their function and pass control to the executive. Multiple pass CSR's will perform a specific action, initiate I/O with a TAC peripheral, and pass control to the executive. Prior to doing so, the CSR is required to set up the linkage addresses required to resume control after completion of requested I/O. The executive will pass control to the CSR upon successful completion of I/O. Upon completion of the CSR's function, control is permanently relinquished to the executive by issuing a message to the I/O so the display will reset the command in progress flag, preventing the exexutive from passing control to any CSR. The DSP is structured to prevent more than one CSR from being active at a time.

5.4.4.2.3 Data Base Processing

The DSP provides a test data base interface to the AP-2 operational program for use in debugging and qualification of the operational program. This function, hereinafter referred to as the data bus driver (DBD), is currently executed as a directive to the DSP. The DBD requires, as input, data residing

on a magnetic tape. This data is processed by the update I/O simulation tables (UPIOS) subroutine. Outputs are selectable by the operator and are routed either to the AP-2 directly via the simulation features of the TAC or to the STE-6511.

- 5.4.4.2.3.1 <u>CITS Data Base Load Tape</u>. The CITS Data Base Load Tape is used to supply the simulated aircraft and avionics signals required by the Debug Simulation Program to support the STE-6510 and STE-6511.
- 5.4.4.2.3.2 <u>Data Base Tape Format</u>. The data residing on the input data base tape consists of physical records blocked into logical records. Logical records consist of four tapes, identification, data bus 1 data, data bus 2 data, and control. The identification record is 2 bytes (16 bits) in length and serves to identify the physical record. It is always first in the physical record. The remaining types follow are each 8 bytes (64 bits) in length. For convenience, they are further broken down into 2-byte words (4 words per record). The maximum number of logical records per physical record is 130 or 1,034 bytes.

5.4.4.2.4 Capabilities/Limitations

- 5.4.4.2.4.1 <u>Capabilities</u>. Simulation of all aircraft signals in a static operational mode.
 - Simulation of some CITS peripherals allowing testing with partial CITS.
 - Monitoring of CITS discrete and analog channels is possible, external to the CITS Operational Program.
 - ° Simulation of the ACUC is provided in a static mode.
 - Output data.

- Operator interface and controls are provided to allow problem investigation to a detailed level.
- ° Hard copy of selected test results and diagnostic data is provided.
- ° Ability to load and dump load tapes and executed programs rapidly via magnetic tape.
- Modification of loaded Operational Program is easily facilitated as well as fabrication of new load tapes.
- ° CITS system level testing is available in a static mode if all CITS peripherals are provided.
- ° Real-time operator interface with the CCD is provided.

5.4.4.2.4.2 <u>Limitations</u>. The present laboratory support software mechanization is limited in these areas:

- ° Dynamic simulation is extremely limited.
- ° DAU's number 1, number 2, and number 5 cannot be properly simulated.
- ° Response to CITS output stimuli cannot be simulated.
- ° Monitoring of transient data on the CITS data buses is not available.
- Oiagnostic programs for the support hardware (with the exception of the SP-1 computer in the TAC) are not presently available.
- Functional test programs for the CITS peripherals require modification to run on the support hardware.
- ° Dynamic simulation of the ACUC is not presently available.
- Opnamic testing of the CITS system level is extremely limited.
- Transfer of aircraft recorded diagnostic data to the CITS test data base for problem investigation is extremely difficult.
- Loading of the CITS Test Data Base for test runs is a long and tedious process, requiring many operator actions.

5.5 LANGUAGE SELECTION

The use of a common language for all onboard software can have some advantages. For example, only one set of support software would be required,

therefore minimizing the development and/or maintenance costs; personnel need be trained in only one programming language; and any interaction between programs is facilitated. On the other hand, there can be some disadvantages. The suitability of the language might be compromised, as desired language features can vary from one type of software to another, leaving some programs inefficient in timing and/or memory utilization. Enforcement of software standardization, MIL-STD-1589B and MIL-STD-1750A, will result in the use of JOVIAL (J73) for all software, unless it can be demonstrated that the program will be so inefficient it will not meet the operating requirements or that the development costs would be too high to warrant using the standardized language.

In choosing a programming language for an onboard, real-time test system several factors must be considered. These can be grouped into five major categories:

- 1. Suitability
- 2. Availability
- 3. Transferability
- 4. Supportability
- 5. Maintainability

Of the five, suitability, of course, is the most important. Most general purpose languages could be used; however, the resulting program may be very costly in memory utilization and/or execution time. These five factors must be weighed according to the individual requirements, schedule, and cost.

The advent of standardization, Military Standard JOVIAL (J73) (MIL-STD-1589B) and Military Standard Sixteen-Bit Computer Instruction Set Architecture (MIL-STD-1750A), will eliminate or change the importance of the above factors. Transferability, supportability, and maintainability would automatically follow; therefore suitability and availability are the major factors.

In considering the suitability of a language for a CITS-type application program the features of the language must be evaluated to determine if they adequately support those required by the program.

In addition, when evaluating a higher order language the compiler must be considered as well as the language. There must be a compiler available for the target computer that will produce efficient code which will meet size and timing requirements, and that will produce a program that is easy to understand and modify. Additional considerations are discussed in paragraph 5.5.1.1. Availability is also an important factor in the selection, as the use of a new and relatively untried compiler will introduce a risk which could affect the cost and schedule for producing the software. This is discussed in paragraph 5.5.1.2.

After careful consideration it may prove to be cost effective to use a language other than that designated for the standard. If so, the points enumerated in the following sections may be used in the evaluation and selection of a substitute programming language.

5.5.1 CONSIDERATIONS IN EVALUATING A LANGUAGE

5.5.1.1 Suitability

In evaluating the suitability of a programming language for an onboard test system a number of factors should be considered. The following, as a minimum, should be used in this evaluation:

- 1. Available features the language should adequately support the features required by the application program. The following questions should be considered in the evaluation:
 - A. What features does the language have that permit it to take advantage of particular target machine features and idiosyncrancies?
 - B. How much control does the programmer have regarding register assignment, memory locations, and machine instructions?
 - C. How does it handle switches, indicators, arbitrary bit patterns?

- D. What facilities does it have to describe and utilize various kinds of data?
- E. How easy is it to access and manipulate bits and bytes?
- F. How does it handle fixed-point numbers, accuracy, and precision? Is scaling under program mer control, or do all scaling decisions depend on the programming and data declarations?
- 2. Flexibility the language should efficiently handle subroutines, their call and return. There should be allowance for the incorporation of machine or other languages if necessary.
- 3. Modularity the language should be adaptable to the concepts of structured programming, modularity, and top-down or bottom-up design. It should be capable of compilation of individual modules.
- 4. Efficient code the compiler should produce efficient code for the target computer.
- 5. Compiler efficiency the compiler should operate in an efficient manner. Recompilation should not be a long and expensive operation.
- 6. Debug capabilities the language and compiler should support debug and validation to the degree necessary to produce a correct program.
- 7. Readability the program written in the language should be easy to read and understand. This is related to item 8.
- 8. Documentation the language should be self-documenting. Enough information should be produced during compilation to provide the necessary visibility and/or information to readily understand and evaluate the program.
- 9. Programmer familiarity to produce an efficient and well designed program, programmers familiar with the language are an asset. If not available, the degree of training required, the existing training aids, and the time needed to reach the desired familiarity must be considered.

5.5.1.2 Availability

If ready-made software suits the application, it may be the best choice,

even though it does not meet all the criteria. Schedules and cost may dictate the use of some established and dependable language over one still in development, or to be developed. Also, a risk is involved in the use of a new and untried compiler for an established language. A new compiler, for example, will require time to develop and validate. Usage, along, will give the degree of confidence desired to support program development.

There is a disadvantage, however, in the choice of some available languages, in particular assembly language. It may commit the user to one hardware supplier and limit the choice to languages supported by that system.

5.5.1.3 Transferability

In considering the language selection for a program that may have a lifetime of several years, a major consideration would be the transferability to a new and more advanced environment. Theoretically, when using a higher order language the change in computer should have no impact on the software. However, in practice this is seldom the case. The following factors can affect the transferability of the application software:

- The amount of machine language that has been inserted into the program in various places to increase the efficiency of the program.
 These sequences would require recoding.
- 2. The availability of a new compiler for the new hardware. Does it need to be developed, or, if in existence, how well is it checked out?
- 3. Incompatibilities that may exist between the old system and the new that requires program modification.
- 4. The risk of incorporating subtle, hard-to-find errors when converting to a new system.

Language and instruction set standardization should eliminate the above problems.

5.5.1.4 Supportability

Things to be considered under this category are:

- The language should be broad enough in scope to be useful for a variety of applications and, therefore, well supported throughout the life cycle of the program.
- 2. There are enough users to assure that the language, itself, will not become obsolete.
- 3. The language is standardized to the extent that it will continue to be valid and supported when new systems are developed.
- 4. The proliferation of subsets to the language will not cause the specific version to become obsolete and support activity discontinued.
- 5. Language subsets may be dedicated to particular systems and not easily modified when the system changes.

Adherence to MIL-STD-1750A and MIL-STD-1589B would result in sufficient usage to assure the continued support of the language.

5.5.1.5 Maintainability

Since program maintenance is often the largest cost factor, it is important that careful consideration be given to the selection of the language.

Program maintenance can roughly be divided into two types:

- 1. In-field debugging of errors that escaped the validation effort.
- 2. Enhancements and modifications to the program due to a variety of causes.

As maintenance is usually done by personnel other than those responsible for the program development good documentation is a must. This includes computer generated aids such as cross-reference lists, set/used lists and load maps as well as the requirements and design documents. The features listed under Suitability that are most important for this phase of the program life cycle are:

- 1. Modularity
- 2. Compiler efficiency
- 3. Debug capabilities
- 4. Readability
- 5. Documentation aids

In the case of standardization, these properties would probably be incorporated, so they need not be a major factor in the evaluation of the language.

5.5.2 CITS LANGUAGE SELECTION

Analysis of results obtained from a B-1 common language study (NA-71-605), made early in the program led to a recommendation that JOVIAL, with the modifications discussed at that time in the report, be adopted as the "B-1 Common Language." Several features of JOVIAL made it attractive for a test system, real-time computer program; namely, the COMPOOL concept for data management, the packing/unpacking capability, and the ability to manipulate bits and bytes At that time the JOVIAL language was undergoing upgrading and modification, and the new version, JOVIAL (J73), was the version recommended by the study. In order to adhere to the B-1 development schedule, programming for the CITS system had to begin prior to the release of a JOVIAL (J73) compiler. In addition, a compiler producing code for the designated CITS computer would need to be developed. In evaluating the languages then available, FORTRAN, PL/1, JOVIAL (J3), and assembly language, it was determined that the assembly language would impact cost and schedule the least, as the supporting software was already developed and the features of the language would give the desired control over computer operations, thus satisfying the two requirements of availability and suitability. In the case of the higher-order languages, they not only did not adequately support the desired features, there was no compiler available for the selection onboard computer. Because of the cost, the risk of using an untried and untested compiler, and the schedule demands, it was

determined that it would be more cost effective to utilize the AP-2 assembly language for the development of the CITS onboard test system computer program.

5.6 SUMMARY

This section deals with the total effort involved in the development of a software program required by an onboard test system, and gives examples and illustrations of the techniques and methods employed in the development of the B-1 CITS software program. A complete description of the CITS program is included.

The approach recommended for software development is discussed, whereby mandatory requirements dictated by Air Force regulations are outlined first, followed by criteria and techniques involving choices. These choices include alternate methods of program organization, such as fixed rate straight line, interrupt control, and multi-rate fixed cycle; estimation techniques for time phasing and for memory sizing; and factors to be considered in the evaluation and selection of a programming language. Advantages and disadvantages are given for choices where applicable, along with the choices made for the CITS and the rationale for the choices.

Section 6

SIGNAL PROCESSING

6.0 INTRODUCTION

In this design guide, Section 4 discussed the signal processing aspects of the onboard test system as it affects the design of the hardware. In this section the hardware techniques will be reviewed, and in addition, what signal processing techniques can be utilized which use software as the implementation tool. The purpose of discussing both hardware and software techniques is to enlighten the test system designer to the fact that, depending on the complexity of the test system, both methods may be required.

6.1 TYPES OF SIGNAL PROCESSING

For this section the signal processing discussed will be segregated by the type of signal processed. There are three basic types of signals which need to be acquisitioned by the test system: 1) Serial Digital Signals, 2) Analog Signals, and 3) Discrete Signals.

6.1.1 SERIAL DIGITAL

When acquiring serial digital data, there are two primary sources: 1) Analog data converted to serial digital form and 2) Test results status discretes packed into a digital word. There are additional processing techniques required before the serial digital data car be utilized by the test program.

For the first case of analog data conversion to serial digital words, three hardware implementation methods were discussed in Section 4. The three methods were successive approximation, integration, and the counter techniques. In some cases, before serial digital data obtained by one of the three techniques can be utilized, further processing could be required. Two basic techniques which are used to process serial digital data words are: 1) Data word reordering and 2) Data word scaling with respect to numeric value. Data word reordering is

used when the accessed data words are not in an order such that the program can utilize them to execute looping methods for efficient test system programming. A program loop provides a series of program instructions that are executed repeatedly with modified instructions or modified data values. A looping function requires fewer program steps for a series of executions than would be required for individually describing and executing each process or each data value. The data inputs operated upon by a loop can be arranged in an orderly manner to minimize programming steps and time for access. In general, repetitive processes are inherently more efficient due to a reduction of the executable steps following definition of the repetitive process. The reordering technique is accomplished by the software input/output subroutine acquisitioning the required test data and storing the information in a predetermined core memory location. When the test software module prepares for performance of the test, reordering of the data occurs before the test is executed. The test system would have an area in memory that is used by all test routines as a scratch pad. For this technique the test program would use the scratch pad area as a temporary location to store the reordered data. The program would individually transfer sixteen bit words, or blocks of words, to the desired location in the scratch pad area in memory. When all the data has been transferred the resultant data would be in the proper order for efficient programming techniques to be utilized.


The second processing technique is data word scaling. This method involves reducing or increasing the numerical value of the digital word by means of multiplying, dividing, or shifting by certain constants stored in memory. An example of this method can be seen in the B-1 engine CITS test program. In this test both engine instrument and engine mounted CITS processor data were utilized. The reason that the scaling was used is because the serial digital formats from the two sources were different. The engine instruments data have to be shifted one bit to the left to increase their value by two, in order that a calculation

could be made using both engine processor and engine instrument data. The scaling technique is an excellent method when utilizing data where digital format dissimilarities exist and a relatively simple solution is necessary. This method can cause difficulties because for extensive calculations involving many parameters, the resultant scaling of the answer is sometimes difficult to determine. Normally a calculation is performed to determine what a variable test limit should be. In this example when the calculated number was determined, it was rescaled to be compatible with the parameter to be tested, in order that a one-to-one comparison could be made by the software program. Another method of further data processing related to packed discrete words is the unpacking and packing of the discretes. Software programs, to be efficient, must have the capability of using looping and common subroutines. In order for this to be implemented the discretes must be in a specific repeatable sequence for the program to use the same portion of the software program to perform many tests. The order of the discretes in a packed discrete word is dependent on the wiring of the signals to the data acquisition device. When these wire designations are made considerations of both test program configurations and wire routing restrictions are made. Due to the signal density variations and data acquisition from all types of subsystems, any one packed discrete may contain discretes from several different systems (see Table VI-1). Another case of misordered packed discretes exists when a system executes a series of BIT and transmits the go/no-go results by means of serial digital packed discretes. The source of this type of packed discretes usually is a controller with the complexity and capabilities of a mini computer. An example where the reordering technique was used extensively was in the B-1 CITS test for the AICS, where the source of the packed discretes was a controller. The AICS controllers, which were comparable to mini computers, executed specific tests and recorded the results in the form of packed discretes. The packed discretes would then be accessed by the CITS DAU, preprocessed and tested. Greater than 90 percent of the data utilized for the AICS test were packed discretes. Before the software

Table VI-1
Typical Packed Discrete Word

BIT NO.	SIGNAL NOMENCLATURE	SUBSYSTEM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Surface Position Indicator Power On Surface Position Indicator Valid Command Transducer Energized Follow-Up Transducer Energized E-H Value Shorted/Open Fail-Safe Rate Fail-Safe Output Solenoid Valve No. 1 Current Solenoid Valve No. 2 Current Taxi-Takeoff Switch Position Left Forward Shutoff Valve Closed Left Aft Shutoff Valve Closed Right Forward Shutoff Valve Closed Right Aft Shutoff Valve Closed Standby ADI Power On Standby ADI Valid	Wing Sweep Wing Sweep Landing Gear Structural Mode Control Structural Mode Control Structural Mode Control Structural Mode Control Flight Director Computer Flight Director Computer

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL EL SEGUNOS CA MORTH AMERICAN --ETC F/G 15/5 ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM DESIGN GUIDE.(U) AUG 81 K DERBYSHIRE, 6 BRAMHALL, T HAIT F33657-80-C-0138 AD-A112 301 UNCLASSIFIED TFD-80-206 ASO-TR-61-5023 NL 4 - 5



program could efficiently test the acquisition data, all discretes had to be separated and repacked into reserved memory locations in the computer. These discussions and examples illustrate that in some cases the acquired serial digital data is not directly usable by the test program and require one or more of the processing techniques discussed to be performed before testing of the system can be executed by the onboard test system. The discrete reordering technique requires the program to transfer, bit by bit, each piece of information from the reserved input/output area to a predetermined location in the scratch pad location in memory. The preprocessing portion of the program does not employ looping or use subroutines to transfer data because each operation would be unique to the others performed.

6.1.2 ANALOG

Internal to the onboard test system all signals and information are in digital form. Therefore, when the DAD acquires analogs, they are immediately converted to digital form and stored into memory to be used for testing. When the converted analog signals have been stored in memory, additional processing, as used for serial digital data, may be necessary before utilization by the test program. The two methods which would apply to analog data are reordering and scaling.

When data is stored in the memory of the computer it is not sorted by signal type, such as analog, digital, or packed discrete, but by what system they represent. This type of segregation results in all types of data being intermixed in one memory area of the computer. To segregate the analogs into an order which the test program can use the data the signals must be reordered. The reordering method is the same as previously described where the program individually transfers each word to a predetermined location in memory scratch pad. When all data has been transferred to their correct locations the software program can continue and perform all the required system tests.


As in serial digital data, analogs may require rescaling before they can be used in a mathematical calculation or comparison test. The reasoning behind this is that the DAD has a certain A/D format for analog conversion whereas the incoming serial digital data, converted externally from the test system, may have a different digital format. Rescaling would be required to have common format for all the inputs for any particular calculation or comparison.

6.1.3 DISCRETE

When discrete signals are acquisitioned by the test system they are converted from zero and five volt readings to logic "0" and "1" bits in the acquisition unit. These logic "0" and "1" discretes are packed into 16 bit digital words and stored in memory. The packing order of the discretes is dependent on the wiring pin assignments for the DAD. The pin assignments are made using the initial test requirements utilization of the acquisition discrete signals via the DAD. There are four software techniques which are available to further process and utilize this type of data: 1) Discrete bit reordering, 2) Pattern recognition, 3) Direct bit testing, and 4) The data masking technique.

The technique of reordering and discretes within the 16 bit word was discussed before, but only for packed discretes from other systems. In addition to reordering within the 16 bit word, new words can be formed by transferring bits from individual words and repacking in memory, as shown in Figure 6-1. As before, this technique enables the software to utilize programming efficiency methods such as looping, or in other words, reusable subroutines stored within the computer memory. The advantage of using this technique would be to obtain the capability of reducing the memory size for the onboard test system software program. This method was used throughout the B-1 CITS software program and lead to the generation of efficient software programming.

The pattern recognition method involves converting the zero and one bit pattern for the "go" condition into hexadecimal format. An example of this can be illustrated by the following zero-one bit pattern: "0101001111000101."



Discrete Bit Reordering Figure 6-1

The resultant hexadecimal number would be "53C5." The converted number would be stored in the computer memory to be used as a test constant compared to the incoming sampled packed discrete word. To perform this test using the pattern recognition technique would involve acquisitioning the packed discrete word, loading the word into a working register, loading another register with the stored "GO" condition bit pattern, and comparing the two registers to see if they compare to one another bit by bit. When testing a system such as the B-1 AICS where the majority of the signals are serial digital discretes, it was more efficient to use the pattern recognition method versus other methods such as direct bit testing and data masking. The rationale for this choice was made when it was found that after preprocessing within CITS all packed discrete configurations would be the same for all AICS controllers. The commonality of configuration for all the packed discretes facilitates the usage of the pattern recognition test technique.

The advantage of direct bit testing enables the software programmer to test any one individual bit within a packed discrete word. The advantage of this method is it requires very few steps because it is a direct usage of the computer's capability to test individual bits. Also this method has the fastest execution time of all methods which makes it a good candidate when time and memory core space are at a minimum.

The data masking procedure is actually a form of pattern recognition whereby the complement of the acceptable value of a data word is included in an indvidual instruction to be compared to the data word. Combination of the incoming data word with its complement by means of an "AND" instruction should give a result of zero for a "GO" condition. This method is used when looping techniques are not employed and has the advantages of reduced instructions and ease of change, as compared to normal pattern recognition.

All of the methods discussed are excellent in their application in performing onboard tests within a computer. Before the test system designer can consider these techniques for his tests, he must make sure that the computer

used has the needed capabilities in order that these tests can be executed properly and efficiently.

6.2 AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEM SIGNAL PROCESSING

The processing of data can either be done in the subsystem under test or by the test system. This section of the design guide will address processing of signals within the system under test. The discussion will include signal scaling, signal conversion, and multiplexing of data to be transmitted to the test system.

6.2.1 SIGNAL SCALING

Most test systems prefer their test signals to be zero to five volts. The reasoning behind this is to have the capability to use low power circuits in the test system and to minimize the distribution of high power lines throughout an aircraft to suppress excess electrical noise from being generated. Test signals, at their origin, can vary from zero to twenty-eight volts, one hundred volts, or four hundred volts depending on their application. These are the reasons for scaling all outputs to the test system to a zero to five volt signal.

The traditional scaling method used is to utilize an operational amplifier circuit with resistive feedback to both scale down and isolate the signal to the test system. This type of circuit will process and scale the voltage ranges mentioned depending on the proper selection of series and feedback resistors. When these signals have been scaled by the hardware, it then is possible to further scale the analog outputs, internal to the system under test, by means of converting to digital signals and inputting them into a microprocessor. Internal to the microprocessor, arithmetic operations can be done and the values would be scaled down further and then converted back to analogs or left as digital words and sent to the test system for further processing.

The B-1 aircraft, for example, utilized the hardware scaling technique and microprocessor software method in the Engine Instruments Subsystem (EIS).

The engine analog signals, with various scalings, were inputted into the Signal Conditioning and Distribution Unit (SCDU) of the EIS, scaled by means of resistor-operational amplifier and multiplexed through an A/D converter to the microprocessor. Within the SCDU microprocessor additional software calculations and scaling took place being serially outputted to the CITS via EMUX. These digital signals would then be used in the CITS engine test after further processing which will be discussed in following sections.

6.2.2 SIGNAL CONVERSION

There are three types of signals, analog in nature, that can be converted into a serial digital signal and transmitted to the onboard test system. The three types of signals are voltage, current, and frequency.

Analog voltages can be directly converted to a digital word via an A/D converter. A/D converters are a plentiful item in the market place. They vary in bit length, speed, voltage source required, and cost. The various techniques of conversion used by this type of device have been discussed in detail in Section 4. The three basic techniques utilized in A/D converters are successive approximation, integration, and the counter method.


Current type signals are easily converted to voltage by the use of a resistor. When a voltage signal has been produced the above processing procedure would be utilized to convert it to a digital signal.

Frequency inputs are easily converted to a voltage by the use of a Variable Frequency Oscillator (VFO) device. These devices come in small modular unit packages and are controlled by DC voltage. The conversion process varies from linear to nonlinear relationships for input frequency versus output voltage. When these signals are converted to voltages, scaling can be done by means of operational amplifiers, and digitizing can be accomplished by the A/D converters.

6.2.3 MULTIPLEXING

Signal multiplexing is a method by which many signals can be transmitted on one pair of wires versus one pair of wires for each signal. This process is normally carried out by integrated circuits which are specifically designed for this purpose. There are two applications for this technique, serial digital, and serial analog interfaces.

The serial digital interface is usually a four wire interface, two wires for an address line from the DAD to the system under test and two wires for the multiplexed information to be sent to the DAD from the signal source. This section focuses attention on those methods used to process data internal to the system under test. With this in mind, all of the addressing and A/D conversion circuitry would be within the system under test. For signal multiplexing to take place, each analog signal would have an address or identifier number assigned. The DAD would transmit a particular code identifying which signal is to be transmitted. The code would be translated into a zero-one bit pattern and decoded in order that the proper signal is selected by the multiplexer circuitry. Internal to the system LRU the analog would be selected by means of a solid state electronic selector switch and routed down a common link to the A/D converter, which is shared by all signals being transmitted to the DAD. After A/D conversion is complete the resultant digital word is clocked out of its temporary storage register to the DAD via the second pair of wires. The speed of this entire process is in the realm of microseconds for completion. It can be seen that in one second thousands of signals can be acquisitioned from a system under test. An example of this method can be seen in the B-1 engine-mounted CITS processor as illustrated in Figure 6-2. The CITS system transmits an eight bit digital address to the CITS processor. When the digital word is received it is decoded and the proper analog signal is selected, A/D converter, and transmitted back to the CITS DAU. To send and receive one simple digital word takes approximately thirty microseconds. This technique for processing data has one major advantage in that it enables the elimination of a



B-1 CITS Engine Data Multiplexing

Figure 6-2

1.1

great many wires to transmit many signals to the DAD for testing purposes. When weight is a critical factor, this method is a superior choice for the designer to make, when performing trade studies on weight, reliability, and complexity. When reducing weight using the multiplexing technique, one automatically obtains higher reliability and reduced complexity for the system under test. The application of this technique reduces the amount of electronic components necessary because common usage by all signals is obtained. The common usage parts would be the A/D converters, address decoder, electronic selector circuit, and the isolation amplifiers. By reducing the circuit complexity, increased reliability is automatically achieved because of reduced cause of failure in fewer parts.

The second application of the multiplexing technique is serial analogs. The circuitry involved is identical to the serial digital case minus the A/D converter. The A/D conversion would be done outside the LRU's on the system under test. The advantages for the serial analog are the same as the serial digital technique. An additional advantage is that the complexity within the LRU is decreased further, thus increasing reliability and reducing weight. One disadvantage is that the analog multiplex signal is more susceptible to noise than the serial digital signal, because voltage changes caused by noise would change the value of the parameter, whereas in the digital signal the value represented by the zero-one bit pattern is relatively fixed when sent from the LRU to the DAD. The digital format has minimum susceptibility to noise because the signal value is determined by the zero-one bit pattern and not the waveform magnitude.

If the designer is faced with interfacing many analogs with his test system by either of the techniques discussed, even with the described disadvantages, the choices are better than the added weight of all of the individual wires and unique electronics necessary for the standard analog interface.

6.3 SUMMARY

The three types of signals normally encountered and accessed as test parameters by a test system are serial digital, analog, and discrete. Each type requires some type of processing to permit their use in the test system. The methods and techniques available and recommended are dependent upon the design requirements of the test system, but generally evolve into the conversion of analog and discrete signals into a serial digital format which in turn usually requires scaling and reordering. For large scale applications, where numerous signals must be routed over appreciable distances, multiplexing of signals is recommended to save weight through the reduction of wiring.

Section 7

SELF-TEST

7.0 INTRODUCTION

An onboard test system would normally consist of a central computer, special purpose computer or microprocessor, subsystem hardware interface units, display device, and recording units. These devices would exchange information through standard interface circuitry residing in each unit.

The general purpose of the onboard test system is to detect and isolate failures of the subsystems being monitored. This function can only be accomplished if the testing units are functioning properly. The function of self-test is to establish the health, on a continuous basis, of the test system, and to prevent results of tests being conducted on other aircraft systems from being outputted when test hardware failures occur.

In this section self-test techniques are discussed and lists of applicable hardware for each type test are presented.

7.1 INSTRUCTION COUNTER TEST

The instruction counter is used by computer devices to store the address of the instruction which is under execution at any one time. The characteristic of this counter permit testing to only occur during the initialization portion of the computer program. The initialization portion of the program is executed by the computer only when the power is first applied and before normal program cycling is commenced. During the initialization tests the hardware and instruction counter are tested. If the counter was tested during the normal cycle, the program would cease because it would not know where it left off on the instruction execution cycle.

The testing of the instruction counter involves loading the register with a value and verifying that the computer circuitry decrements that value to zero by observing a zero interrupt. A zero interrupt will occur every time

the counter goes to zero. When zero interrupts have occurred a bit is set by the computer in a status word. A computer interrupt (whereby the computer ceases all instruction execution) will occur when inherent computer mechanisms malfunction, such as when the instruction counter goes to zero. The inherent function of the counter demands that it cannot be zero, or else the computer ceases to function.

7.1.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit (CPU).
- 2. Subsystem Electronic Controllers (Digital Type) which utilize software instructions.

7.2 ADDRESSING AND DATA TRANSFER

The main tools computers use to execute their function are address loading and data transferring. The technique used to test these types of function is to simply insert test cases, execute the function, and verify that the expected answer was present. To illustrate this the following could be used as a model to design tests for future systems. The B-1 CITS CPU uses a specific application of the test technique described. The CPU self-test program enters a predetermined address into an address register and verifies that it was entered correctly. If the address loading test is verified successfully, data is loaded into a register, then transferred to another register, and both registers are compared to one another to verify that they have equivalent stored values. The following examples illustrate the individual steps the computer would take to execute the two described tests.

Example 7.2

- 1. Address Loading Test.
 - A. Define register at address XXXX.
 - B. Load address 7ACD into address register at location XXXX.

C. Verify that address 7ACD was loaded into address register XXXX correctly.

2. Data Transfer Test.

- A. Define data register at address ZZZZ.
- B. Load data word 8ACD into register at address ZZZZ.
- C. Transfer data 8ACD from register at location ZZZZ to register at location ZZZZ + 5.
- D. Verify that data in location ZZZZ is equivalent to data in location ZZZZ + 5.

7.2.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Subsystem Controllers (Digital Type).
- 3. Display devices with digital interfaces.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Digital Maintenance Recorder.

7.3 REGISTER INDEX ADDRESSING

This type of testing involves loading one register with a fixed value and another with an index value. Index values are values used to increment addresses for modified branch locations in a computer. When the registers are loaded, the program adds the index to the register with a fixed value. The results are checked to verify the function which is vital to the operation of modified addressing for branch instruction execution. This test technique can be illustrated by the following examples listing the steps which the computer would execute to verify the Register Index Addressing function.

Example 7.3

- 1. Define register at address XXXX as register 2.
- 2. Define register at address XXXX + 2 as register 4.

- 3. Load index value 0010 into register 2.
- 4. Load address 7ADC into register 4.
- 5. Add register 2 to register 4 and store results in register 4.
- 6. Verify register to be 7AEC. (Note: 7AEC is equivalent to 7ADC + 0010 in hexadecimal code.)

7.3.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Future hardware designs will all incorporate microprocessors to reduce cost and increase reliability. This change will require these hardware types to use this self-test technique:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.4 REGISTER-TO-REGISTER CHECKSUM

Devices which contain computer circuitry have base registers which are used to temporarily store values such as data, partial calculation results, and program addresses. For this reason a self-test of these functions is very important. This test involves loading all base registers with fixed numbers. When this has been accomplished the test program will add and subtract the register in different combinations and check the results to verify both the register loading and addressing circuitry. This test technique is widely used and is identified as a checksum test. At this point an example can be shown to define the steps a CPU program would execute to perform a checksum test.

Example 7.4

- 1. Define address location XXXX to be register 2.
- 2. Define address location XXXX + 1 to be register 3.
- 3. Define address location XXXX + 2 to be register 4.
- 4. Define address location XXXX + 3 to be register 5.
- 5. Load register 2 with hexadecimal data of 1111.
- 6. Load register 3 with hexadecimal data of 1111.
- 7. Load register 4 with hexadecimal data of 1111.
- 8. Load register 5 with hexadecimal data of 1111.
- 9. Add register 2 to register 3 and store results in register 3.
- 10. Add register 3 to register 4 and store results in register 4.
- 11. Add register 4 to register 5 and store results in register 5.
- 12. Subtract register 5 from register 2 and store results in register
 - 2. Verify checksum in register 2 to be -3333 which has an equivalent hexadecimal code of CCCD.

7.4.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. For future hardware units, utilizing microprocessors, the following would use this technique:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.5 BASIC INSTRUCTION FORMAT OPERATIONS

During program execution, the main functions which are used the most are branching and data shifting. Branching involves advancing from one portion

of the program to another in order that instruction execution sequencing can be manipulated. The shifting function is used to scale or modify data and to address indexing information for utilization in the computer program. The test technique utilized involves storing and manipulating predetermined values, and verifying that the appropriate decision branching can be executed properly. The shifting function is checked in the same manner. Data is loaded into registers and shifting is executed and the results are verified to be correct. These types of tests will verify that the basic functions operate.

The following example defines those steps that the computer would execute to perform the branching and shifting functional checkout.

Example 7.5

- 1. Branching Test.
 - A. Define address location XXXX to be register 2.
 - B. Define address location XXXX + 1 to be register 3.
 - C. Load register 2 with a hexadecimal value of 5CDE.
 - D. Load register 3 with a hexadecimal value of 3CCC.
 - E. Compare register 2 with register 3. Verify that computer branches when register 2 is greater in value than register 3.
 - F. Compare register 3 with register 2. Verify that computer branches when register 3 is less in value than register 2.

2. Shifting Test.

- A. Define address location XXXX to be register 2.
- B. Load register 2 with a hexadecimal value of 4444.
- C. Execute a right shift instruction for one digit right.
- D. Verify register 2 to be a hexadecimal of 2222.

7.5.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Digital SCDU's.
- 5. Those future designs utilizing microprocessors are:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.6 MEMORY STORAGE CAPABILITY

The storage capability test involves storing a test constant into a memory location and extracting it again to see if the value has changed. When the test value is extracted from the memory core it is temporarily stored in one of the address registers waiting for the comparison test to take place. The test is done twice, using two different portions of memory. This is done to check more than only one portion of the circuitry, even though there are many common circuits involved in the procedure. Past experience on the B-1 CITS program has shown this type of testing to be very reliable in proving the functional health of the memory storage capability.

7.6.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Digital SCDU's
- 5. The following represent those units which will have microprocessors incorporated in the future designs:

- A. Data Acquisition Units.
- B. Hardcopy Printers.
- C. Control and Display Units.
- D. Digital Maintenance Recorders

7.7 MEMORY ADDRESS INTERPRETER

The address interpreter test involves taking a fixed hexadecimal constant, converting it to its complement (i.e., the negative of the number), and storing it in an addressable location in memory. The test continues on by adding the original constant to the complement and verifying that the sum is zero. The add instruction used utilizes addresses of the number involved rather than the actual numbers themselves. This technique tests the capability of the memory to interpret the address of the value desired from core memory, transfer that value to the arithmetic section, and obtain the correct answer. It has been proven by B-1 CITS experience, and in industry, that the most efficient way to test a computer function is by exercising that function with known inputs and comparing the output with the predictable results.

7.7.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Digital SCDU's.
- 5. Those future designs utilizing microprocessors such as:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.8 INITIALIZATION TESTING

Initialization testing is done during the test system power-up sequence to establish a starting point for the program and to determine the primary health of the hardware. There are tests which can only be done during the initialization period, because they would disrupt the program cycle if they were tested at other times. An example of this type of situation is the program instruction counters. The program would cease to run if during operation the instruction counter was set to zero for a test. The initialization portion of the computer checkout included memory checksum tests, interrupt tests, counter tests, discrete input/output test, and computer channel tests.

7.8.1 CHECKSUM TEST

The checksum test done during the initialization portion of the selftest program is the same as described in paragraph 7.4. This test is one of those that can be done during program operation as well as at initialization, because the operations involved are not part of the basic cycling mechanisms of the hardware or software program. When this test is executed during initialization it establishes the initial condition, at power up, of the register and arithmetic portions of the computer circuitry.

7.8.1.1 Applications

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Digital SCDU's.
- 5. Those future designs utilizing microprocessors are:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.8.2 INTERRUPTS

The basic function of interrupts is to transfer program control from one point in the computer to another. The B-1 CITS computer program has 16 different types of interrupts. Table VII-1 gives a listing of the interrupt types and priority levels. Some of the interrupts are of a failure type and the remainder occur as an event marker. When the computer is executing the instructions of the main program and a non-failure type interrupt occurs, the hardware stores the address where the computer leaves off and then executes a special subroutine program that performs operations which take care of that particular interrupt occuring in the program. When the subroutine has completed its tasks the main program is continued from where the program transferred control.

In conjunction with the interrupt function, the CITS software program utilizes a Program Status Word (PSW). The PSW carries the discrete status of the information contained in the previously described list of interrupt level assignments. Each interrupt level has a unique main store fullword location assigned to the "old PSW" and one assigned to the "new PSW." The zone of main store containing these assigned PSW locations is called the permanent storage area. Upon taking an interrupt the computer automatically stores the current PSW in the main store location assigned to the "old PSW" for the level of the interrupt taken and loads the contents of the "new PSW" location into the current program status registers in the CPU. The old PSW holds all the necessary status information on the system existing at the time of the interruption. Execution of the interrupt routine begins at the instruction location specified by bits 0-15 of the new PSW. At the conclusion of the interrupt routine a LOAD PROGRAM STATUS WORD instruction, specifying the address of that interrupt level's old PSW, returns the machine status to that contained prior to entering the interrupt routine and the interrupted routine continues.

TABLE VII-1

Interrupt and Interrupt Level Assignments

Level Number	Interrupt Number	Interrupt Description
0	0	Parity error on data received by CPU
0	1	Parity error or memory not responsive
0	2	Bad Data from a peripheral
0	3	Multiple commands sent to input/output
0	4	GO/NO GO overflow
1	2	Arithmetic overflow
2	6	Clock number 1
3	7	Clock number 2
4	8	External number 1
5	9	External number 2
6	10	External number 3
7	11	External number 4
8	12	Input/output channel number l termination
8	13	Input/output channel number 2 termination.
8	14	Input/output channel number 3 termination
8	15	Input/output channel number 4 termination

The test technique used for the interrupt function involves loading a bad parity word in a functional register and observing the PSW to verify the proper bit setting.

The only time which lends itself to a self-test of the interrupt function is during the initialization period. If this test were done during the operational mode of the program, the computer would immediately discontinue processing data, transfer control to a level zero (failure type) interrupt test routine, which stores the address where the error occurred, and would go into a secure mode, requiring operator assistance to initiate a system reinitialization.

7.8.2.1 Applications

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Those future designs utilizing microprocessors are:
 - A. Data Acquisition Units.
 - B. Hardcopy Printers.
 - C. Control and Display Units.
 - D. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.8.3 COUNTERS

The testing of the counters is another test that can only be executed during the initialization period. The B-1 CITS system utilizes three different types of functional counters. The first type is the main instruction counter which the computer uses to store the address of the instruction being executed. This counter is never tested because of its inherent function. If this circuitry should fail the computer would stop all instruction execution, therefore when a failure does occur the computer will secure itself. The second type is a program loadable counter. This type is a countdown counter,

16 bits in length, and is program loadable. The counter is loadable from a general register and is decremented every 100 microseconds, with a maximum count of 6.55 seconds. When the counter passes through zero, an interrupt is generated. The testing of the counter involves loading a constant, permitting it to decrement to zero, and verifying that an interrupt occurs. The third type of counter is GO/NO-GO. This 16 bit counter is both loadable and readable. The counter is decremented every 50 microseconds, with a maximum count of 3.28 seconds. When the counter passes through zero, an interrupt is generated and the fault indicator is set. This counter is not tested because testing would result in a system secure situation.

7.8.3.1 Applications

- 1. Computer Central Processing Units.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Data Acquisition Units.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Control and Display Units.
- 6. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 7. Digital SCDU's.

7.8.4 DISCRETE INPUT/OUTPUT

The function of the discrete input/output is to transport sets of packed discretes, in one 16 bit word, from the interface units into a dedicated memory location in the computer. To test this function during the initialization period, self-test enters a predetermined pattern of 16 bit discretes into an active data register. The program then branches to input/output control which transports the packed discretes to its dedicated input/output memory location and then back to another active data register. After this has been accomplished, control is branched back to self-test where the original register data is compared with the new register data. The registers should be equal

bit for bit to pass this test. Passing this test establishes the capability of the discrete input/output function to transfer packed discretes from one memory location to another without transforming or dropping any discretes in route. The testing of this function is vital because the discrete data is used for: (1) The precondition set up for all tests executed by the subsystem test and (2) The transmission of data relating status of vital equipment on the systems under test.

This test technique is utilized extensively in the B-1 CITS program, where thousands of discretes per second are arranged, transported, and decoded for purpose of obtaining split-second health status of vital equipment on the aircraft.

7.8.4.1 Applications

- 1. Microprocessors.
- 2. Data Acquisition Units.
- 3. Control and Display Units.
- 4. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 5. Digital SCDU's.

7.8.5 COMPUTER CHANNELS

The B-1 CITS application of an onboard test system involves a centralized general purpose computer with two input/output channels which can be utilized to interface directly with another computer system. The following test technique can be used to verify proper operation. First the input/output channel must be disabled to prevent actual outputs from occurring during the test. The second step is to initiate an output of predetermined data on the channel, and verify if it was executed by observing an input/output channel termination interrupt. By obtaining an interrupt, verification is made that the command was successfully executed. This test can be repeated for each channel which would exist in a particular design.

This type of testing can only be done during the initialization period because normal inter-device communication is interrupted during the test. If a disturbance in communication occurs, vital equipment data would be lost and misinterpretation of the loss could result in false indications by the test system.

7.8.5.1 Applications

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessor.

7.9 RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (RAM) TESTS

There are three techniques for testing RAM devices: 1) Duplication,
2) Parity, and 3) Checkerboard. The following is a discussion of these three test techniques.

7.9.1 DUPLICATION

RAM devices have two modes of operation, write and read. The testing of the RAM is done while in the read mode. When the data is read out, one from each duplicate RAM, each is compared to the other, detecting an error if a mismatch occurs. This method detects all memory faults including multiple bit faults and addressing errors and with additional circuitry can incorporate error correction.

7.9.2 PARITY

Single bit parity is the simplest and most common technique used in memory fault detection. The implementation of this test technique involves adding a single bit to each data word such that the total number of "ones" in that word is odd for odd parity, or even for even parity. The test is done when data words are read into or extracted from the RAM. To pass the test they must have the same parity chosen for implementation, odd or even.

7.9.3 CHECKERBOARD

The checkerboard test technique (sometimes referred to as pattern recognition) involves a pattern of alternating "zeros" and "ones" to be loaded and extracted from the RAM. The extracted data is then verified to have the correct pattern. To implement this test technique a temporary storage location must be allocated to store programs when displaced from tested locations in the RAM.

7.9.4 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Microprocessors.
- 2. Hardcopy Printers.
- 3. Control and Display Panels.
- 4. Digital Maintenance Recorder.
- 5. Subsystem Digital Controller.
- 6. Digital SCDU.

7.10 READ ONLY MEMORY (ROM) TESTS

ROM devices function in the same manner as RAM's. In this context the duplication and parity test techniques can be applied with some modifications. The checkerboard technique cannot be used because no data can be inputted into the ROM device. The following represents the modifications needed to execute the duplication and parity tests.

7.10.1 DUPLICATION

The ROM device requires a driving circuit for decoding of addresses. To implement the duplication test comparison a complete system in parallel would be added such that each decoder circuit would drive its own ROM device. The test would compare instructions/data that is incorporated in the ROM design.

7.10.2 PARITY

To implement a parity test on a ROM device causes a problem because the word size within the ROM is fixed and enlarging them to add the parity bit is improper. This can be relieved by adding a RAM device to store the parity bits. The designer should specify his addressing scheme very carefully such that the parity bits stored in RAM will always match the instruction/data locations in ROM for proper test results.

7.10.3 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Microprocessors.
- 2. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 3. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 4. Digital SCDU's.

7.11 FIRST-IN-FIRST-OUT MEMORY (FIFO)

The FIFO memory device is similar to a RAM and all of the test techniques are the same. The FIFO is best suited for parity checking because it is made up of 9 bit words, thus the ninth bit would be used for parity checking.

7.12 OVERTEMPERATURE CHECK

Power supplies have a characteristic which, if left unchecked, would cause wide-spread damage to surrounding electronics circuits. The one characteristic that could cause this fault is overtemperature. When the loading on the power supply increases, the current demand increases, which in turn increases the temperature of the power supply transformer. As the transformer increases in temperature the internal resistance increases. Due to the increased current demands and increased resistance of the transformer windings due to heat, the temperature has a tendency to rapidly increase and begin to damage the transformer and microcircuitry. To curtail possible damage

it is recommended that the temperature at the power transformer heat sink be monitored. If the monitoring of the temperature should detect a high value condition, warning can be given to the operator so that manual action can terminate operation of the overheated equipment.

7.12.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessor.
- 3. Data Acquisition Unit.
- 4. Hardcopy Printer.
- 5. Control and Display.
- 6. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 7. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 8. Digital SCDU's.

7.13 ANALOG CHANNEL TEST

Normally there are many analog signals coming from the system under test to the onboard test system. A typical configuration would consist of many analog signals coming into dedicated operational amplifier circuits for isolation purposes, then to an analog multiplex from where the signals are fed to an analog to digital (A/D) converter, and finally to storage in addressable data registers for future use. This type of configuration can experience several kinds of failures. Typical failures include: (1) Shorted operational amplifier, (2) Non-linear amplifier, (3) Zero offset, (4) A/D converter problem in either the most significant bits (MSB) or the least significant bits (LSB) of the resultant digital word. These failures can be detected by a test which utilizes the same technique three times, but uses three different fixed inputs. First, a ground test is done by grounding all analog inputs and observing the resultant A/D outputs. If a channel

exceeds zero plus or minus a fixed constant, it is considered as failed. Secondly the test designer would have to pick two other values to insert for A/D conversion to verify linearity of the circuits. This type of test technique will also detect shorted isolation/scaling amplifiers and erroneous A/D converters. The interface unit used on the B-1 aircraft CITS is called the DAU and utilizes a number of analog channels. The CITS application used -4.85V, OV, and +4.05V as the three input constants for linearity testing because the analog range was -5V to +5V. Other aircraft applications could have different analog ranges, such that different input constants would be selected.

7.13.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Data Acquisition Devices.
- 2. Subsystem Digital Controllers.

7.14 DISCRETE CHANNEL TEST

The discrete input channel can be tested by applying a logic "1" and a logic "0" alternately to the input of each discrete channel being tested. This test technique is utilized on the B-1 CITS. Each channel is tested in the manner described and status bits are set, communicating channel health to the computer for information display and recording.

This test technique is applicable to other systems where discrete input channels exist, but timing of the test is crucial. The B-1 CITS DAU executes this test only when no sampling of those channels involved is taking place. If sampling and testing were confused or overlayed, erroneous information would be inputted to the system and many false indications would arise.

7.14.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Microprocessors.
- 2. Data Acquisition Units.
- 3. Control and Display Devices.

7.15 SERIAL DIGITAL CHANNEL TEST

Serial digital input channels can be tested by applying two different 17 bit patterns to each of the input channels. The bit patterns are selected to test each bit in both logic level states. There are two areas of application of this test technique: (1) Serial digital channel test used in the B-1 CITS and (2) B-1 engine mounted CITS processor serial digital interface circuitry. The B-1 CITS DAU has several serial digital input channels that are tested in the manner described. The results of these tests are stored in status registers, available for computer scanning, information display, and recording. The engine mounted CITS processor utilizes this test technique and sends two serial digital words to CITS via an interface to the DAU. These check words are compared to fixed constants, with tolerances applied, and are either determined to pass or fail. This type of test is excellent because it tests the entire serial digital channel and enables one to execute an end-to-end test of the involved circuitry.

7.15.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Microprocessors.
- 2. Data Acquisition Units.
- 3. Hardcopy Printers.
- 4. Control and Display.
- 5. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 6. Subsystem Digital Recorders.
- 7. Digital SCDU's.

7.16 INPUT/OUTPUT BUFFER SELF-TEST

The interface device, if separate from the computer unit, must have interface circuitry installed in order that two-way communications between the interface device and computer can take place. The interface circuitry would include, as a major element, an input/output buffer. To test this

portion of the circuitry, the computer would issue a code to prepare the interface device to receive a string of data words. The data words received are stored in the input buffer, but are not processed as normal data. When the transmission is complete, the contents of the input buffer are stored in the output buffer until a transmit data command from the computer is received. The computer transmits a command to the interface device to send the contents of the output buffer. When the computer receives the data, it is compared to the original data words it sends, and if they match, the test has passed. In other words, the transmitted data and the received data must be the same for all the interface circuitry to be functioning properly.

7.16.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessor.
- 3. Data Acquisiton Units.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Control and Display Devices.
- 6. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 7. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 8. Digital SCDU's.

7.17 OUTPUT LOGIC SELF-TEST

The output logic self-test should be conducted automatically in a continuous mode. After completion of an output data message transmission from a control and display device, the output data memory should be sent to the logic zero state. Each memory element would then be individually set to a logic one state and the memory element outputs monitored for a logic one condition. A logic zero condition in the memory elements during the monitoring then would be designated as a failure of the control and display device. This type of test should be inhibited when the keyboard, if any, is being

used because operation would differ in the manual mode from that in the automatic display mode.

7.17.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Hardcopy Printers.
- 2. Control and Display Devices.

7.18 DISPLAY LOGIC SELF-TEST

The display logic self-test would be enabled and disabled by the computer. The enable and disable commands should have transmission codes in the computer such that confusion between the two is eliminated. The control and display device logic circuitry would retain the display logic self-test "enabled" or "disabled" state until a new command from the central computer was received. During power initialization testing or computer reset, the display logic selftest would assume the "enabled" state. When enabled the display logic selftest would occur once each time the control and display device is communicated with and also in conjunction with the display logic. After completion of all input data validation tests, all input data would be stored in a buffer memory. Each discrete of the data words represents the test results in two lights in the display device. The test approach used on the indicator lights involves the hardware injecting a very short voltage pulse and observing the resultant current developed, and comparing it to a fixed constant plus or minus a tolerance. This test technique has demonstrated valid results on checking light bulbs in the B-1 CITS control and display panel, therefore it should give equal success in future design projects.

7.18.1 APPLICATIONS

1. Control and Display Devices.

7.19 INTERFACE ECHO TEST

The interface echo test is computer controlled and involves inter-communication between the computer and the peripheral devices. The computer would send a data word storage address, a data word, and information telling the interface device that a test was in progress. Upon completion of the transmittal of the data, the computer would transmit information to obtain the data word back from the interface device. Once the computer receives the data word, a comparison is made with the original data word. For the test to pass, both data words must be the same value. This test technique is valid for all devices which have a two-way interface with a computer. It has been successfully used on the B-1 CITS system inter-hardware interfaces.

7.19.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessors.

7.20 PARITY ERRORS

Onboard test peripherals require two-way communication with the central computer such that when data are sent to them, a response of receipt can be returned. The data which are sent for output are in the form of sixteen bits plus one bit for odd or even parity, thus resulting in seventeen bits transmitted. When the word is sent to the peripheral device, it is checked for odd or even parity by the self-test circuitry. Upon determining the validity of the word, pertinent information on the status is transmitted to the computer for processing. Odd parity is tested by verifying that there is an odd number of logic ones (for even parity an even number of logic ones) in the seventeen bit word. For example, if the computer were to send a word of all logic "ones", it would have to add the seventeenth bit of logic "one" to result in a valid odd parity word.

This test technique is a standard method of checking data words being transmitted or received on a serial digital transmission line.

7.20.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessor.
- 3. Data Acquisition Units.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Control and Display Devices.
- 6. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 7. Subsystem Digital Controllers.
- 8. Digital SCDU's.

7.21 1553 DATA BUS PROTOCOL TESTS

The input/output bus protocol as defined in MIL-STD-1553B requires the peripheral hardware to recognize certain transmission errors. As an example, the CITS hardcopy printer must respond to these types of errors in a fixed format on the printer message output. The following represents two tests that can be used to verify proper protocol on the data bus.

7.21.1 NON-VALID DATA WORD

A non-valid data word can be caused by such errors as:

- 1. Bad word parity.
- 2. Non-Manchester codes.
- 3. Short word, i.e., missing bits.

The printer, in recognition of this error, would replace the incoming data word with a fixed pattern that replaces the printed characters with a known character such as question marks. The printer, to detect such an error, would compare the data word format to all legal formats and codes stored within its memory and if a match does not occur with one of the proper codes an error has been detected.

7.21.2 NON-VALID MESSAGE

When the computer is transmitting data to the printer for printing, it must communicate to the printer the exact number of data words it is sending in one string. The printer receives the control message with the data word string count, waits for the entire data string to be transmitted, and then the self-test circuitry verifies that the sent number of data words agrees with the intended number. If there is a disagreement, the printer self-test will declare the message sent to be non-valid and print a known pattern at the end of the message printed, such as underline characters, to notify the reader that the message is in error.

7.21.3 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessor.
- 3. Data Acquisition Units.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Control and Display Devices.
- 6. Digital Maintenance Recorders.

7.22 POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE REGULATION

The power supplies for the onboard test system hardware units are voltage regulated and designed such that maximum protection is provided for the circuit components. Protective measures include prevention of equipment damage caused by overvoltage, undervoltage, or transient conditions of the supply AC voltage. Overvoltage and undervoltage protection are important because overvoltage on the input power tends to cause the power supply to operate at a higher than normal temperature, whereas the undervoltage condition causes the user devices to become unstable and make random logic errors.

As in the input power undervoltage case, deregulation of output would also cause instability of the unit circuitry. Regulation should be within

plus or minus five percent of the normal DC voltage required for operation. The output voltage of the power supply should be monitored by the test system and declared failed if the readings exceed plus or minus five percent. If the voltage were allowed to exceed the test limits, possible damage would be evidenced in the unit electronic components of the test system.

7.22.1 APPLICATIONS

- 1. Computer Central Processing Unit.
- 2. Microprocessors.
- 3. Data Acquisition Units.
- 4. Hardcopy Printers.
- 5. Control and Display Devices.
- 6. Digital Maintenance Recorders.
- 7. System Digital Controllers.
- 8. Digital SCDU's.

7.23 READ-AFTER-WRITE TEST

The read-after-write self-test applies to digital maintenance recorders. The test involves the following procedure:

When the recorder is in the write mode, and in the process of recording on magnetic tape, the recorder would compare each bit of the data read from the tape with each bit of the data stored in the registers for recording. If a mismatch is found the self-test circuitry should do two tasks:

- 1. Communicate that an error was found to the central processing unit.
- 2. Set a non-valid bit in the recorded data word to communicate the problem to the data user.

This type of test would not require computer initiation but would be done on a continuous basis when the recorder is performing its recording function.

7.24 SUMMARY

This section describes twenty-seven different types of self-tests and their hardware application that a designer could choose from for an onboard test system design. Table VII-2 is presented to summarize the tests and their applications to different hardware units. Table VII-3 is included to illustrate those tests and what hardware units they were applied to for the B-1 aircraft.

TABLE VII-2

_				_	_				$\overline{}$
	Read-After-Write		L				×		
	Power Supply Voltage Regulation	×	×	×	_ ζ	×	×	×	×
L	1222 Data Bus Protocol	×	×	×	×	×	×		
	Parity Errors	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
L	Interface Echo	×	×						
L	Display Logic					X			
	Output Logic				χ	Х			
L	Input/Output Buffer	Х	X	X	X	Χ	X	×	×
	Serial Digital Channel		χ	X	X	Χ	X	×	×
L	Discrete Channel		Χ	χ		Χ			
	Analog Channel			Х				×	
[Overtemperature Check	Х	X	χ	X	X	X	×	×
	FIFO (First In First Out)		Х	X			X		
" L	ROM (Read Only Memory)		Х				X	×	×
ion	RAM (Random Access Memory)		X		Х	Х	Х	×	×
icat	Computer Channels	X	X						
Self-Test Applications	Discrete Input/Output		Х	Х		X		×	×
	Counters	Х	Х	χ	Х	Х		×	×
	Interrupts	×	×	1	-	1		×	
Seli	Memory Checksums	×	×	1	1	1	1	×	
	Memory Address Interpreter	×	Х	1	1	1	1	×	×
	Memory Storage Capability	×	×	1	7	1		×	×
l	Basic Instruction Operations	×	X	1	1	1	1	×	×
	Register-to-Register Checksum	×	×	1	1	1	1	×	
	Register Index Addressing	×	×	1	1	1	1	×	
l	Addressing and Data Transfer	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
	Instruction Counter	×	×						
	SELF-TESTS HARDWARE UNIT APPLICATIONS	Computer Central Processing Unit	Microprocessor	Data Acquisition	Hardcopy Printer	Control and Display	Digital Maintenance Recorders	Subsystem Digital Controllers	Digital Signal Cond. § Distribution Unit

NOTE: 1. Future hardware will incorporate microprocessors to reduce cost and increase reliability.

B-1 CITS Self-Test Experience TABLE VII-3

L

Read-After-Write					×
Power Supply Voltage Regulation	×	×	×	X	×
1553 Data Bus Protocol	×	×	Х	χ	×
Parity Errors	X	×	×	Х	X
Interface Echo Test	×	2	2	2	2
Display Logic			×		
Output Logic			×	Х	X
Input/Output Buffer		1	ī	1	1
Serial Digital Channel		×			
Discrete Channel		×			
Analog Channel		×			
Олеттептретатите Сheck	×	×	×	Х	X
FIRO (First In First Out)					×
ROM (Read Only Memory)			×	Х	
RAM (Random Access Memory)			3	3	3
Computer Channels	×				
Discrete Input/Output	×				
Counters	×				
Interrupts	X				
у вшо х) Сувс к глшг	Х				
Memory Address Interpreter	X				
Memory Storage Capability	X	1		1	1
Basic Instruction Operations	Х				
Register-to-Register Checksum	X				
Register Index Addressing	х				
Addressing and Data Transfer	X	X	Х	Х	Х
Instruction Counter	X				
SELF-TESTS HARDWARE UNIT APPLICATIONS	General Purpose Computer	Data Acquisition Units	Control and Display Panel	Hardcopy Printer	Maintenance Recorder

Performed by computer software with fixed patterns. Performed by computer software with variable patterns. Checkerboard technique. 1. 2. 3. NOTES:

Section 8

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MIL-STD-704	Electric Power, Aircraft, Characteristics, and Utilization Of
MIL-STD-721	Definitions of Effectiveness Terms for Reliability, Maintainability, Human Factors, and Safety
MIL-STD-882	System Safety Program for Systems and Associated Subsystems and Equipment, Requirements For
MIL-STD-1309	Definition of Terms for Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment
MIL-STD-1345	Data, Measurement, In Support of Maintenance, Calibration, and Repair of Electronic Equipment
MIL-STD-1553	Aircraft Internal Time Division Command/Response Multiplex Data Bus

MIL-STD-1591	On-Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems, Analysis/ Synthesis Of
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Section 9

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Α Availability A/C Aircraft A/P Airborne Printer ACUC Avionics Control Unit Complex ADC Analog to Digital Converter AFR Air Force Regulation AGE Aerospace Ground Equipment Air Induction Control System AICS Avionics Multiplex AMUX APU Auxiliary Power Unit ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ATE Automatic Test Equipment BIT Built-In-Test BITE Built-In-Test Equipment CCD CITS Control and Display CCSE Common Computer Support Equipment CCW Channel Control Word CITS Dedicated Computer CDC CDR Critical Design Review Crash Data Recorder CDR Central Integrated Test System **CITS** CMR CITS Maintenance Recorder **CPDP** Computer Program Development Program CPU Central Processing Unit

Cathode Ray Tube

CRT

D Detection Assurance

DAD Data Acquisition Device

DAC Digital to Analog Converter

DACU Defensive Avionics Control Unit

DAU Data Aquisition Unit

DOD Department of Defense

DSB Data Storage Buffer

DSP Debug Simulation Program

ECS Environmental Control System

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EMUX Electrical Multiplex

FD/FI Failure Detection/Fault Isolation

FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

GNACU Guidance and Navigation Avionics Control Unit

GRT Ground Readiness Test

GTS Ground Test System

HOL High Order Language

HW Half Word

I Isolation Certainty

ICD Interface Control Document

ILSW Interrupt Level Status Word

I/O Input/Output

IOC Input/Output Control

IOU Input/Output Unit

KYBD Keyboard

LCC Life Cycle Cost

LED Light Emiting Diode
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
LSB Least Significant Bit

LVDT Linear Variable Differential Transformer

M Maintainability

 ${f M}_{{f ct}}$ Mean Corrective Maintenance Time

MSB Most Significant Bit

MTBF Mean Time Between Failures

NRZ Non-Return to Zero

OACU Offensive Avionics Control Unit

OBTS Onboard Test System

P Probability of Mission Success

PC Power Control

PCM Pulse Coded Modulation

PDR Preliminary Design Review

PO Program/Project Office

PSW Program Status Word

RAM Random Access Memory

RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation

RFP Request for Proposal

ROM Read Only Memory

RVDT Rotary Variable Differential Transformer

RZ Return to Zero

SCDU Signal Conditioning and Distribution Unit

S/H Sample/Hold

SRU Shop Replaceable Unit
STE Special Test Equipment

SUT System Under Test

TAC Test Adapter Controller

TBD To be Determined

TIC Transfer Initiate Command

TMDE Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment

T/R Transfer/Receive

T/S Time Slot

UUT Unit Under Test

VFO Variable Frequency Oscillator

WDACU Weapon Delivery Avionics Control Unit

λ Failure Rate

Section 10

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Appendix A

ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM SPECIFICATION

This section contains a suggested format and content as a guideline for the preparation of a specification which encompasses the overall requirements for a typical onboard test system. Specific details and wording are not necessarily included because of the possible variations arising from different applications. Those requirements which are felt to be mandatory, as a minimum, are included without regard to weapon system variances.

1. SCOPE

- 1.1 Scope. This specification established the performance, design, development, and test requirements for an onboard test system.
- 1.2 <u>Applicability</u>. The requirements contained in this basic specification shall apply to

2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

2.1 Applicability. The following documents of the exact issue shown form a part of this specification to the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise specified, in the event of conflict between the documents listed below and the contents of this specification, the contents of this specification shall be considered a superseding requirement.

2.2 Government Documents

Standards
Specifications
Other Publications

3. REQUIREMENTS

3.1 Item Definition. The onboard test system is a weapon system subsystem which continually tests the operability of all weapon system systems, subsystems, and equipment. The onboard test system displays malfunction data to the aircrew for evaluation of mission capability and records and displays data for maintenance crews to facilitate weapon system repair. The onboard test system is comprised of ______.

3.2 Interface

3.2.1 Definition. The onboard test system interface diagram shown in Figure illustrates the major components of the test system with their interface relationship to other weapon system systems, subsystems, and equipment.

3.2.2 Identification

- 3.2.2.1 <u>Support Subsystems Interface</u>. The onboard test system shall interface with the following support subsystems:
 - A. Electrical power generation and distribution (power power via hard line).
 - B. Environmental control (for cooling via ducting).
- 3.2.2.2 <u>Weapon System Subsystems Interface</u>. The onboard test system shall interface with equipment of the following subsystems as shown in Figure ____.

3.2.3 Signals

3.2.3.1 <u>Input Data Signals</u>. The onboard test system shall be capable of receiving from the interfacing systems, subsystems, and equipment the following types of input signals for processing:

A. DC Analogs

0.0 to plus or minus 5.0 volts

dc plus or minus 1 percent of

full scale.

B. Discretes

0.0 to plus or minus 2.0 volts

dc (logic "0").

Plus 2.5 to plus 6.0 volts dc

(logic "1").

C. Serial Digital

Each word bits plus parity

bit, mhz.

3.2.3.2 Output Signals. The onboard test system shall be capable of sending to the interfacing systems, subsystems, and equipment the following types of output signals for testing:

A. Discrete

0.0 to plus or minus 1.0 volts dc

(logic "0").

Plus 5.0 plus or minus 1.0 volts

dc (logic "1").

B. Serial Digital

Each word ____ bits plus parity

bit, ___ mhz.

3.2.4 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). The components of the onboard test system shall interface with the applicable AGE. The test system interfaces required for onboard servicing, handling, and testing shall be so located as to permit interconnection of the AGE with the onboard test system installed in its normal operating position in the weapon system.

3.3 Characteristics

- 3.3.1 <u>Functional</u>. The onboard test system shall provide for the onboard test of the systems, subsystem, and equipment specified in 3.2.2.2.
- 3.3.1.1 <u>Detection Assurance</u>. The onboard test system shall provide an assurance of at least <u>percent</u> percent that system performance is operationally acceptable or that an indicated failure is valid during in-flight or ground operation.
- 3.3.1.2 <u>Isolation Certainty</u>. The onboard test system shall provide isolation of a detected failure to an LRU with a certainty of at least ___percent.
- 3.3.1.3 <u>Availability</u>. The onboard test system shall incorporate those design characteristics essential to the achievement of an operational weapon system availability of not less than __percent.
- 3.3.1.4 <u>Reliability</u>. The onboard test system shall incorporate those design characteristics essential to the achievement of a mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) greater than hours.
- 3.3.1.5 <u>Maintainability (Quantitative)</u>. The onboard test system shall incorporate those design characteristics essential to the achievement of a maintainability requirement of no less than __percent for organizational level maintenance.
- 3.3.1.6 <u>False Indication Rate</u> The occurrence of a false indication of a system, subsystem, or equipment status shall not exceed __percent.
- 3.3.1.7 <u>Automaticity</u>. The test function shall be essentially automatic. The manual or semiautomatic approach shall be held to an absolute minimum and shall be utilized only when operational requirements preclude the use of automaticity or no other technique will satisfy the automatic test requirement.

- 3.3.1.8 <u>Radiation Silence</u>. The onboard test system shall be capable of evaluating and testing system, subsystem, or equipment performance when radiating systems are either radiating or observing radiation silence.
- 3.3.1.9 <u>Self-Test</u>. The onboard test system shall be capable of automatically performing a self-test of all internal test operations either on a continuous or periodic basis, or a combination of both.
- 3.3.1.10 <u>Fail Safe</u>. The onboard test system shall not cause failure or degradation of the operational performance of the weapon system in the event of a malfunction of the onboard test system.
- 3.3.1.11 <u>Display</u>. The status display for the onboard test system shall clearly indicate the status of the systems, subsystems, or equipments while operating in flight or on the ground. No special catalogs or handbooks shall be required, and no understanding of special, complex coded language shall be required of the flight crew to determine total weapon system status and performance while in flight.
- 3.3.1.12 Test Techniques. The onboard test system shall perform an integrated test of weapon system systems, subsystems, and equipment, utilizing combined end-to-end dynamic testing to the maximum extent possible. The integrated test approach shall be applied to system functions which use groups of subsystems to derive a mission required parameter. During the in-flight condition, maximum use shall be made of dynamic parameters within the subsystem resulting from the operational environment of the subsystem or weapon system as test stimuli. When actual operational parameters are not available or usable for test purposes, the test technique shall dynamically exercise the subsystem in a manner which accurately simulates the actual operational environment of the subsystem. The test technique shall utilize carefully selected test

points which will be capable of providing multiple parameter data rather than a single usable parameter for each test point. The test technique shall minimize reliance on the analysis of series point-by-point test results.

3.3.2 Physical.

- 3.3.2.1 <u>Weight</u>. The target weight for the onboard test system including installation provisions is included in the empty weight of the weapon system as specified in ____.
- 3.3.2.2 <u>Volume</u>. The volume of those portions of the onboard test system not contained within LRU's of other systems, subsystems, or equipment shall not exceed a total of ___ cubic feet.
- 3.3.2.3 <u>Power</u>. The onboard test system shall perform within the requirements specified herein while operating from a nominal _____ volt, ____ hertz power source having characteristics as described in ____.

3.3.2.4 <u>Survivability/Vulnerability</u>.

is section shall contain subparagraph S/V requirements which are derived from the overall weapon system S/V requirements.)

3.3.2.5 Maintainability (Qualitative).

(This section shall contain subparagraph maintainability requirements which are derived from the overall weapon system maintainability requirements.)

3.4 Design and Construction.

(This section shall include subparagraphs to specify minimum requirements that are not controlled by performance characteristics or interface requirements. They shall include applicable design standards; requirements governing the use or selection of materials, processes, and parts; interchangeability requirements, safety requirements, etc. To the maximum extent possible, these requirements shall be specified by reference to established military standards and specifications.)

4. QUALITY ASSURANCE

- 4.1 <u>Verification Requirements</u>. This section describes the methods for verification of compliance with the performance and design requirements of Section 3. The verification methods consist of inspection, analysis, demonstration, and test which are applied as appropriate in the qualification of the onboard test system. A cross reference between the requirements of Section 3 and the methods of verification for these requirements is provided in Table I.
- 4.1.1 <u>Responsibility for Test</u>. Unless otherwise specified, the inspections, analyses, and testing specified herein shall be the responsibility of the prime contractor.
- 4.1.2 <u>Air Force Approval</u>. The procuring activity shall have the option to approve all analyses and testing required for verification of compliance with Section 3 requirements including the methods, procedures, conditions, limits, and results of each verification requirement.

4.1.3 <u>Inspections</u>

4.1.3.1 <u>Volume</u>. Compliance with the volume requirements of paragraph 3.3.2.2 shall be verified by inspection. (3.3.2.2.)

4.1.4 Analyses

4.1.4.1 <u>Interfaces</u>. Compliance with interface requirements shall be verified by a review of engineering drawings, wiring diagrams, and schematics during design reviews (3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2, 3.2.4).

- 4.1.4.2 <u>Electrical Power Requirements</u>. Compliance with electrical power requirements shall be verified by analysis for voltage and frequency characteristics and normal electrical system operation transient surge voltage as specified in ____. Where deemed more feasible, the contractor may substitute test for any portion of the analysis or perform tests to support any part of the analysis (3.3.2.3).
- 4.1.4.3 <u>Performance</u>. Compliance with the onboard test system performance requirements shall be verified by analysis of design and test data as follows:
 - A. <u>Detection Assurance</u> Compliance with the detection assurance requirement shall be verified by analysis of design and extrapolation of the onboard test system outputs during ground and in-flight tests (3.3.1.1).
 - B. <u>Isolation Certainty</u> Compliance with isolation certainty requirements shall be verified by analysis of design and extrapolation of the onboard test system outputs during ground and in-flight tests (3.3.1.2).
 - C. Availability Compliance with the availability requirement shall be verified by analysis of design (3.3.1.3).
 - D. <u>Reliability</u> Compliance with the reliability requirement shall be verified by analysis of design (3.3.1.4).
 - E. <u>Maintainability (Quantitative)</u> Compliance with the quantitative maintainability requirement shall be verified by analysis of design (3.3.1.5).
 - F. False Indication Rate Compliance with the false indication rate requirement shall be verified by analysis of design and extrapolation of the onboard test system outputs during ground and in-flight test (3.3.1.6).
 - G. <u>Automaticity</u> Compliance with the requirement for automaticity shall be verified by analysis of design (3.3.1.7).

- H. Radiation Silence Compliance with the requirement for radiation silence shall be verified by analysis of design (3.3.1.8).
- I. <u>Self-Test</u>. Compliance with the requirement that the onboard test system be capable of automatically performing self-test shall be verified by analysis of self-test control logic design and test data (3.3.1.9).
- J. <u>Fail Safe</u> Compliance with the requirement that the onboard test system cause no degradation of the operational performance of weapon system systems, subsystems, or equipment during onboard test system failure shall be verified by analysis of control and output logic design and test data (3.3.1.10).
- K. <u>Test Techniques</u>. Compliance with test technique requirements shall be verified by analysis of the onboard test system test requirements implementation design (3.3.1.12).
- 4.1.4.4 <u>Survivability/Vulnerability</u>. Compliance with the survivability/vulnerability requirements shall be verified by analysis as specified in (3.3.2.4).
- 4.1.4.5 <u>Maintainability (Qualitative)</u>. Compliance with the qualitative maintainability requirements shall be verified by analysis of maintenance engineering data and applicable test data (3.3.2.5).

4.1.5 <u>Tests</u>

4.1.5.1 Off-Aircraft. Acceptance testing shall be performed by the supplier(s) of the onboard test system (or portions thereof as applicable), prior to delivery to the prime contractor, to verify that the action or operation of the equipment is in compliance with specific quantitative requirements under specific conditions. Artificially induced signals, loads, operating modes, and environments may be utilized to simulate specified conditions (3.2.3.1, 3.2.3.2, 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.6, 3.3.1.9, 3.3.1.10, 3.3.1.11, 3.3.2.3, 3.4).

- 4.1.5.1.2 <u>Prequalification Tests</u>. The onboard test system shall be tested as a system to verify compliance with the requirement that it detect and display tested weapon system systems, subsystems, and equipment functional performance, and identify and fault isolate malfunctions in accordance with specification requirements in all modes of operation. The test shall be conducted on at least the major subsystem level for all tested weapon system subsystems. The test shall utilize a series of controlled Air Force approved simulated failures and artificially induced performance degradations and utilize system or subsystem hot mockups or system simulators. The test shall be performed on the complete set of onboard test system computer programs to the maximum extent possible (3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.6, 3.3.1.9, 3.3.1.10, 3.3.1.11).
- 4.1.5.2 On-Aircraft. The following tests are to be conducted on the onboard test system after installation in the weapon system.
- 4.1.5.2.1 Ground Tests. Tests shall be conducted to verify compliance with design requirements for the onboard test system ground modes of operation (3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.6, 3.3.1.9).
- 4.1.5.2.2 Flight Tests. Tests shall be conducted to verify compliance with design requirements for the onboard test system in-flight performance and fault isolation modes of operation for all performance envelopes of the weapon system. Natural, rather than induced, failures shall be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the in-flight detection and isolation modes. During flight test, ground and flight test instrumentation data shall be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the onboard test system in detecting out-of-tolerance conditions. Preflight and postflight operational checkouts of the weapon system systems, subsystems, and equipment shall be included to demonstrate failure isolation capabilities of the onboard test system. The tests shall demonstrate the ability of the onboard test system to determine the output weapon system status and isolate faults in accordance with Section 3 requirements (3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.6, 3.3.1.9).

TABLE I VERIFICATION CROSS REFERENCE

REQUIREMENT	REQUIREMENTS AND VERIFICATION		INFORMATION
PARAGRAPH	PARAGRAPH	TITLE	REFERENCE (TP/PS NO.)
3	N/A		
3.1	N/A		
3.2	N/A		
3.2.1	N/A		
3.2.2	N/A		
3.2.2.1	4.1.4.1	Interfaces	
3.2.2.2	4.1.4.1	Interfaces	
3.2.3	N/A		
3.2.3.1	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
3.2.3.2	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
3.2.4	4.1.4.1	Interfaces	
3.3	N/A		
3.3.1	N/A		
3.3.1.1	4.1.4.3	Performance	
	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
	4.1.5.2.1	Ground Tests	
	4.1.5.2.2	Flight Tests	
3.3.1.2	4.1.4.3	Performance	
	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
	4.1.5.2.1	Ground Tests	
7 7 1 6	4.1.5.2.2	Flight Tests	
3.3.1.3	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.1.4	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.1.5	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.1.6	4.1.4.3	Performance	
	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
	4.1.5.2.1	Ground Tests	
3.3.1.7	4.1.5.2.2	Flight Tests	
3.3.1.8	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.1.9	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.1.9	4.1.4.3	Performance	
	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
	4.1.5.2.1	Ground Tests	
	4.1.5.2.2	Flight Tests	

TABLE I VERIFICATION CROSS REFERENCE

	REQUIREMENTS AND VERIFICATION		INFORMATION
REQUI REMENT PARAGRAPH	PARAGRAPH	TITLE	REFERENCE (TP/PS NO.)
3.3.1.10	4.1.4.3	Performance	
	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
3.3.1.11	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	
	4.1.5.1.2	Pre-Qualification Tests	
3.3.1.12	4.1.4.3	Performance	
3.3.2	N/A		
3.3.2.1	N/A		
3.3.2.2	4.1.3.1	Volume	
3.3.2.3	4.1.4.2	Electrical Power Requirem	ments
	4.1.5.1.	Acceptance Tests	
3.3.2.4	4.1.4.4	Survivability/Vulnerabili	ity
3.3.2.5	4.1.4.5	Maintainability (Qualitat	ive)
3.4	4.1.5.1.1	Acceptance Tests	

APPENDIX B

PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION FORMAT FOR ONBOARD TEST SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

This appendix is an example of the type of onboard test system (OBTS) requirements that should be included in the procurement specification of the systems under test. Paragraph headings preceding the OBTS requirements are included to give greater visibility to the context of these requirements. The name of the system under test is to be inserted in the space coded "*".

- 1. SCOPE
- 2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
- 3. REQUIREMENTS
- 3.1 Item Definition
- 3.1.1 Item Diagrams
- 3.1.2 Interface Definition
- 3.1.2.1 Aircraft Subsystem Interface
- 3.1.2.1.1 Electrical Power Subsystem
- 3.1.2.1.2 Environmental Control Subsystem
- 3.1.2.1.3 Hydraulic Power Subsystem

3.1.2.1.4 Onboard Test System (OBTS) Interface			
The shall interface with the OBTS and provide test signals to the			
OBTS as necessary to satisfy the per	formance requirements of paragraph 3.2.1.4.		
3.1.2.1.4.1 Test Signal Interface R	equirements		
The test signals shall be condi	tioned, buffered, and scaled in accordance		
with the following interface require	ments:		
a. Analog (* Output to OBTS)			
(1) Vc tage	to plus or minus volts dc		
	(differential)		
(2) Impedance	megohm minimum (differential)		
	at the specified voltage		
(3) Frequency	DC to Hz		
(4) Accuracy	percent of full scale		
NOTE: All analog signals	transmitted to OBTS shall be scaled, con-		
ditioned, demodulat	ed, and/or converted to a dc analog volt-		
age by the*.			
b. Discrete (* Output to OBTS	<u>)</u>		
(1) Logic "1"	Plus volts dc plus or minus		
	volt		
(2) Logic "0"	volts dc plus or minus volt		
(3) Current capability	milliamperes current minimum at		
	plus volts		
c. Discrete (OBTS Input to the	*)		
(1) Logic "1"	Plus volts dc to plus volts		
	dc (differential)		
(2) Logic "0"	volts dc to plus or minus		
	volts dc (differential)		
(3) Impedance	ohms minimum (differential) for		
	sichem Jamin 11711 om Jamin 11011 immut		

d.	Digital Data (* Output to OBTS) **			
	(1)	Logic "1"	Plus volts dc plus or minus	
			volt	
	(2)	Dead time	Zero plus or minus volt	
	(3)	Logic "0"	volts dc plus or minus volt	
	(4)	Word length	bit word plus one parity bit	
	(5)	Impedance	ohms plus or minus percent	
	(6)	Rise and fall time	plus or minus nanoseconds	
	(7)	Code		
	(8)	Bit rate	plus or minus megabit per	
			second	
e.	Digit	al Address (OBTS Input	to the *) **	
	(1)	Logic "l"	Plus volts dc to volts dc	
	(2)	Dead time	Zero volts to plus volts	
	(3)	Logic "0"	volts dc to minus volts dc	
	(4)	Word length	bit word plus one parity bit	
	(5)	Impedance	ohms plus or minus percent	
	(6)	Rise and fall time	plus or minus nanoseconds	
	(7)	Code		
	(8)	Bit rate	plus or minus megabit per	
			second	
	**NOTE	: OBTS will send a	-bit address (bit word plus one	
		parity bit) to the	*. After the last bit of the address	
		word from OBTS has b	een received, the * shall begin trans-	
		mitting thebi	t data (bit word plus one parity	
		bit) to OBTS within	microseconds.	

3.1.2.1.4.2 OBTS Supplemental Signals

The selected signals listed in Table A shall be provided by the ____* for OBTS usage. These signals shall not duplicate signals required for compliance with paragraph 3.2.1.4. The signal interface with the OBTS shall conform to paragraphs 3.1.2.1.4.1, 3.4.1.1, and 3.4.1.3.

TABLE A

OBTS SUPPLEMENTAL SIGNALS

Item Signal Name Signal Type

A

B

C

3.2 Characteristics

3.2.1 Performance

3.2.1.1 Operating Modes

3.2.1.2 Accuracies

3.2.1.3 Operating Time

3.2.1.4 OBTS Requirements

The _* shall be capable of being tested by the OBTS in all modes of operation during flight or on the ground without being supplemented by TMDE.

The _* shall have provisions for verification of acceptable performance,

detection of failures, identification of affected functions, and isolation of failures to the LRU level. Failure shall be defined as any condition wherein the performance requirements of this specification are not fulfilled.

3.2.1.4.1 Performance Test

3.2.1.4.1.1 Flight Configuration Test

A continuous flight configuration test capability shall be provided for automatic real-time determination, by the OBTS, of __* performance in all modes of operation during aircraft start-up, taxi, flight, landing, and shut-down. The flight configuration test capability shall be designed for detection of failures and identification of affected modes and functions by the OBTS.

In no instance shall this test interrupt normal __* operation, cause movement of aircraft flight control surfaces, cause erroneous reading of cockpit indications, or cause any other uncommanded operation of aircraft systems. The flight configuration test capability shall provide to be determined (TBD) percent assurance of detecting __* failures, based on failure rate, and correctly indicating effects on performance. Refer to Appendix 1 for percent detection assurance calculation procedure. All __* failure modes affecting flight safety shall be detected.

3.2.1.4.1.2 Ground Operational Readiness Test

The operationally acceptable status of __* shall be verified by the OBTS while the aircraft is on the ground. This operator selected test shall verify the proper operation of all normal, and alternate, redundant, and standby modes of __* operation. Maximum use shall be made of test provisions and test logic established for the flight configuration tests, tests that simulate in-flight operating conditions, and tests that utilize OBTS stimuli to exercise redundant and flight critical __* modes. The ground operational test capability shall

provide TBD percent assurance of detecting * failures, based on failure rate.

Refer to Appendix 1 for percent detection assurance calculation procedure. All

* failure modes affecting flight safety shall be detected.

3.2.1.4.2 Fault Isolation Tests

The * shall provide the capability for the OBTS to isolate detected failures to the malfunctioning LRU with a TBD percent certainty. Refer to Appendix 1 for percent certainty calculation procedure.

The LRU isolation shall be accomplished by the flight configuration and ground operational readiness tests.

3.3 Design and Construction

3.4 Major Components Characteristics

3.4.1 OBTS Test Provisions

The OBTS test provisions of the __* shall include access to those indicating and/or operational signals which will be used by the OBTS for test data acquisition, test control, performance monitoring, and failure evaluation. The OBTS test provisions shall make maximum use of dynamic operational signals within the __* for performance monitoring and fault isolation and shall not employ hardware for exclusive use by the OBTS unless necessary to satisfy test requirements.

3.4.1.1 Fail-Safe Design

Failure of _* test provisions shall not cause failure or degradation of _* operational performance. An abnormal OBTS interface condition caused by interfacing OBTS equipment failure shall not cause failure or degradation of _* operational performance.

3.4.1.2 False Indications

The design of the __* test provisions shall be such that false indications are minimized. A false indication is defined as an indication by the OBTS of a failure of the __* when, in fact, no failure exists; or the absence of an indication by the OBTS of a detectable failure of the __* when the failure exists.

3.4.1.3 Test Provision Self-Test

The design of the <u>*</u> test provisions shall be such that TBD percent <u>*</u> test provision failure rate shall be detectable by the OBTS and shall be distinguishable from actual * failures.

4. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS

4.1 Verification Requirements

Verification methods that are applicable to preliminary qualification, formal qualification, and acceptance of the __* are identified in Table B. The methods are not listed in the sequence of performance.

4.1.1 Qualification

4.1.2 Acceptance

4.1.3 General Test Requirements

4.2 Verification Methods

Verification methods consist of inspection, analysis, demonstration, and test. (Refer to Section 6 for definitions.) For information purposes, a cross reference between Section 3 paragraphs and 4.2 subparagraphs is contained in 6.3

TABLE B
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Paragraph	Verification Method	Prequa1	Formal Qual	Acceptance
4.2.2.5	OBTS Analysis	X		
4.2.4.1.2.1	OBTS Interface and Performance Verification	X	Х	x
4.2.4.1.2.1.1	Interface Verification	x	x	X
4.2.4.1.2.1.2	Performance Verification	X		

4.2.1 <u>Inspections</u>

4.2.2 Analyses

Requirements to be verified by analysis including the following:

4.2.2.1 System Safety

4.2.2.2 Service Life

4.2.2.3 Reliability

4.2.2.4 Maintainability

4.2.2.5 OBTS

The following OBTS performance and design capabilities of the * shall be verified by analysis.

- A. Flight configuration test detection assurance.
- B. Ground operational readiness test detection assurance.
- C. Detection capability of failures affecting flight safety.
- D. LRU isolation certainty.
- E. Fail-safe design capability.
- F. Test provisions self-test capability.
- G. Interface compatibility
- H. Justification for selection of test signals, transducers, and sensors.

4.2.2.6 Survivability/Vulnerability

4.2.2.7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility

4.2.3 Demonstrations

4.2.4 <u>Tests</u>

Verification tests consist of performance and design verification tests and environmental tests.

4.2.4.1 Performance and Design Verification Tests

4.2.4.1.1 Performance Record Test

4.2.4.1.2 Subsystem Tests

Tests shall be conducted to demonstrate functional operation and performance of the complete subsystem. Input power and output load devices shall be used to simulate the comparable aircraft interfaces.

4.2.4.1.2.1 OBTS Interface and Performance Verification

Tests shall be conducted on the * to verify compliance with the OBTS requirements of paragraph 3. These tests shall include, but shall not be restricted to the following:

4.2.4.1.2.1.1 Interface Verification

The OBTS interface requirements shall be verified in all modes of ____* operation.

4.2.4.1.2.1.2 Performance Verification

Tests shall be conducted on the __* to verify the detection assurance, isolation certainty, fail-safe design, and test provision self-test capability of the OBTS test signals. These tests shall consist of simulating malfunction

conditions and verifying that the OBTS signals and defined logic produce the required performance. The number of malfunctions simulated shall include all safety-of-flight and mission critical __* failure modes plus a minimum of TBD percent of the remaining __* failure modes. Selection of all simulated malfunctions shall be subject to contractor approval.

- 5. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
- 6. NOTES
- 6.1 Definitions
- 6.2 Preferred Parts List
- 6.3 Verification Cross Reference

Table C identifies each requirement in Section 3 and correlates the Section 4 paragraphs that verify it.

TABLE C
VERIFICATION CROSS REFERENCE

Section 3	Section 4	Section 3	Section 4
3.1.2.1.4	4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1	3.4.1	4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1
3.1.2.1.4.1	4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1	3.4.1.1	4.2.4.1.2.1.2 4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1
3.1.2.1.4.2	4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1	3.4.1.2	4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2 4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1
3.2.1.4	4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2	3.4.1.3	4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2 4.2.1.1 4.2.2.5
3.2.1.4.1 3.2.1.4.1.1	N/A 4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2		4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2
3.2.1.4.1.2	4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2		
3.2.1.4.2	4.2.2.5 4.2.4.1.2.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.1 4.2.4.1.2.1.2		

APPENDIX 1

10. OBTS REQUIREMENTS CALCULATION PROCEDURE

10.1 Scope

This appendix describes the procedure for calculating the OBTS detection assurance and isolation certainty capability of the * as required by paragraph 3.2.1.4.

10.2 OBTS Requirements Calculation Procedures

The following procedures utilize the ___* FMEA data.

10.2.1 Percent Detection Assurance

The following method shall be used to calculate the percent detection assurance capability of the $\underline{\ }^*$:

Percent detection assurance = Total failure rate of detected failure modes

Total system failure rate

X 100%,

Where:

D = percent detection assurance

 λ_i = failure rate of ith failure mode (failures per million hours)

 $\lambda_d^{}$ = failure rate summation of all failure modes detected by the OBTS

 λ_{11} = failure rate summation of all failure modes undetected by the OBTS

 λ = failure rate summation of all failure modes, both detected and undetected

m = number of failure modes detected by the OBTS

n = total number of failure modes

10.2.2 Percent Isolation Certainty

The following method shall be used to calculate the percent isolation certainty capability of the $\underline{}$:

Percent isolation certainty = $\frac{\text{Creditable failure rate for LRU isolation}}{\text{Total failure rate of detected failure modes}} \times 100\%$,

$$I = \frac{\lambda_{I}}{\lambda_{d}} \times 100\% = \begin{array}{c} j=x \\ j=x \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ j=1 \end{array} \times \begin{array}{c} j=x \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ j=1 \end{array} \times \begin{array}{c} k=y \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ k=1 \end{array} \times \begin{array}{c} (\lambda_{IBjk})^{2} \\ k=y \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ k=y \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ k=y \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ k=y \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ k=1 \end{array} \times \begin{array}{c} 100\% \\ \Sigma \lambda \\ i \\ i=1 \end{array} \times \begin{array}{c} \lambda_{IBjk} \\ \Sigma \lambda_$$

Where:

I = percent isolation certainty

 $\lambda_{_{\mathrm{T}}}$ = creditable failure for LRU isolation

 λ_{d} = failure rate summation of all failure modes detected by the OBTS

 $\lambda_{\text{TR}_{\text{i}}}$ = creditable failure rate for jth isolation block

 $\lambda_{\mbox{IBjk}}$ = failure rate of the kth LRU which contributes to the failure rate of the jth isolation block

x = number of isolation blocks

y = number of LRU's involved in an isolation block

m = number of failure modes detected by the OBTS

Appendix C

STANDARD SIGNAL INTERFACE SPECIFICATION

This appendix contains an example of a standard signal interface specification as referenced in paragraph 3.2.1.1. (Note: Portions of this example may be superceded by MIL-STD-1553B and its Notice One.)

1. SCOPE

- 1.1 <u>Scope</u>. This specification establishes the interface requirements for transmitting, receiving, and formatting of applicable data signals provided by the air vehicle electrical, electronic, and military avionics components and subsystems.
- 1.2 <u>Classification</u>. The signal characteristics at the interfaces shall be of the following types:
 - a. Type I data signals are unique for party line digital data transmission equipment, data receiving equipment, and data format.

 A party line interface in the air vehicle is defined as one involving two-way digital transmission of data nonsimultaneously between subsystems or subsystem LRU's all under the direction of a controller. The controller may be a computer or a special-purpose control unit.
 - b. Type II. Type II data signals are unique for dedicated serial data transmission equipment, data receiving equipment, and data format. A dedicated serial digital interface in the air vehicle is defined as one involving one-way digital transmission of data between subsystems or subsystem LRU's.
 - c. Type III. Type III data signals consist of standard, discrete, do analog, and digital signals that will be used to interface with a Type I system or between subsystems or subsystem LRU's as required by the detail specification.

d. Type IV. Type IV signals consist of standard analog signals that will be used to interface between subsystems or between subsystem LRU's as required by the detail specification. (Type IV signals are not intended to be used to interface between Type I systems and other subsystems.)

2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

2.1 Applicability. The following documents of the exact issue shown form a part of this specification to the extent specified herein. In the event of conflict between the documents referenced below and the contents of this specification, the contents of this specification shall be considered a superseding requirement. In the event of conflict between this specification and the detail procurement specification, the detail procurement specification shall take precedence.

2.1.1 Government Documents.

SPECIFICATIONS

Military

MIL-C-7078B (1)

Cable, Electric, Aerospace Vehicle, General

5 December 1967

Specification for

STANDARDS

Military

MIL-STD-442B

Aerospace Telemetry Standards

1 December 1967


3. REQUIREMENTS

3.1 <u>Standardization</u>. Subsystem signal interfaces shall conform to the standardized requirements specified herein.

- 3.1.1 <u>Signal Polarity</u>. The standard signal circuits shall be protected from damage by input signal polarity reversal and shall not be damaged by short circuiting of the input and output terminations.
- 3.1.2 Data Form. Digital data shall be expressed in the following forms:
 - a. True binary form with negative binary numbers expressed in a two's complement form.
 - b. Binary-coded decimal.
 - c. Group of discrete bits formatted into a data word. Discrete bits may also be inserted in unused bit spaces of data words carrying other types of information. Unused bit positions shall be transmitted as a logic zero.
- 3.1.3 <u>Bit Priority</u>. The most significant bit shall be transmitted first with the less significant bits following in descending order of value. The number of bits required to define a quantity shall be consistent with the resolution or accuracy required. In the event double precision quantities (information accuracy or resolution requiring more than 20 bits) are transmitted, the most significant half shall be transmitted first, followed by the least significant half.
- 3.2 <u>Characteristics</u>. Unless otherwise indicated, the following requirements are applicable to both Type I and Type II signals.
- 3.2.1 Transmission Method.
- 3.2.1.1 <u>Pulse Code Modulation</u>. Data and synchronization information shall be transmitted using pulse code modulation (PCM).

- 3.2.1.2 <u>Data Code</u>. The data code shall be Manchester 11 (BiØ-L) as defined in MIL-STD-442. A logic "one" shall be transmitted as a dipolar coded signal 10 (i.e., a positive pulse followed by a negative pulse). A logic "zero" shall be bipolar coded signal 01 (i.e., a negative pulse followed by a positive pulse). See Figure 1.
- 3.2.1.3 <u>Data Rate</u>. The data bit rate shall be 1 megabit per second plus or minus 0.1 percent.
- 3.2.1.4 <u>Data Link Clock</u>. The data link clock shall be generated by the transmitting subsystem and used in the fabrication of the Manchester 11 code format. The receiving subsystem shall derive the clock from the Manchester 11 code format as received.
- 3.2.1.5 <u>Message</u>. The data may be in the form of a message. If a message format is used, the first word of each message shall be preceded by a message sync, and each subsequent word of the message shall be preceded by a word sync. The message format for Type I data signals shall be as specified in 3.2.1.12.1.

 The message format for Type II data signals shall be as specified in 3.2.1.12.3.
- 3.2.1.6 Message Sync. The message sync shall be a nonvalid Manchester code as shown in Figure 2. The positive and negative going pulses that form a message sync shall be 1.5 microseconds plus or minus 3 percent wide, respectively. A Manchester 11 01 code immediately preceding or following the message sync will increase the apparent width of the affected pulse by 0.5 microseconds plus or minus 10 percent.



NOTE B1 PHASE LEVEL (MANCHESTER 11)
"1" REPRESENTED BY 10
"0" REPRESENTED BY 01

FIGURE 1. DATA CODE

- 3.2.1.7 <u>Data Word Sync</u>. The data word sync shall be a nonvalid Manchester code as shown in Figure 3. The negative and positive going pulses that form a data word sync shall each be 1.5 microseconds plus or minus 3 percent wide, respectively. A Manchester 11 10 code immediately preceding or following the data word sync will increase the apparent width of the affected pulse by 0.5 microsecond plus or minus 10 percent.
- 3.2.1.8 <u>Word Size</u>. The word size shall be 21 bits plus sync as shown in Figure 4.
- 3.2.1.9 Word Format. The word format (bit definition) shall be specified in the detail specification.
- 3.2.1.10 Number of Words. The number of words in a message shall be as specified in the detail specification.
- 3.2.1.11 Parity Bit. Each word shall contain a parity bit. During transmission, the parity bit shall be assigned a value so the total number of "ones" in the word is odd. During reception, the parity shall be checked by determining whether or not the received word contains an odd number of "one".

3.2.1.12 Message Format.

3.2.1.12.1 Message Format, Type I. The Type I message format shall be as shown in Figure 4. The first word will be a command word followed by data words. The format of the command and data words (bit designation) shall be as specified in the detail specification.




Figure 2. Message Sync - Nonvalid Manchester Code




Figure 3. Word Sync - Nonvalid Manchester Code




Figure 4. Type I Message Format Two-Way Party Line

- 3.2.1.12.2 <u>Message Termination</u>, Type I. When an output circuit turns off (stops transmitting data) there shall be a 2.0-microsecond minimum dead time before any output circuit shall be permitted to turn on (start transmitting data).
- 3.2.1.12.3 Message Format, Type II. The Type II message format shall be as shown in Figure 5. The transmitting subsystem shall transmit message sync followed by data words on a continuous basis, one word after the other, in a fixed sequence, until all data words have been transmitted. The above sequence shall be repeated continuously.

3.2.2 Transmission Line.

- 3.2.2.1 <u>Cable</u>. The cable used to transfer messages will be a two-conductor, twisted, single-shielded, jacketed cable equivalent to a twin axial cable having 71 ohms plus or minus 10 percent impedance and a distributed capacitance no greater than 50 picofarads per foot.
- 3.2.2.2 <u>Cable Length</u>. The cable length may be up to 300 feet long excluding the length of cable stubs specified in 3.2.3.6.1 for Type I signals. The length of redundant cables carrying redundant data may vary in relationship to each other as much as plus or minus 25 percent to accommodate routing paths.
- 3.2.2.3 <u>Number of Cables</u>. The number of cables shall be as specified in the detail specification and shall be a function of the number of redundant transmitters and receivers required by the subsystem detail specification. A fault in a redundant cable shall not affect the ability of the alternate cable and associated output and input circuits to operate.




Figure 5. Type II Message P 'mat, Dedicated Serial Digital, Onc.Way

- 3.2.2.4 <u>Cable Shield Termination</u>. The cable shield shall be connected to air vehicle ground at all terminal connector breaks.
- 3.2.2.5 <u>Cable Termination</u>. The cables shall be transformer-coupled to all subsystems as specified in 3.2.3. Insulation resistance shall be no less than 2 megohms.

3.2.2.6 Number of Terminations.

- 3.2.2.6.1 <u>Number of Terminations, Type I</u>. For Type I signals, no more than 32 transmitter-receivers shall be coupled to the cable.
- 3.2.2.6.2 <u>Number of Terminations, Type II</u>. For Type II signals, one transmitter and no more than four receivers will be coupled to the cable.

3.2.3 Output-Input Circuits.

- 3.2.3.1 <u>Circuit Configuration</u>, Type I. The output-input circuits shall consist of a transmitter-receiver, coupling-transformer, and isolation resistors as configured in Figure 6. The isolation resistors may either be in the LRU or external to the LRU with an external transformer as specified in the detail specification.
- 3.2.3.2 <u>Circuit Configuration</u>, <u>Type II</u>. The output circuit shall consist of a transmitter and coupling-transformer. The input circuit shall consist of a receiver and coupling-transformer (see Figure 7).
- 3.2.3.3 Number of Output-Input Circuits (Redundancy). The number of output-input circuits in a subsystem shall be in accordance with the detail specification. There shall be one output-input circuit for each cable specified in the detail specification.




Figure 6. Type I Two-Way Party Line





Figure 7. Type II Dedicated Serial Digital


- 3.2.3.4 Fault Protection (Redundancy). The redundant output-input circuits shall be isolated from each other so that a single fault (short to ground, voltage, or open) shall not affect the ability of the alternate output-input circuits to transmit or receive data. The output-input circuits shall not be damaged by opens, shorts to ground, shorts to voltage sources of zero to plus or minus 50 volts peak, line-to-ground, or short to a voltage source of zero to plus or minus 50 volts peak, zero to 50-microsecond pulse, line-to-line.
- 3.2.3.5 Fault Isolation, Type I. An isolation resistor shall be provided with a value of 54 ohms plus or minus 5 percent in series with each output lead of the Type I signal output-input circuit coupling-transformer. The impedance reflected on the cable shall be no less than 103 ohms for any failure of the coupling-transformer or transmitter-receiver circuit.

3.2.3.6 Output Circuit Characteristics.

- 3.2.3.6.1 Ouput Circuit Power, Type I. The Type I signal output circuit shall be capable of driving the cable specified in 3.2.2.2 and no less than 31 output-input circuits, as specified herein, each attached to the cable by means of a cable stub not longer than 20 feet in length. The output circuits shall maintain the specified operation except for a 25 percent maximum reduction of the data link signal amplitude in the event that one of the 31 output-input circuits has a fault that causes it to reflect the fault impedance specified in 3.2.3.5. The signal output voltage on the cable shall be a nominal plus or minus 3.0 volts peak line-to-line.
- 3.2.3.6.2 Output Circuit Power, Type II. Type II signal output circuit shall be capable of driving the cable specified in 3.2.2.1 and no less than four Type II signal input circuits attached to the cable. The signal output voltage on the cable shall be nominal plus or minus 3.0 volts peak line-to-line.

- 3.2.3.6.3 Output Circuit Impedance, Type I. Not applicable.
- 3.2.3.6.4 Output Circuit Impedance, Type II. The Type II signal output circuit transmitting impedance shall be 71 ohms plus or minus 10 percent reflected on the cable.
- 3.2.3.6.5 Output Circuit Voltage, Type I. The Type I signal output circuit voltage shall be plus 2.7 to plus 3.6 volts and minus 2.7 to minus 3.6 volts peak line-to-line as measured when the isolation resistors specified in 3.2.3.5 are terminated into a 35.0-ohm plus or minus 1 percent resistor.
- 3.2.3.6.6 Output Circuit Voltage, Type II. The Type II signal output circuit voltage shall be plus 2.7 to plus 3.6 volts or minus 2.7 to minus 3.6 volts peak line-to-line reflected on the cable.
- 3.2.3.6.7 Output Waveform. The output circuit waveforms shall be bipolar pulses. The width of the pulses shall be as shown in Figure 1, 2, and 3 when measured at the zero crossover. The rise and fall shall be 150 plus or minus 50 nanoseconds when measured at 10 percent and 90 percent of the nominal minus 3- and plus 3-volt limits. In the case of redundant output circuits that transmit concurrently, data time differential between identical data bits being transferred on the individual cables shall be no greater than 0.1 microsecond. This delay time shall be measured at the 50 percent point of the applicable bit rise and fall time transition.
- 3.2.3.6.8 Output Waveform Distortion. Any distortion of the waveform by the output circuit including (but not limited to) overshoot, ringing, foldover, or zero crossover distortion shall not exceed 300 millivolts peak-to-peak, line-to-line.





- 3.2.3.6.9 <u>Transmitter Output Noise (Off State)</u>. Any transmitter output noise when in the off state shall be no greater than 50 millivolts peak-to-peak, line-to-line.
- 3.2.3.6.10 <u>Transmitter Off Impedance</u>. When not transmitting or when power is removed, the transmitter impedance shall be no less than 6,800 ohms line-to-line when measured with plus or minus 6 volts peak, line-to-line applied to the output circuit terminations.

3.2.3.7 Input Circuit Characteristics.

- 3.2.3.7.1 <u>Input Circuit Compatibility</u>. The input circuit shall be compatible with the incoming signals specified herein and shall accept waveforms varying from a square wave to a sine wave.
- 3.2.3.7.2 <u>Input Circuit Noise Rejection</u>. The receiver shall detect data and sync signals specified herein that have a signal-to-noise ratio (S+N/N) RMS of plus 14 db with a probability of bit error of better than one part in 10⁷ prior to the data validation checks (3.2.3.8). The signal-to-noise ratio shall be determined with 1.5 volt peak, line-to-line sync and data signals in a message form as specified herein and white gaussian noise distributed over the band of 1,000 Hz to 4.0 MHz. The input circuit shall reject all noise up to plus or minus 6 volts peak, line-to-line, below 1,000 Hz and above 4.0 MHz.
- 3.2.3.7.3 <u>Input Circuit Common Mode Rejection</u>. Signals from dc to 2.0 MHz with amplitudes up to plus or minus 50 volts peak, line-to-ground, applied to both the input circuit terminals that are connected together shall not cause the receiver to operate (i.e., the signal received by the receiver shall be below the threshold specified in 3.2.3.7.4).

- 3.2.3.7.4 Receiver Input Sensitivity. The receiver shall respond with an input signal amplitude from plus or minus 4.0 volts peak, line-to-line, down to a threshold level of plus or minus 0.6 volt peak, line-to-line. The receiver shall not respond to input signals of 0.0 to plus or minus 0.45 volt peak, line-to-line, the receiver shall operate as specified in 3.2.3.7.2 with input signal levels of plus or minus 4.0 volts peak, line-to-line, down to plus or minus 1.5 volts peak plus or minus 10 percent, line-to-line.
- 3.2.3.7.5 <u>Input Circuit Input Impedance</u>. Input circuit operating input impedance including the effect of the transmitter shall be no less than 6,800 ohms line-to-line.
- 3.2.3.7.6 <u>Input Circuit Off Impedance</u>. The input circuit off impedance (power removed), including the effect of the transmitter, shall be no less than 6,800 ohms line-to-line, with plus or minus 6 volts peak, line-to-line, applied to the input terminals.
- 3.2.3.8 <u>Data Validation</u>. Logic shall be provided in the receiving subsystem to recognize improperly coded signals, data dropouts, or excessively noisy signals. Each word shall conform to the following minimum validating criteria:
 - a. The word begins with a valid sync field.
 - b. The bits are in a valid Manchester 11 code.
 - c. The word has 20 bits plus parity.
 - d. The word parity is odd.

Where a word fails to conform to the preceding criteria, the word shall be considered invalid and shall not be used by the receiving subsystem. Where an invalid word sync occurs, the receiving subsystem shall reset and wait for a new valid message sync.

3.2.4 Type III Signals - Discrete, Analog, and Digital.

- 3.2.4.1 <u>Transmission Lines</u>. The discrete, analog, and digital signals will be input and output via two-conductor, twisted, shielded, jacketed cables conforming to MIL-C-7078, or equivalent. The designation is (TBD).
- 3.2.4.2 <u>Discrete Signals</u>. The characteristics of discrete signals shall be in accordance with the following subparagraphs.
- 3.2.4.2.1 <u>Electrical Characteristics</u>. The electrical characteristics of discrete signals shall be as follows:

Signal Parameter a. Digital "one" state (true) b. Digital "zero" state (false) c. Rise time* Characteristics Plus 5 plus or minus 1.0 volts Zero plus or minus 0.5 volts 1.0 to 20.0 microseconds 1.0 to 20.0 microseconds

*NOTE: The rise and fall time shall be measured between 10 percent and 90 percent of nominal zero and plus 5-volt limits driving a resistive load of 1K plus or minus 5 percent paralleled with 5,000 picofarads plus or minus 10 percent.

- 3.2.4.2.2 Discrete Signal Output Circuit.
- 3.2.4.2.2.1 Single Ended. Discrete outputs shall last for periods greater than 5 milliseconds. The output circuit shall be capable of ing 5 milliamperes current minimum at plus 4.0 volts, minimum. The output circuit shall be capable of driving no less than 50 feet of single-conductor cable having a distributed capacitance of 100 picofarads per foot with no less than four input circuits on the line, each drawing 1.25 milliamperes, maximum. The output circuit shall be capable of sinking 10 milliamperes of current in the digital "zero" state at plus 0.5 volt, maximum. Discrete outputs shall be single-ended unless otherwise specified by the detail specification.

- 3.2.4.2.2.2 <u>Double Ended.</u> Differential output circuits shall be provided meeting the applicable requirements of 3.2.4.2.2.1 (except that current sinking capability (false state) shall be no less than 2.5 milliamperes at 0.5 volt) where the responsive time delay due to line capacitance and input filtering is unacceptable and therefore a differential circuit is required by the detail specification. The differential output circuits shall provide no less than 100K ohms isolation between the input logic return and the outputs.
- 3.2.4.2.2.3 <u>Power-Off Impedance</u>. When de-energized, the dc impedance of the output circuit shall be no less than 10K ohms with plus 2 volts applied.
- 3.2.4.2.2.4 <u>Signal Ground</u>. Signal ground (return) shall be provided in accordance with 3.2.4.2.4.

3.2.4.2.3 Discrete Signal Input Circuit.

3.2.4.2.3.1 Single Ended. Input circuits shall be compatible with the incoming signal characteristics. Differential receiver circuits shall be used to detect discretes properly with a plus or minus 1.5-volt signal ground difference. The receiver shall interpret an input of plus 2.0 volts or less difference with respect to its return line as a digital "zero" (false) and an input greater than plus 2.5 volts as a digital "one" (true). Noise suppression or filtering shall be employed for all lines driven by single-ended output circuits. Rise and fall times resulting from the use of noise suppression or filtering circuits shall be no greater than 2 milliseconds. The input circuits shall draw a maximum of plus or minus 1.25 milliampere in the digital "one" state and supply a maximum current of 2.5 milliamperes to the external drivers in the digital "zero" state. All discrete input circuits shall provide overvoltage protection of at least plus or minus 10 volts peak. The differential receiver shall provide no less than 100K ohms isolation between

its input signal return and its output logic return. The receiver shall interpret an open line or the driver power-off impedance specified in 3.2.4.2.3.3 as a digital "zero".

- 3.2.4.2.3.2 <u>Double Ended.</u> Differential input circuits required to receive double-ended signals shall meet the applicable requirements specified in 3.2.4.2.3.1 except that no noise suppression or filtering devices shall be employed unless otherwise specified by the detail specification. Input circuits shall provide a maximum of 80 db common mode rejection for levels of at least plus or minus 10 volts peak from dc to 1,000 Hz. The receiver shall interpret an open line or the driver power-off impedance specified in 3.2.4.2.3.3 as a digital "zero".
- 3.2.4.2.4 <u>Discrete Signal Return Lines</u>. Each discrete signal shall have a return line, except a maximum of 10 single-ended discretes to a single external LRU may use a single return. Multiple discretes to several LRU's, however, shall have a minimum of one return line from each LRU.
- 3.2.4.3 <u>DC Analog Signals</u>. The characteristics of dc analog signals shall be in accordance with the following subparagraphs.
- 3.2.4.3.1 <u>Electrical Characteristics</u>. The electrical characteristics of the dc analog signal shall be as follows:

Si	gnal Parameter	<u>Characteristics</u>
a.	Scaling	As specified in detail specification
ъ.	Linearity	As specified in detail specification
c.	Accuracy	As specified in detail specification
d.	Output voltage	Zero to plus or minus 5 volts or zero
		to plus 5 volts as specified in detail
		specification

- 3.2.4.3.1.1 <u>Transfer</u>. The output-input circuits shall be capable of transferring a dc to 10 Hz analog signal with an accuracy as specified in the detail specification over the cable specified in 3.2.4.1.
- 3.2.4.3.1.2 <u>Malfunction</u>. The output-input circuits shall not be damaged by, or malfunction when subjected to, the following:
 - a. Voltage of plus or minus 10 volts peak, line-to-ground
 - b. Opens
 - c. Shorts to ground
- 3.2.4.3.2 DC Analog Signal Output Circuit. The output circuit shall be single-ended or differential as specified in the detail specification and shall exhibit a maximum output impedance of 200 ohms. The noise output of the output circuit shall be no greater than 1 millivolt RMS. The output circuit shall be capable of supplying 4 milliamperes minimum at plus 5 volts nominal. The output circuit shall be capable of sinking 4 milliamperes minimum at minus 5 volts. The output circuit shall be capable of driving no less than 50 feet of two-conductor cable with a distributed capacitance of 100 picofarads per foot with no less than four input circuits on the line, each drawing 1 milliampere maximum.
- 3.2.4.3.3 DC Analog Signal Input Circuit. The input circuit shall be compatible with the incoming signal characteristics specified herein. The input circuit shall be a differential receiver capable of accepting the analog signal from the output circuit specified in 3.2.4.3.2. The input settling time shall be no greater than 1 millisecond to within the accuracy required by the detail specification. The input circuits overload recovery time shall be no greater than 1 millisecond. An open circuit shall cause the input circuit to output a voltage that represents the off-state of the parameter represented. The input circuit common mode rejection shall be 60 db from dc to 1,000 Hz

at plus or minus 10 volts minimum. The differential receiver shall provide no less than 100K ohms isolation between its input signal return and its output logic return.

- 3.2.4.4 <u>Digital Signal Interface</u>. The characteristics of serial digital signals shall be in accordance with the following subparagraphs.
- 3.2.4.4.1 <u>Data Code</u>. The data code shall be bipolar return-to-zero (RZ) self-clocking pulse code modulation. A logic "one" shall be transmitted as a positive pulse 1/2-bit in time length followed by a dead-time (zero volts) 1/2-bit time in length. A logic "zero" shall be a negative pulse 1/2-bit time in length followed by a dead-time 1/2-bit time in length (see Figure 8).
- 3.2.4.4.2 Word Formats. Digital data transactions shall utilize two types of word formats. The two types shall be designated as an address word and a data word. An address word shall be used to specify data to be transmitted; a data word shall be used to transmit the requested data.
- 3.2.4.4.2.1 Address Word Format. An address word shall consist of 9 bits. The first 8 bits are available for use as a data address; the ninth bit shall be a parity bit. The number of bits used (up to 8) for a specific data address shall be as specified in the interfacing subsystem detail specification. See Figure 8 for address word example.
- 3.2.4.4.2.2 <u>Data Word Format</u>. A data word shall consist of 17 bits. The first 16 bits are available for use to transmit data, the 17th bit shall be a parity bit. The number of data bits utilized (up to 16) for a specific data response shall be specified in the interfacing subsystem detail specification. See Figure 8 for data word example.

BI-POLAR RZ (SELF-CLOCKING)




Figure 8. Serial Digital Output/Input signals

- 3.2.4.4.2.3 Parity. The parity for both the address word and the data word shall be odd parity. The parity bit for both words, bit 9 and bit 17 respectively, shall be set to a logic "one" or "zero" such that the number of logic "ones" for the entire word, including the parity bit, shall be odd.
- 3.2.4.4.3 <u>Data Rate</u>. The data bit rate for both address and data words shall be 1 megabit per second plus or minus 10 percent.
- 3.2.4.4.4 <u>Cable</u>. The cable used to transfer serial digital signals shall be two conductor twisted, single shield, jacketed cable equivalent to a twin axial cable having 71 ohms plus or minus 10 percent impedance and a distributed capacitance no greater than 50 picofarads per foot. There shall be one cable dedicated to the transmission of address words and another dedicated to the transmission of data words.
- 3.2.4.4.5 <u>Input/Output Circuit Characteristics</u>. The serial digital input and output circuit characteristics shall conform to the requirements specified in 3.2.4.4.5.1 and 3.2.4.4.5.2.
- 3.2.4.4.5.1 Output Circuit Characteristics. The output circuit shall conform to the following characteristics:

a. Type

Differential and balanced output.

b. Output voltage

Peak line-to-line.

Logic "1" shall be 5 plus or minus 1.0 volts. Dead time shall be 0 plus or minus 0.5 volts. Logic "0" shall be minus 5 plus or minus 1.0 volts.

c. Common mode output voltage

The common mode output voltage (measured from each line to the signal common) of the output circuit shall be no greater than plus or minus 0.5 volt peak.

d. Output drive capability

The output circuit shall be capable of driving no less than six serial digital input circuits, as specified below, connected by no less than 50 feet of two-conductor, twisted, single-shielded, jacketed cable equivalent to a twin axial cable having 71 plus or minus ten percent ohms impedance and a distributed capitance no greater than 50 picofarads per foot. The cable will be terminated in its characteristics impedance (see Figure 9).

e. Rise and fall time

150 plus or minus 50 nanoseconds measured line-to-line at 10 percent and 90 percent of the nominal zero to plus 5-volt and zero to minus 5-volt limits when driving a resistive load of 71 plus or minus 10 percent parallel with 2,500 picofarads plus or minus 10 percent. The output circuit shall not be damaged when subjected to shorts to ground or a voltage of plus or minus 10 volts dc or ac peak-to-peak, line-to-ground.

f. Short protection

3.2.4.4.5.2 <u>Input Circuit Characteristics</u>. The input circuit shall conform to the following characteristics:

a. Type

b. Input voltage

Differential input.

Plus 2.5 to plus 6.0 volts peak line-to-line shall represent a logic "1".
0.0 to plus or minus 2.0 volts shall represent dead time.




Figure 9. Type III, Serial Digital

c. Overvoltage protection

Minus 2.5 to minus 6.0 volts peak lineto-line shall represent a logic "0" Plus or minus 30 volts common mode (dc or ac peak-to-peak).

Plus or minus 10 volts differential (dc or ac peak-to-peak).

d. Input impedance

4K minimum or 71 ohms plus or minus 10 percent line-to-line as specified in detail specification.

Common mode to logic return: 10K minimum.

With power off, input circuit failure or the overvoltage input (common mode) defined above the impedance shall be 20K minimum.

e. Input circuit compatibility

The input circuit(s) shall accept the signals from the serial digital output circuit connected by the cable as specified in output drive capability (3.2.4.4.5.1, item "d").

f. Common mode rejection

A common mode voltage of plus or minus 10 volts dc to 1.0 MHz shall not cause a logic "1" or logic "0" to be misinterpreted.

g. Frequency

1 megabit per second.

Noise filtering for pulses less than 100 nanoseconds wide shall be provided.

3.2.5 Type IV Signals - Analog.

3.2.5.1 <u>DC Analog Signal</u>. The electrical characteristics of the dc analog and associated input and output circuits shall conform to the requirements specified in 3.2.5.1.1 through 3.2.5.1.3.

3.2.5.1.1 Output-Input Circuit. The output-input circuit shall conform to the following general requirements:

a. Scaling

Plus or minus 10 volts, plus 10 volts peak line-to-line shall be equivalent to maximum state the parameter may normally attain. The minus value shall be as specified in the detail specification.

b. Accuracy

c. Linearity error

d. Bandwidth

e. Malfunction

As specified in the detail specification.

As specified in the detail specification.

As specified in the detail specification.

The output-input circuits shall not be

damaged by open circuit or shorts to

28 volts, dc or ac or ground.

3.2.5.1.2 Output Circuit Characteristics. The output circuit shall conform to the following characteristics:

a. Type

1

Differential and balanced output.

b. Output voltage

0.0 to plus or minus 10 volts peak

line-to-line (differential).

c. Common mode output voltage

0.5 volts peak maximum dc to 1,000 Hz.

d. Output impedance

100 ohms maximum.

e. Output drive capability

The output circuit shall be capable of driving the input circuit specified below connected by no less than 50 feet of two-conductor, twisted, single-shield jacketed cable with a distribution capacitance of no greater than 50 picofarads per foot.

3.2.5.1.3 <u>Input Circuit Characteristics</u>. The input circuit shall conform to the following characteristics:

a.	Туре	Differential and balance input.
b.	Input circuit	The input circuit shall be compatible
	compatibility	with the output circuit signal.
c.	Input voltage	0.0 to plus or minus 10 volts peak
		line-to-line (differential).
d.	Input impedance	100K ohm minimum.
e.	Common mode rejection	60 db dc to 1,000 Hz for levels of
		at least 20 volts peak.
f.	Overload recover time	1 millisecond maximum.
g.	Power off and input circuit	20K ohms minimum with input voltage
	failure's input impedance	of 0.0 to plus or minus 10 volts.
h.	Balance	The inputs's impedance shall be bal-
		anced to ground to within 2 percent.
i.	Isolation	100K ohms minimum between input signal
		lines and the receiver output circuit
		return.

3.2.6 Environmental Conditions. The data transmission and receiving equipment shall provide the specific performance specified herein over the service life and environmental conditions specified in the detail specification.

4. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS

- 4.1 <u>Tests</u>. The data transmission and receiving equipment shall be subjected to verifications to determine compliance with the requirements specified in Section 3 over the service life and environments specified in the detail specification. The tests shall be an integral part of the verification tests required by the detail specification.
- 5. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY. No applicable.
- 6. NOTES. Not applicable.

APPENDIX D

B-1 CITS TEST IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARY

It is desirable that all systems within an aircraft/weapon system be tested with some level of onboard test. The onboard test system provides two primary functions:

- 1. To monitor the "general well being" of the systems under test and inform the operator of any malfunctions.
- 2. To fault isolate the failure to the LRU level.

Onboard test systems perform these functions of fault detection and isolation by implementing test algorithms which utilize the techniques of:

- 1. End-to-end testing.
 - A. Command to response.
- 2. Limit testing.
 - A. Test parameter to fixed limit.
 - 1. Pressure high or low.
 - 2. Temperature high or low.
 - 3. Flow rate high or low.
 - 4. Speed over or under.
 - 5. Voltage over or under.
 - 6. Frequency over or under.
 - 7. Current over.
 - B. Test parameter to calculated limit.
 - 1. Pressure high or low.
 - 2. Speed over or under.
 - 3. Temperature high or low.
- 3. Comparison testing.
 - A. Input to output.
 - B. Parameter to parameter.
 - C. Parameter to average.

- D. Channel to channel.
- E. Bit status to pattern recognition.

An onboard test system utilizes these test techniques, in various combinations, to logically determine the status of each aircraft system tested. When an out of tolerance condition is detected, the test system expands these techniques to isolate the failure to the failed line replaceable unit(s).

The B-1 CITS onboard test system implementation was based on these basic testing techniques. Tests mechanized in the B-1 CITS onboard test system are provided as examples of the types of tests implemented, the effectiveness of the tests, the problems experienced and additional tests recommended. These tests are shown as: good (G), satifactory (S), poor (P), and recommended (R) and are provided in Tables I through X.

TABLE I

B-1 CITS Tests for Electrical Power, Electrical Multiplex, and Proximity Switch Subsystems

TESTS		ENI	-то	-ENI)		LIMI	T				α)MPA	RISC	N		
SUBSYSTEMS	Forced Switching (GRT)	PROM Compare (GRT)	Confidence Test (GRT)	Proximity Switches (GRT)	Protective Function Time Delay (GRT)	Generator Control System	Transformer/Rectifier	Battery/Charger	Emergency Generator	Remote Box	Control Box	CITS Interface Box	Bus Tie and Load Contactors	Input Buffer	CITS Interface Box Memory	Overfrequency/Open Phase Trip	Generator Pre-Power
Electrical Power Generating System			S6		R	P3	G	P4	G				S5			R	R
Electrical Multiplex	G	G							ì	S1	G	S2		R	R		
Proximity Switches				S													

NOTES: 1. Basic test is good but input buffer failures cannot be readily detected or isolated.

- 2. Although CI memory failures seldom occur, these failures cannot be readily detected or isolated.
- 3. Only 3 of 5 protective functions which result in generator trips are available. Also, present test mechanization does not provide for any charge pressure, PMG, or circuit breaker checks until a generator line contactor is initially closed.
- 4. Battery/charger failures require a one hour time delay before failure is flagged.
- 5. Erroneous bus tie failures are indicated due to the addition of cockpit over-ride switches.
- 6. Individual protective function time delays and status are not checked.

TABLE II

B-1 CITS Tests for Steering and Damping, Landing Gear, and Braking and Anti-Skid Subsystems

	Wheel Velocity			S
	Brake Temperature			S
	Metering Valve			P2
	Anti-Skid Control Box Status			S
	Hydraulic SCDU Brake Channel			P2
Z	Landing Gear Timing		P1	
COMPARISON	Rate Failure	S		
AMD.	Railure Status	S		
Ö	Hydraulic Pressure Switch	9		
	Solenoid Valve Status	S		
	E-H Valve Open/Short	S		
	Control Box Power Fail	9		
	Command/Follow-Up Transducer	S		
	Brake Temp Sensor Open/Short			5
11	Metering Valve Transducer			9
LIMIT	Parking Brake			9
	F-H Valve Amplifier	5		
	Power Controller Sequencing		R	
ш	Oplock/Downlock Switch		~	
	Hydraulic Stimulus			9
TESTS	(E = End-to-End) SUBSYSTEMS	Steering and Damping	Landing Gear	Braking and Anti-Skid

Detects only gross failures and provides no fault isolation. Hardware deficiency - noise susceptibility. NOTES:

D-4

TABLE III
B-1 CITS Tests for Propulsion System

	1	_						n sy		_						7		
TESTS		:ND	TO-	END 1	EST	<u>s</u>		└	COM	PAR	<u>150</u>	N.	TE:	<u>ST</u>	<u>S_</u>	4		
SUBSYSTEMS	Augmentor and Nozzle Control	Inlet Guide Vane Control	Normal Mode Test	Autothrottle Mode Test	Alternate Mode Test	Anti-Ice Valve Check	Ramp/Throat/Bypass	Left to Right EMUX	Checksum	Controller A/D	To Dische Theoret	in-riight iniust						
Engines	S2	G	+	+	\vdash		†		T	1	1	s	Г	†		1		
Engine Instruments		L	I					S5			土			I	_	1		
Engine Thrust Control		Γ	S1	S1	S1						Ι			\perp]		
Engine Anti-Ice		T		1		G	Î			Γ	Т			T		1		
Air Induction		T	T				P3		P6	S	T			T		1		
TESTS						LIM	— ПТ 1	TEST	s									
SUBSYSTEMS	Start Cycle	Lube Oil Level	Lube Oil Temperature	Fan Overspeed Turbine Blade Temperature	Engine Vibration	Augmentor Lite-Off Engine Stability		Torque Motor Current		ADG Start Initiate	Engine Motoring	Intel Pressure Sensor	Controller Power Supply	Moveable Lip	Rapid Power Loss	10% Active Test	90% Active Test	Discrete Active Test
SUBSYSTEMS Engines	↓	-	D Lube Oil Temperature	D Fan Overspeed Control of Temperature	+		Ground Thrust	Torque Motor Current Signal Integrity	Output Frequency	ADG Start Initiate	Engine Motoring	Omtanilar Dans Samily	Concroller Power Supply	Moveable Lip	ഗ Rapid Power Loss		90% Active Test	Discrete Active Test
SUBSYSTEMS Engines Engine Instruments	₩	-	-	₩		Augmentor Lite-Off Engine Stability	Ground Thrust	Torque Motor Current Signal Integrity	Output Frequency	ADG Start Initiate	1	1	1		_	Ω 10% Active Test	П	ධ Discrete Active Test
SUBSYSTEMS Engines Engine Instruments Air Induction	₩	-	-	₩		Augmentor Lite-Off Engine Stability	Ground Thrust	Torque Motor Current Signal Integrity	Output Frequency	ADG Start Initiate	S Engine Motoring	1	Committee Fower Supply		_		П	Discrete Active
SUBSYSTEMS Engines Engine Instruments	₩	-	-	₩		Augmentor Lite-Off Engine Stability	Ground Thrust	Torque Motor Current Signal Integrity	Output Frequency	ADG Start Initiate	s	1	1		_		П	Discrete Active

NOTES: 1. Specific operating limits were difficult to determine until actual flight test data was obtained.

- 2. Determination of proper test preconditions is critical.
- 3. Controller software problem unresolved test discontinued.
- 4. Timing of events was determined from flight test data.
- 5. A time delay was added to mask an uncorrectable characteristic of all data from one side of the EIS SCDU, going to zero for one second, then back to normal.
- 6. Did not function properly because the changing rate of the two checksum values was not compatible with the available sampling rates of the CITS.

D-S

TABLE IV B-1 CITS Tests for Bleed Air, ECS, Fire Protection, and Crew Escape Systems

TESTS			LI	MIT	TES	TS			(C)	(E)
(C = Comparison Test, E = End-to End Test) SUBSYSTEMS	Trip Level	Pressure	Temperature	Position	Drive Command	Speed	Delta Pressure	Altitude	Controller Validity	Self-Test
Bleed Air Leak Detection	G		G							G
Bleed Air Distribution and Pressurization		G1	G3	G	G5	G6				
ECS Air Conditioning and Pressurization		G2	G	G4	G		57		G	G
Fire Detection	G		G8							
Fire Extinguishing		G								
Crew Escape and Safety		G						G	G	

- NOTES: 1. Discrete pressure switches become contaminated resulting in shift in pressure trip points, producing false indications.
 - 2. Discrete pressure switch setpoints were improperly selected.
 - 3. Discrete temperature switch setpoints were improperly selected and response rate was slower than analog sensors.
 - 4. Proximity switch adjustment/alignment, rigging, and scoop flexing caused proximity switches to move out of target range, resulting in improper position indications.
 - 5. Discrete drive command was difficult to set in order to determine drive/no-drive status of bleed air temperature control valve.
 - 6. Discrete RPM sensor setpoint for bleed air precooler blower is difficult to set and change.
 - 7. Delta pressure sensor for ECS filter analog signal range from +5V to -5V with zero volts being a go condition. Failure at zero volts cannot be detected.
 - 8. Signal stability problems due to improper or poor termination of ground return wire at connectors. Problem corrected with improve I manufacturing procedures.

 $\label{eq:TABLE V} $$ $$ B-1 CITS Tests for Fuel System$

TESTS			(OMP.	ARIS	ON 1	EST	S	_		L	IMIT	TES	STS	(E)	
(E = End-to-End Tests) SUBSYSTEMS	Intermediate Device Status	Discrete Input Data/ID Memory	Analog Input Data Validity	CG Thumbwheel Comparison	Operating Weight Thumbwheel	Thruput Self-Test	Fuel Quantity Comparison	CG Comparison	Redundant Power Supply	ID Cross-Comparison (Packed Word)	Tank Unit Dissipation 200/500 Percent	Compensation Dissipation 200/500 Percent	Tank Unit	Compensator Unit	Fuel Pumps	Fuel Valves	Fuel Flow
Cester-of-Gravity Management	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G			
Fuel Transfer															P2	G	Р3

NOTES: 1. Stimulus input circuitry in Interface Device (ID) was very sensitive.

Minor noise on the aircraft wiring would trigger ID self-test. Modification to ID input circuitry identified to correct problem.

2. Pump pressure switches indicate pressure when pump was 'OFF' and no pressure when pump was 'ON' with a high fuel rate. Recommend RPM sensor be implemented to determine pump running.

3. Fuel flow test required many preconditions to determine flow/no-flow condition. This in conjunction with pressure switch problem above combine to make this test ineffective.

TABLE VI

B-1 CITS Tests for Spoilers and Automatic Flight Control (AFCS) Subsystems

<u>_</u>	Monitor	IJ	
LIMIT	ЯНТ		S
	Parity	ပ	9
	Clutch Control	ŋ	
	Actuator Control	ပ	
Z	Hydraulic Power	9	
COMPARISON	Validity	ຽ	9
MPA	Command	Ъ	
8	Position Transducer	9	
	Excitation	ົວ	
	Monitor		9
	Validity		5
	Stimulus Lockout		S
	TFR Modes		S
	9boM mirT		S
EN EN	Desd Band	S	
END-TO-END	Surface Rate/Symmetry	S	
END	Actuator Rate	Э	
	Switch to Surface Posn	С	
	Pre-Test Status	S	
	ebaM.	9	S
TESTS	SURSYSTERS	Spoilers	AFCS

TABLE VII

B-1 CITS Tests for Pitch, Roll, and Yaw Stability Control and Augmentation Subsystem (SCAS)

	Shutoff Valve	9	g	9
COMPARISON	Position Transducer	S	S	S
PARI	Cyro Transducer	S	S	S
8	Interface Circuit	S	S	S
	Accelerometer	S		S
	Balancer Limit	S	S	S
	Surface Actuator		G	
	Monitor Circuit	G	G	G
LIMIT	Stimulus Circuit	9	Э	9
17	Parity/CITS Interface	C	G	9
	Power Supply	G	G	G
	Pressure Limit	S	S	S
	Balancer Rate	ົວ	g	9
	Servo Seal Leakage	9	G	9
8	Servo Actuator to Mechanical Linkage	G	G	G
END-TO-END	Stick Mechanical Linkage	S	S	S
2	Cyro to Actuator	S	S	S
	Mode Failure	9	9	9
TESTS	SUBSYSTEMS	Pitch SCAS	Roll SCAS	Yaw SCAS

Test mechanization was essentially satisfactory to good, however two common problems were experienced. NOTES:

1. The accuracy of the analog multiplex circuitry in the SCAS controllers was inadequate.

 Analog multiplexing on signals being compared was marginal due to time required to access.

TABLE VIII

					-
		Disengage Centering		Ж	
	{	Control Loop		В	
Ŋ	{	Underwing Fairing Actuation			R
stem		Alternate Mode Actuation			~
bsys	S	Flap Interlock			G
Su.	COMPARISON	Control and Drive Motor			S4
мее	ON P	Surface Position Indicator			P3
ingsi	°	In-Flight Passive		P2	
id Wi	Ì	Brake Status	S		
æ.	İ	Surface Rate Transducer	S		
tro1		Synchro Tracking	S	1	
Cont		Motor Drain Pressure			S4
ge	f	Transducer Excitation Power Supply			G
1 MK	⊢	Surface Position Measuring System			S
tura	LIMIT	Asymmetry	S		
ırıc		Rudder Limiter	S		
S.		Controller Monitor	9	R	
Slat		Acceleromter Torquing (GRT)		R	
ap/	Ε	Pressure Monitor Test (GKT)		2	
r Fl		Monitor Trip Test (GRT)	0	P1	
B-1 CITS Tests for Flap/Slat, Structural Mode Control, and Wingsweep Subsystems	TESTS	(E = End-to-end) SUBSYSTEMS	Flap/Slat	Structural Mode Control	Wingsweep

control loop operation, and disengage centering are not presently mechanized due to memory limit. Pressure monitors are not tested due to a controller design deficiency. Acceleromter torquing, NOTES:

Disengage centering, monitor Only a simple safety-of-flight disengage valve test is performed. 7

status, and channel comparisons are not presently mechanized due to memory limit. Surface position indicator valid signal is intermittent due to a design deficiency. Only gross failures can be detected due to the inaccuracy of hydraulic pressure transducers. ۰. 4

 $\label{eq:TABLE IX} \mbox{B-1 CITS Test for the Hydraulic Subsystem}$

TESTS		L.	MIT				С	
(C = Comparison Tests) SUBSYSTEM	Nitrogen Head Pressure	Hydraulic Reservoir	Hydraulic System Pressure	Fluid Probe Test	Fluid Temperature Test	Pressure SCDU	Quantity SCDU	Temperature SCDU
Hydraulics	S1	S1	S1	G	G	S1	G	G

NOTE:

1. The pressure tests for hydraulic power caused problems because vibration on the aircraft caused the pressure signals to exhibit excessive noise. Notch filters were added to reduce the noise from the sensor.

TABLE X

B-1 CITS Tests for Weapon Bay Door Drive and Rotary Launcher Drive Subsystems

Mormal System Command Test Alternate System Command Test Alternate System Command Test Blectrical Power Test Brooder Status Test Brocder Status Test Command Status Test Alternatic Motor Status Test Alternatic Motor Status Test Whydraulic Motor Status Test No Systems Mode Test No Ground Test					OMP/	COMPARISON	S				Ħ	L
G G G P1 G G S S	End-to-end tests; Limit tests)	Normal System Command Test	Alternate System Command Test	Electrical Power Test	Position Command Test	Encoder Status Test	Electrical & Mech Shop Test	Solenoid Status Test	Hydraulic Motor Status Test	Systems Mode Test	Sectional Test	Hydraulic Power Test
G G P1 G G G S S	Bay Door Drive	9	9									
	totary Launcher Drive			G		P1	G	G	G	S	S	G

NOTES:

 Hardware deficiency; encoder status is momentary, not continuous.

END

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